Petrol output covers about 65% of average seasonal demand, and the shortfall series stops discriminating between states at roughly the point where the state starts rationing. What replaces it here is a ladder of administrative responses, calibrated once against a magnitude and then read as rungs.
The natural indicator is the shortfall: −35%, against a threshold of −20%, or −25%, or whatever the analyst picks. Three things are wrong with it, whether the analyst notices or not: 1) the threshold has no defensible origin, since any number invites the question of why it is not five points lower and the only answer is the analyst’s judgement, which is a weak thing to put underneath the reading; 2) the scale saturates, since once the shortfall is past the threshold the indicator has said everything it can say, while the interesting movement happens afterwards — a state facing a 35% gap does things it was not doing at 20%, and those things are the reading; 3) the series is soft exactly where it matters, since output, demand and coverage are estimates with wide intervals, published by parties with an interest in them, and revisable.
A regional decree either exists or it does not, and it carries a date. The administrative record is harder than the quantitative one.
Seven rungs, each defined by an action taken by an authority or a seller, each observable from a decree or from a notice taped to a pump. Zones attach to rungs, not to percentages.
| Rung | Trigger | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Exports free, no shortage | passed |
| 1 | Export ban or quota | passed |
| 2 | Cap on the volume of a single fill in individual regions | passed |
| 3 | Fuel quality requirements lowered: the bill passes to the car owner as engine wear | passed, deepened |
| 4 | Fill restrictions in 30+ regions and/or covering more than 50 million people | current |
| 5 | Restriction on frequency of access: odd–even by plate, one fill a day, persistent queues in the two capitals | partly passed |
| 6 | Personalised volume limit per period, with identification of the buyer | |
| 7 | Not on open sale; supply only to protected categories | partly passed |
The rungs are not four variants of one thing called “rationing”. Rungs 2 and 4 cap the volume of a single purchase and the buyer comes back in the evening; rung 5 caps the frequency of access, which is a refusal to sell to a particular person on a particular day; rung 6 introduces personalised accounting and converts petrol from a good into an allocated resource = the buyer stops being a customer and becomes a recipient. Collapse the four into one category and the only movement worth watching disappears.
Rung 4 was reached in June 2026, on the first wave of strikes, at a fall in domestic supply of about 20%. That figure is recorded as the point at which the scale was calibrated: a date and an observed correspondence, not a judgement. Thus “why 20 and not 15” has an answer that does not belong to the analyst — 20 is where the state acted.
Two consequences. The current state is worse than the calibration point — coverage of about 65% of seasonal demand, a gap near 35% — and the scale keeps working through that deterioration, since rungs 5, 6 and 7 lie above it. And the calibration is checkable by anyone: it fails if the correspondence between shortfall and response does not hold on the next episode.
In Lipetsk and Astrakhan oblasts the restriction was lifted and then reimposed; in Volgograd, a city of over a million, two majors lifted their caps on 28 July 2026 and by 1 August the caps were back, one of them at 40 litres a transaction; in Mordovia the regime paused for a day on 1 August and was restored on 2 August.
An attempt to relieve the balance was made and it did not hold = the restriction comes off not by decision but only when the cause is removed, and the cause has not been removed.
A percentage indicator cannot record this at all: the shortfall series shows a small wobble, or nothing. The ladder records a failed relief — precisely the observation that would have refuted the panel’s standing claim had it held — and logs it as a candidate that did not materialise.
The scale also names the payer at each rung, which a shortfall figure never does. Rung 3 is the clearest case: permitting fuel of a lower emissions class closes the shortage by quality instead of by volume, and the bill goes to the car owner in engine wear = a tacit tax on continuing the war, collected in repairs rather than in roubles. Introduced by resolution No. 819 of 2 July 2026 and widened on 5 August; widening it five weeks later means the first wave solved nothing.
Diesel demand is compressed by decision, through administered consumers: the shortage is absorbed by prioritising deliveries by category and stays invisible. Petrol demand is atomised across millions of buyers who cannot be prioritised quietly, thus rationing petrol is a public demonstration of incapacity rather than a regulatory measure. The export cushion runs on the same axis — 10–15% of output for petrol against about 50% for diesel — so an export ban buys weeks on one and quarters on the other.
Rule: pick the good whose shortage the state cannot allocate out of sight. An indicator built on the administered good measures the administration, not the shortage.
Nothing here is specific to fuel, or to Russia. It applies wherever the quantitative series is soft, the administrative record is hard, and the state has an interest in the difference.
Three failure modes, in order of how often they appear.
The state chooses what it announces. It does not choose what it has to do at the pump, and that is the only part worth measuring.