

Limits of Russian endurance in a war of attrition

WHO BEARS THE COST · SNAPSHOT RELEASE

Data as of 21 Aug 2026 Budget execution Jan–Aug 2026 NWF as of 1 Aug 2026 As of 12 Sep 2026: widgets 1.1, 2.1, 2.2 updated · 2.6 added

CONVERSION MECHANISMS SPENT

7
of 12 known

Fully or partly drawn on. Partial counts where the mechanism was prepared and politically spent. The list and the rules are under [Conversion](#).

CONSOLIDATED STATE CLAIM (CSC)

40%
of federal budget revenue

Numerator ₹16.1 trn; working range 13.1–18.9. Denominator: federal budget revenue under the 2026 budget law, ₹40,283.3 bn¹ — 16.1 / 40.283 = 39.97%. The volume of ruble obligations that must be funded, refinanced or placed under compulsion over the year for the federal centre, the regions, the funds, systemic state companies, the defence industry and the social envelope not to start missing payments.

AGAINST THE NATIONAL DEFENCE LINE (₹12.9 TRN)

124%

NEW MONEY

₹11.9 trn

REFINANCING

₹4.3 trn

The panel does not name the level at which the war stops, and it does not forecast near-term collapse. It names how many moves are left on each ladder, who pays for the next one and what the previous ones cost; the judgment of sufficiency — how deep a manifestation it would take for the regime to change its decision — the panel passes to the reader and does not make on their behalf. The regime retains conversion mechanisms, including sales of gold from the reserves, but the speed of conversion is limited, and the accelerating pace required to close a widening gap is itself a terminal signal. Each further rung carries greater risk for the regime and more irreversible consequences. And all of this is happening in a war against a comparably capable opponent, where Ukrainian and European pressure responds to signs of weakness. **The point of breakdown or halt therefore does not require the reserves to be exhausted.**

– BREAKDOWN – COMPOSITION OF THE CLAIM, ASYMMETRY, BUDGET EXECUTION

Why the CSC and not the federal GFN. GFN — gross financing need — measures the need of a single legal entity, whereas the obligations are carried by a system, and it is built on the logic of budget classification, whereas the binding constraint lies in the logic of the financial system’s balance sheet. It gives a reassuring answer — 20–25% of revenue — to the wrong question. The federal GFN is retained as a component: ₹8.1–10.1 trn, taken at 9.5. **The CSC — the consolidated state claim — counts the same thing but across everyone the state is ultimately answerable for: the federal budget, the regions, the funds, state companies, the defence industry. Legally these are different entities; in fact the bill is one. The regime cannot let Russian Railways or a defence plant go bankrupt, so the money will have to be found regardless — and found in the same rubles as everything else.**

The asymmetry of uncertainty points upward. There is one risk of overstatement — double counting of the defence industry rollover, up to ₹0.5 trn. There are three risks of understatement, each larger: external corporate debt of \$313 bn with 2026 redemptions on the order of \$30–40 bn, project finance for developers, and regional state and municipal enterprises. **The figure of ₹16.1 trn is taken as the working value, but the balance of unaccounted risks is asymmetric upward:** one risk of overstatement, bounded at ₹0.5 trn, against three risks of understatement, each larger. The range of ₹13.1–18.9 trn stands, but within it the probability is shifted toward the upper half.

A need of ₹16 trn does not in itself look unmanageable. What makes it unmanageable is that three of the six sources are already exhausted or blocked: the cash balance, on the current trend, runs out in December–January; the NWF is blocked by the government’s own fiscal rule; and the OFZ market has been closed since 20 July. What remains is rollover, bank credit and issuance — and the first two run into the same balance sheet.



LAYER OF THE CLAIM	SIZE, ₪ TRN	NATURE AND CHANNEL
Federal budget deficit	6.5–8.5 · taken at 7.9	New money. January–July already 6.455 — about 170% of the annual plan
OFZ redemptions	1.34	Refinancing. Issues 26219 (16 Sep) and 26226 (7 Oct), both fixed-coupon
External redemptions	0.22	Refinancing unavailable: the external market is closed entirely
Federal GFN, total	8.1–10.1 · taken at 9.5	20–25% of federal budget revenue
Regional deficits after transfers	2.00–2.40 · taken at 2.20	New money. Regional debt of ₪3.5 trn is a 15-year record
Regions: refinancing of market and bank debt	0.30–0.45 · taken at 0.35	Refinancing. The channel is banks and budget loans
The health insurance fund and cash gaps outside the transfer	0.05–0.20 · taken at 0.10	New money. The transfer to the Social Fund (about 2.0) is a layer of the stack rather than an addend: it is already contained in federal expenditure
Russian Railways: rollover of short-term debt	0.80–1.50 · taken at 1.10	Refinancing. Channels: tariff → the consumer · recapitalisation → the budget · restructuring → the banks
Russian Railways: net increase	0.20–0.40 · taken at 0.30	New money
Defence industry: rollover and working capital beyond advances	0.80–1.40 · taken at 1.00	Refinancing. The figure is not directly observable — see the separate breakdown below
Defence industry: net increase	0.30–0.70 · taken at 0.50	New money
Avtodor, GTLK, coal, agriculture, fuel retail	0.30–0.70 · taken at 0.50	Mixed. Sectoral circuits with a de facto state guarantee
Banking circuit: absorption of losses and recapitalisation	0.10–0.60 · taken at 0.30	New money. Arises when credit risk in the state perimeter materialises
Emergency circuit: off-budget support	0.15–0.50 · taken at 0.30	New money. Unplanned obligations of the year
CSC, total	13.1–18.9 · taken at 16.1	40% of federal budget revenue

The defence industry rollover — how the figure was obtained. Bank debt of defence enterprises is published neither in aggregate nor by issuer. The estimate rests on the relation between profitability and the cost of debt: at a state defence order contract margin of about 2%² and borrowing costs of 16–22%, the principal is not amortised out of operations. The rollover coefficient is taken at the lower bound of the defensible range — 0.75; the lower bound was chosen deliberately, since it yields a smaller estimate and a smaller consolidated claim. **A testable implication:** a rollover of ₪1.0 trn at a coefficient of 0.75 implies principal falling due in 2026 of about ₪1.33 trn; at a coefficient of 0.95 it implies about ₪1.05 trn. The relation is inverse, and this is not a typo: if a smaller share of maturing principal is rolled, the principal must be larger to produce the same rollover volume. What is published is precisely this: not an estimate that cannot be checked, but a figure that can be refuted. This is the most concealed and most censored part of Russian government reporting, and this parameter of the panel is open to correction if convincing arguments are found or supplied.

A rollover is not free; its price is somebody's refusal. Refinancing the obligations of the state perimeter requires no new money. It requires that existing money not be withdrawn — and therefore that somebody else not receive it. The payer here is the non-systemic borrower, and the bill is presented as a refusal of credit rather than as a decision. Observable markers: rising bankruptcies and liquidations of legal entities, a slowdown in housing completions, provisioning up ₪77 bn (+38%) in June. Direct confirmation: about half the growth of the corporate portfolio in June 2026 went to loans to the largest state companies.

Budget execution, January–July 2026. Revenue ₪22,112 bn · expenditure ₪28,567 bn · deficit ₪6,455 bn³ — about 170% of the annual plan in seven months. Hydrocarbon revenue was ₪4,594.7 bn against a base level of ₪4,467 bn⁴: a fourth month above the base, which is what blocks any drawdown of the NWF.

The year's bill and what covers it. Two bars on the same scale: the claim above, and below it everything already found or still findable against it.



The inflation channel — the price of the ruble



Every other constraint can be lifted by a decision: borrow, cut, seize, print. Each of those decisions has a payer, and for most of them the payer is the same one — the holder of rubles. What binds is not that all roads lead to inflation: part of 2026 inflation is non-monetary in origin. What binds is that **the bill on every road is presented to the same person, and it cannot be presented twice**. The constraint sits at the end of the bridge rather than in the masthead because it is what all the links run into at once.

– BRIDGE BREAKDOWN

Links one, three and four are in use at the same time; link two is in question. Over Jan–Jul, Treasury balances covered 51% of the need, the market 42% and the NWF 7% — but the market’s 42% was raised before 20 July, and the 2 September placement went through link three, not link two. The movement from left to right is itself the answer to "who pays": each successive link has a payer closer to those the regime rests on.

Conversion is the lifting of a material constraint by a decision for which the regime pays a political price: print money, place debt under compulsion, cut spending, seize an asset. Each link further to the right is a deeper conversion with a more sensitive payer. The first link is included because spending down an accumulated cash balance is not a conversion at all: **it has no payer**. It is finite — the operating floor is calibrated on the December cycles of 2024 and 2025 at ₺2.0–3.0 trn, against a balance of about ₺5.8 trn on 12 Sep 2026.

At a glance at a glance

ID	INDICATOR	SCALE	VALUE
TIER 1			
1.1	Funding gap % of the need closed outside the market · Jan-Jul 2026	 red zone	58 %
1.2	M2 and the monetisation signature % M2 growth year on year · ₺134.85 trn	 gap 1.7–4.4 pp	13.3 %
1.3	Petrol: the administrative response ladder rung of fuel rationing	 red zone in 1 move	4 of 7
1.4	Observed inflation % observed, July 2026	 red zone in 2.9	15.1 %
TIER 2			



A red zone does not mean the balance is going uncovered. It means the balance is being covered by conversion — by moving the bill onto a payer who, on the authorities’ calculation, will not respond in a way dangerous to the regime until some threshold. The colour describes an increasingly heavy method of covering, not the unbearability of the position. The panel should not be read as a forecast that the war stops because the budget runs out of money: it stops when the regime is left with no conversion of available resources into the continuation of the war that it finds acceptable.

What changed

what changed

first public release · data update of 12 Sep 2026

– UPDATE OF 12 SEP 2026. THE OFZ MARKET REOPENED · TREASURY BALANCE ₺5.8 TRN, NOT 3.8 · THE FLOATER PORTFOLIO UP ₺1 TRN · A GOLD WIDGET ADDED

The panel’s anchor date is 21 Aug 2026. Since then three widgets have been recomputed — [1.1](#), [2.1](#), [2.2](#) — and a new one added, [2.6](#). Only what changes the reading is listed; refinements that alter neither a zone nor a conclusion are not.

WIDGET	IN THE RELEASE OF 21 AUG	AS OF 12 SEP
1.1	OFZ market closed since 20 Jul. Treasury cash balance about ₺3.8 trn at a drawdown of ₺0.5 trn a month	The market reopened on 2 Sep: the entire 29031 floater issue of ₺1 trn at par was placed in a single session, proceeds ₺938.9 bn. The Treasury balance is about ₺5.8 trn, not 3.8: August produced not a drawdown but a surplus of about ₺660 bn. The earlier linear estimate was wrong, and the error runs both ways. Confidence on the balance remains low: the series is closed and the September pace is an assumption
2.1	A closed market creates no new coupon obligations. Debt-service sensitivity ₺107 bn per percentage point of the key rate	The claim stopped being true on 2 Sep. The floating-rate OFZ portfolio grew from roughly ₺10.7 to 11.7 trn, its share from 33% to about 35%, and sensitivity to about ₺117 bn per percentage point . The first coupon falls on 29 Oct 2026: the improvement achieved by closing the market has begun to unwind
2.2	The headline quantity is the number of days without a completed auction	The day counter is back to zero and is no longer the headline: the channel reopened, and the counter stopped measuring what it was set up to measure. What is measured is concentration — 99% of quarterly borrowing in a single session out of fourteen auction days, against a historical maximum of the order of 50-60%
2.6	Gold was not tracked as a separate widget	A new widget. The spending of the physical stock is given its own scale: over the whole of 2025, 6 t were sold — negligible, but the first annual reduction of the stock in twenty years; over January-July 2026, 49.7 t. In Q2 the Bank of Russia was the only sizeable seller among central banks (21.77 t against 4.23 t for Turkey) in a quarter when the official sector bought a record 289 t. The zone is green and stays green: the point of the widget is not the exhaustion of the stock but that the ceiling of this mechanism is set by outside players rather than by the regime

– MOVEMENT SINCE THE WINDOW OPENED: OFZ MARKET 63 DAYS WITHOUT A PLACEMENT • TREASURY ₺8.0 → 5.8 TRN • KEY RATE 14.00% • 24 OF 33 REFINERIES AFFECTED • 7 OF 12 MECHANISMS SPENT

This is the first public release, and there is nothing to compare it with. From the next release onward this section will carry the difference against the previous one: which rungs were passed, which zones changed, which series stopped being published. For now it shows movement since the observation window opened on 1 Jan 2026.

WHAT	AT 1 JAN 2026	NOW
OFZ market	working	63 days without a completed placement — the last was 1 Jul, the next 2 Sep 2026; auctions stopped on 20 Jul, and the channel reopened in a single session of ₺1 trn
Treasury cash balance	₺8.0 trn	about ₺5.8 trn estimated at 12 Sep against an operating range of ₺2.0–3.0 trn; the series is closed and confidence is low
Key rate	16.00% ⁵	14.00% — down 2.00 pp over the year, a fifth consecutive cut against the CBR's own raised inflation forecast
Real rate for the depositor	—	–2.2 pp , against +8.1 pp for the key rate deflated by the Rosstat index: a gap of 10.3 pp
Refining	—	24 of 33 major refineries affected, including all ten largest by installed capacity; strikes at 2,500 km from the border
Export infrastructure	—	force majeure declared on contracts; several Novorossiysk terminals halted; strikes on Baltic ports
Conversion mechanisms	—	7 of 12 known ones spent

WHAT	AT 1 JAN 2026	NOW
Log of relieved balances	opened empty	still empty

Checkable dates ahead what to watch next

- 11 SEP - CBR BOARD · 20 SEP - ELECTIONS · 1 OCT - PAY INDEXATION AND THE WINTER CIRCUIT · 31 OCT - CONTROL DATE ON AUCTIONS

Each event with its reading declared in advance. The full calendar is below, under Calendar.

DATE	EVENT	WHAT IT WILL MEAN
11 Sep 2026	Board meeting of the Bank of Russia	Another cut with InFOM above 15% keeps the depositor's real rate negative and confirms class B of the evidence tree in widget 1.2, M2 and the monetisation signature
20 Sep 2026	State Duma elections	Close the window used to explain the deferral of rungs on the expenditure ladder. After them — allowing a few weeks for the chamber to convene and decisions to pass — the deferral loses its explanation
late September	Q4 borrowing plan	Either an admission that the market is closed, or a declared plan that will have to be met with floaters
1 Oct 2026	4% indexation of military pay	Against observed inflation of 15.1%, an unannounced passage of a rung on the expenditure ladder. The winter circuit of widget M.3 activates on the same date
31 Oct 2026	Control date on the resumption of auctions	A check on the standing forecast. No resumption, with the plan under 50% fulfilled, keeps widget 1.1 in the red zone
Dec-Jan	Exhaustion of the Treasury cash balance — a linear projection of the current rate	The date moves closer on any acceleration of spending: mobilisation payments, a shortfall in tax receipts, emergency measures, an acceleration of monetary financing. It moves further out only if placements resume or the fiscal rule is suspended. The last of the three sources in use closes; what remains is rollover, bank credit and issuance

Tier 1 — quantities that settle the argument on their own tier 1 4 widgets

Tier 1 is entirely fiscal, monetary and physical. Military quantities are placed in a separate group deliberately.


1.1

Funding gap

How much money has to be found outside the market — and which link it is passing through now

58 % of the need closed outside the market · Jan-Jul 2026

The numerator is assembled from two independently published quantities: the proceeds of every completed auction and the liquid part of the NWF. The denominator is the deficit from monthly budget execution. A third quantity, the Treasury cash balance, does not enter the calculation directly: it comes out by subtraction, as the part of the deficit the first two did not cover. It need not be observed directly — which is why the closure of Treasury balance reporting does not break the construction. There is exactly one way to fake the figure: actually borrow more on the market.



January-July 2026: 58% of the need closed outside the market — treasury balances 51% and the NWF 7%; the market 42%. The red zone begins above 50%.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

RESIDUAL CAPACITY OF THE NON-MARKET CIRCUIT

Cash balances — about ₹5.8 trn estimated at 12 Sep against an operating floor of 2.0-3.0; extractable over a year 2.8-3.8 trn, confidence low. **NWF, yuan** — CNY 189.7 bn at 1 Aug, blocked by the fiscal rule in 2026. **NWF, gold** — 141.2 t at 1 Aug against 160.2 at 1 Jan; sits inside the Bank of Russia stock and forms no separate capacity. **Bank of Russia gold, total** — 2,277 t at 1 Aug, ₹1.18-2.32 trn in cash unimpeded through the domestic channel at 100-200 t and a maximum of 3.40 trn at 300 t, with the balance-sheet revaluation of the remainder held separately: see [widget 2.6](#)

TOTAL OF THE NON-MARKET CIRCUIT

The whole non-market circuit in painless mode yields ₹2.7-4.1 trn against a Consolidated State Claim of 16.1 trn, of which the federal budget is 7.1-9.0 trn

BALANCES RECOMPUTED, REVISION 2 OF 12 SEP

The earlier estimate — ₹0.5 trn a month of drawdown, a balance of about 3.8 trn — is wrong, and the error runs both ways. August produced not a drawdown but a surplus of about ₹660 bn: the January-July deficit was ₹6,455 bn, the January-August deficit ₹5,795 bn³. The cause was ₹691 bn of state company dividends and a fall in state procurement to ₹550 bn against a monthly average of 1.2 trn. The balance at 1 Sep was therefore about ₹5.16 trn, not below 4.5. Add ₹938.9 bn brought in by the 2 Sep auction, subtract an estimated ₹0.3 trn of spending over the first twelve

1.2

M2 and the monetisation signature

The closing monetary aggregate: what the gap in 1.1 is actually being closed with


13.3 % M2 growth year on year · ₹134.85 trn

M2 captures the result of repo operations and other schemes that are formally not issuance, and therefore aggregates all of them. The zone is set not by this number but by the evidence tree: in the current regime a quantitative aggregate does not determine the zone.

READING REGIME — DETERMINED BY THE PANEL'S OBSERVED QUANTITIES

I Anchored InFOM below 14% AND the key rate net of inflation ≥ 0	The zone is set by the scale boundaries above
II Transitional InFOM $\geq 14\%$ OR the key rate net of inflation below 0	The zone is set by observed action and revealed preference — classes A and B, see the evidence tree below
III Open monetisation Direct purchase of OFZ by the Bank of Russia (rung 5+ of the refinancing ladder)	The zone is set by the rate of M2 growth: quantitative aggregates return as a measure of the speed of printing

The regime is determined by quantities already on the panel and requires no judgment. The 14% boundary is not arbitrary: it is the level at which, in Russian experience, expectations ceased to be anchored — observed in spring 2022. The current regime is II: InFOM 15.1%, key rate net of inflation -0.7 to -1.1 pp.



The scale shows not M2 but the spread: M2 growth year on year minus nominal GDP growth year on year, i.e. $13.3\% - (9-11.6\%) = 1.7-4.4$ pp. The grey band is a range because the denominator is reconstructed. For reference only. In regime II it does not set the zone: the denominator contains an export price component and moves with the oil price rather than with monetary policy.

Regime II · A: 1 of 2, one more prepared and not fired · B: 2 of 2 → orange

– EVIDENCE TREE AND THE READING RULE

A · DIRECT INSTITUTIONAL

- ✓ CBR refinancing against state collateral
₹6.6 trn on 14 Aug 2026 against ₹3.637 trn at end-2025 — up 81% in seven and a half months; a structural liquidity deficit of ₹2.7 trn⁶, the highest since March 2022

- ⓘ Compulsory absorption of sovereign debt
the channel is prepared and has not fired: on 23 Jul 2026 floating-rate OFZ 29030 and 29031 were registered for ₹1.5 trn⁷ and admitted to the top listing tier on 28 Jul — against the Finance

	days of September. The total at 12 Sep is about ₺5.8 trn, of which 2.8-3.8 trn is extractable above the operating floor. Confidence is low: the series is closed, the September pace is an assumption, and all three components after 1 Aug are reconstruction
THE 2 SEP FLOATER, ₺0.93 TRN, IS NOT COUNTED INTO NON-MARKET SOURCES	The placement of 29031 brought the budget ₺938.9 bn of proceeds. That figure is not included in the share closed outside the market: the funding source of the buyers is not established, and “not established” does not read as “market”. The line is held separately until the share of systemically important banks at September auctions is published, at the end of October 2026. Above 60% means banks bought; around 20% means the non-bank circuit bought, and the monetisation reading for this episode is withdrawn
NWF GOLD DOES NOT ADD TO BANK OF RUSSIA GOLD	The 141.2 t of the NWF sit inside the 2,277 t of reserves: an accounting marker within a single stock, not a second stock. The line is needed separately for a different reason — selling 100 t out of the NWF takes the NWF itself into the yellow zone on its own scale while leaving the total Bank of Russia stock in the green. The two scales diverge, and the divergence is informative
ANNUAL NET BORROWING PLAN	₺4.17 trn
NET SEQUESTRATION CAPACITY	₺1.5-2.5 trn annualised — 9-16% of the need. Only part of it is available inside 2026: the decision cannot be taken before October, one quarter remains to year-end, and the in-year effect is ₺0.4-0.6 trn, under 5% of the need. The rest is a 2027 effect, not a source of closing the current gap

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

The claim that a closed market creates no new coupon obligations stopped being true on 2 September 2026. The entire 29031 floater issue of ₺1 trn was placed at par: the floating-rate OFZ portfolio grew from roughly ₺10.7 to 11.7 trn, its share from 33% to about 35%, and the sensitivity of debt service to the key rate from ₺107 to about ₺117 bn per percentage point. The first coupon falls on 29 October 2026. The improvement in the debt-service indicator achieved by closing the market has ended and has begun to unwind. Both quantities are derived from the ratio in [2.1](#) and are to be recomputed against primary data on the floating-rate portfolio.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Auctions resume with the quarterly plan 70% fulfilled or better [activated 2 Sep 2026, check 30 Sep 2026 — auctions resumed, the Q3 plan is 62% fulfilled] · external borrowing that clears the thresholds in 6.2 · oil and gas revenue up by ₺4 trn or more annualised · the

Ministry’s own target of cutting the floater share to 25–30%. No placement followed: the 29028 auction failed

- Refinancing is rationed rather than supplied on demand
18 Aug 2026: ₺4.5 trn supplied at the weekly repo auction against demand of ₺6.5 trn — demand exceeded the limit by 44%. **A single observation.** The weekly repo limit is set by the CBR’s liquidity forecast rather than by a decision to refuse, and excess demand has occurred in calm periods too. The marker enters the zone reading rule only after three consecutive observations, and until then does not count toward ‘A: 1 of 2’;

B · PRICE AND BEHAVIOURAL

- ✓ The real rate for the depositor is negative
–2.2 pp: the average maximum rate at the top ten banks is 12.89%⁸ (first ten days of August 2026) against observed InFOM inflation of 15.1%⁹. The rate was cut five times against the CBR’s own raised inflation forecast. The policy rate meanwhile is positive — +8.1 pp on the Rosstat CPI; both figures are correct and refer to different agents, see 1.4
- ✓ Disintermediation of deposits
₺643.4 bn moved into cash in July; the household term-deposit share of M2 is 34.0%¹⁰, falling 0.3 pp a month; the cash-minus-M2 gap is 5.3 pp

C · QUANTITATIVE AGGREGATES

- ✗ Acceleration of M2, month on month
0.9–1.2% against a threshold above 1.5%. Annualised that is 11–15% against the current 13.3% year on year: the figures are close but measure different things — the widget’s headline number is the level over a year, this line is the rate of the last month
- M2 spread year on year to nominal GDP — the quantity on the widget’s scale
1.7–4.4 pp on the reconstructed denominator; its upper bound reaches into the orange zone, but the denominator is contaminated

D · CONTROL

- ✗ Sterilising operations by the CBR
the volume is observable and is a control quantity when assessing the issuance effect — not collected
- Share of OFZ in the repo collateral pool
rising; a discriminator for the purpose of refinancing — series not collected

Monetisation is not announced — it is assembled from markers. The markers are sorted into four classes, and the classes are not equal: the weight of a class depends on the regime the monetary system is in. The regime is determined not by the author’s opinion but by two observable quantities — the real rate for the depositor and the state of the government debt market.

CLASS	WHAT IT IS	WHY ITS WEIGHT CHANGES
A · Direct institutional	Actions the state itself takes: refinancing against state collateral, compulsory absorption of debt	Observed action. The strongest class in any regime: the action has been taken and can be undone only by another action

share of the need closed outside the market falls below 35% in any quarter while the quarterly plan is at least 85% fulfilled.

CONF. H ON AUCTION PROCEEDS AND THE LIQUID PART OF THE NWF · L ON CASH BALANCES

CONSTRAINT

DIRECTION	A rising share = deterioration
FREQUENCY	Weekly on placements, monthly on budget execution
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	30 Sep 2026 — quarterly plan outcome and falsifier check · ~9-10 Oct 2026 — nine-month execution
SOURCE	Russian Finance Ministry: borrowing plan, auction results, monthly execution
OBSERVATION DATE	12 Sep 2026

– BREAKDOWN

Chronology. 26 June 2026 — a law granted the right to borrow above the debt ceiling and to finance the deficit from single treasury account balances. 20 July 2026 — auctions stopped. No later than 10 August 2026 — it was discovered that the Treasury had closed publication of single treasury account balances; the actual date of removal is not established. 2 September 2026 — the entire 29031 issue of ₺1 trn was placed in a single session. The four events are set side by side as a chronology, not as a chain of causes: the panel does not claim that daily balance reporting was closed in order to make the placement possible, and it imputes no intent to any decision. Dates and primary references are published; the reader judges the connection.

Lower intensity does not put the war into a cheap mode. By outcome Russia is already fighting with results no better than it would obtain at reduced intensity: advance is low, and lower intensity would have produced higher Ukrainian effectiveness. Costs have not fallen with it. Spending divides into what varies with tempo — munitions, equipment, replacement of losses — and what is close to fixed: pay for the standing force, payments to the families of the dead as an accumulated obligation, debt service, maintenance of industry. Cutting tempo cuts the first group and barely touches the second.

Why the NWF is not a source. The mechanism for realising the liquid part is a sale of gold and currency to the central bank for roubles, that is the creation of roubles against the receipt of an asset. Selling the same asset externally would work differently: currency would come in, selling it on the market would yield roubles from buyers, the money supply would not grow and the exchange rate would get support. The worse of the two ways of spending the same reserve has been chosen. In 2026 the NWF is in any case not being drawn down: oil and gas revenue has been above the base level for a fourth month, and the fiscal rule blocks withdrawal.

WORKING TOWARD DETERIORATION

- The market reopened on 2 September 2026: the entire 29031 issue of ₺1 trn was placed in a single session

WORKING TOWARD IMPROVEMENT

- The Hormuz premium is not fully unwound: the crisis holds oil back from falling further and the risk of escalation

CLASS	WHAT IT IS	WHY ITS WEIGHT CHANGES
B · Price and behavioural	The payer’s revealed preference: the real rate for the depositor, disintermediation of deposits	The payer bears a cost and therefore cannot lie. In regime II it carries the same weight as A
C · Quantitative aggregates	M2 growth, the spread to nominal GDP	Demoted to confirmatory. The denominator is contaminated: inflation and the oil price raise nominal GDP, the spread improves, and the monetary picture does not change. An aggregate that improves when things get worse cannot set a zone
D · Control	Sterilising operations by the CBR, the share of government debt in the repo collateral pool	Discriminators rather than markers: they answer what the observed thing is, not whether it is observed. They set no zone in any regime

Three reading regimes. Anchored: inflation expectations are stable, the real rate is positive, the debt market works — the zone is set by class C aggregates, because in a stable system growth of the money supply is itself the signal. Transitional: expectations have drifted, the market works intermittently — weight is distributed. Open monetisation: the real rate for the depositor is negative, the market is closed — the zone is set by A and B, and C becomes confirmatory, because in an unstable system the aggregate stops discriminating between states.

The current regime is II, transitional to open monetisation. Reading rule: orange is declared when at least two markers across classes A and B are met, of which at least one is from class A. Red requires both class A markers met in full. At B: 1 of 2 the zone would be yellow.

The sign · denotes partial passage: the observable is recorded in a limited or unacknowledged form. A mechanism prepared and not fired counts as partial — it has already been spent as a political resource.

Orange by classes A and C of the evidence tree: non-routine substitution is required. The quantitative half is demoted to confirmatory in regime II.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

DIRECTION OF MARKER A2	The floating-rate OFZ share ran 43% (end-2024) → 38% (end-2025) → 35% (April) → 33% (July 2026) → about 35% after the placement of 29031, ₺1 trn, on 2 September 2026. The July turning point proved to last one month, and the turn went the other way: compulsory absorption, which had been unwinding since 2024, is building again. The marker is not static — it has a sign, and the sign has returned to what it was
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- The price concession against November 2025 was 1.3 pp
- The quarterly plan was 62% fulfilled after a failed July and August
- Signing bonuses at an all-time high and still rising
- A large price premium on hydrocarbons from the shock of the start of the war in Iran — a one-off, and already partly unwound as the market adapted
- Rescue of private logistics after the strikes
- Effective strikes on Novorossiysk and on shipping in the Azov and Black Seas: a significant deterioration in oil and grain exports
- Indexation of defence contracts at 13–15% inflation, if physical procurement volumes are to be held
- Contract payments concentrated at the end of the year
- Fiscal consolidation measures deferred indefinitely
- Refineries knocked out of service require spending on imported petrol and jet fuel: the price, transport and distribution of imported fuel are probably far more expensive than the saving on a reduced damper, so not paying the damper produces not a saving but a larger net outlay (confidence L, series not collected)
- The possible US Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act: passed the Senate on 7 Aug 2026 and now in the House; it would allow tariffs of up to 100% against the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas, including China, India and Turkey
- Pipeline gas exports to the EU ended on 17 June 2026 under short-term contracts, with LNG exports to the EU to stop entirely from 1 January 2027, against a steadily expanding list of sanctioned tankers: the loss of the

persists, though the March–April 2026 level is very unlikely — the market has adapted, a channel of transponder-off tankers with transfers off Oman has formed, and the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani pact has effectively removed Saudi facilities from the set of Iranian targets

- Inflationary erosion of the accumulated ruble debt
- Five key-rate cuts since the start of the year: 14.00% against 21% at the peak reduces both the cost of servicing floaters and budget-subsidised lending programmes
- Plants shut down by strikes do not receive the damper

NOMINAL GDP, RECONSTRUCTED	9–11% (M). A GDP deflator of 8.5–11.5% by component plus real growth of 0 to +1%. Used as the denominator
NOMINAL GDP, PLANNED	The forecast embedded in the 2026 federal budget law: ₺235,067 bn ¹ . Published as a reference point and not used as a denominator: it is the plan of the party whose monetisation the widget measures
M2 TO GDP	49% (2021) → about 57–58% (2026, on reconstructed 2026 GDP)

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

The increase in banks' liabilities to the CBR is almost exactly equal to the outflow into cash: + ₺2.3 trn against ₺2.0–2.5 trn over one period. That is not a margin of safety but running to stand still: refinancing goes to replace rubles leaving the system and creates no resource for anyone else. The leak is accelerating — cash is growing 2.9% a month against 2.1% in June — and the balance-sheet capacity taken up by this replacement and by rolling over the state perimeter's debt cannot be used to lend to the rest of the economy. The payer is observable: provisioning up ₺77 bn (+38%) in June, and about half the growth of the corporate portfolio going to the largest state companies. The leak regime matters in its own right: ₺400–650 bn a month. The banking system is experiencing not a run but an even withdrawal, and that is the worse of the two regimes, because it has no moment at which a decision is taken. **The denominator is being refined:** relating the outflow to the deposit base (0.6–1.0% a month) understates it, since a term deposit cannot be moved instantly without loss to the depositor — it moves only as it matures. The correct measure is the share of maturing deposits not rolled over each month, provisionally 4–6% (confidence L); to be recomputed on the CBR's maturity-structure series. Until then the figure is not published as a percentage of the base, only in absolute terms. Falsifier: two consecutive months below ₺300 bn with the key rate unchanged.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

A reduction in banks' liabilities to the CBR together with a falling floater share in new placements · the real rate for the depositor moving into sustained positive territory · an end to the outflow into cash alongside a rising term-deposit share.

CONF. H ON M2 AND ON CLASS A · M ON RECONSTRUCTED GDP · L ON THE SPREAD

MECHANISM : DERIVED : REVERSIBLE AT A COST

DIRECTION	Deterioration in classes A and C = deterioration
FREQUENCY	Monthly, CBR, around the 20th
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	~20 Aug 2026
SOURCE	Bank of Russia: monetary aggregates, banking sector liquidity; Finance Ministry: register of issues
OBSERVATION DATE	1 Jul 2026

premium market in full, replaced only at Asian prices

– BREAKDOWN

Why the weight of evidence depends on the regime. The question of whether monetisation is under way has different diagnostics at different speeds. In an anchored regime quantitative aggregates are informative, and direct institutional markers are rare and therefore decisive. Under open monetisation the direct markers stop discriminating — all of them are met — and the aggregates return as a measure of speed. Between those two states lies a transitional regime in which the aggregates are contaminated and the direct markers are not yet sufficient for an unambiguous reading. This is the least studied area, and waiting for it to resolve itself buys time for the side that created it.

What exactly contaminates the denominator. The GDP deflator contains an export price component weighing roughly a quarter. In 2026 ruble export prices were falling, so the deflator comes out below consumer inflation entirely legitimately. The consequence: if oil falls, the deflator falls, nominal GDP falls, the spread widens and the widget reddens — with M2 unchanged. If oil jumps, the reverse. The denominator moves with the same exogenous variable that the panel treats elsewhere as market conditions. The direction of the bias is such that the scenario the panel expects would light up its own thesis through the denominator rather than through monetisation; the spread is therefore demoted to a confirmatory marker.

The class weights by regime are published and open to redefinition by the reader. An analyst who disagrees with the distribution of weights can set their own: the construction is open precisely because the transitional regime has no established methodology, and claiming otherwise would be false precision.

Petrol: administrative response ladder

An ordinal scale calibrated on observed actions rather than on a percentage shortfall

4 of 7 rung of fuel rationing

Rung 3 has been passed and deepened twice in five weeks. Rung 5 is partly passed: odd-even rules operate in seven regions. Petrol output covers about 65% of average seasonal demand (July 2026)¹¹.

RUNG	TRIGGER	ZONE	STATUS
0	Exports free, no shortage		passed
1	Export ban or quota		passed
2	Cap on the volume of a single fill in individual regions		passed
3	Lower fuel quality requirements: the bill is transferred to the car owner in engine wear		PASSED AND DEEPENED
4	Fill restrictions of any kind in 30+ regions and/or covering more than 50 million people		CURRENT
5	Restriction on frequency of access: odd-even by plate, one fill a day, persistent queues in Moscow or St Petersburg		partial
6	Personalised volume limit per period with identification of the buyer		
7	Not on open sale; supply only to protected categories		partial

One rung to the red zone. The step from 4 to 5 is the step from limiting the volume of a purchase to refusing to sell to a particular person on a particular day. Scenarios for the petrol crisis, with numbers and charts: fuel.incidence.world (<https://fuel.incidence.world/>).

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

RETAIL AVAILABILITY IS
CONTAMINATED AS AN INDICATOR FROM
1 SEP 2026

The permission to sell class K2-K5 fuel at retail from 1 September 2026 adds no refining: the mechanism works on a substitution margin. The share of filling stations with fuel in stock will rise with no increase in refining, and the series stops measuring what it measured. The compensating pairs that replace it: declared class on the forecourt sign against retail availability · the AI-92 to AI-95 spread at retail · naphtha exports from Baltic and Black Sea terminals. The estimate of an additional 350-600 kt a month without the return of AI-80 rests on three unverified quantities — the pyrolysis gasoline resource, MMA production capacity, and current petrol output — and

Observed inflation

What the holder of rubles bears

15.1 % observed, July 2026

The InFOM survey commissioned by the CBR measures perceived inflation rather than basket inflation, and is therefore not amenable to methodological management by the publishing body.



2.9 pp to the red zone. The boundary is calibrated on an observed action rather than on a figure: red is declared when pay, military allowances or pensions are indexed out of turn, above what has already been approved — that is, when the regime is forced to reopen its own budget decision. The level at which that happens is estimated at around 18% observed inflation: at 4% indexation, prices outrun pay by 13.5% over a year. At the current 15.1% the overrun is 10.7%, so roughly four fifths of the distance has been covered. The numeric mark is an estimate; what triggers is the observed action.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

ROSSTAT 5.91% — outside the triangulated deflator range and rejected

EXPECTED INFLATION 14.7%, up 2.3 pp in a month — the highest since spring 2022

AMONG RESPONDENTS WITH NO SAVINGS observed 17.1% · expected 16.5%

TWO REAL RATES, BOTH CORRECT The panel publishes both and does not choose between them: each is computed from the rate the relevant agent actually faces and the deflator that agent actually uses. The gap between them is itself the reading. — THE POLICY REAL RATE: the key rate of 14.00%¹³ minus the Rosstat CPI of 5.91%¹⁴ = +8.1 pp. On this measure Russian monetary policy is among the tightest in the world. — THE HOUSEHOLD REAL DEPOSIT RATE: the average maximum rate at the top ten banks, 12.89%⁸, minus observed InFOM inflation of 15.1%⁹ = -2.2 pp. Against expected InFOM inflation of 14.7% the figure is -1.8 pp. — THE GAP IS 10.3 pp. The CBR looks ultra-tight on the official price index while simultaneously failing to compensate the loss of purchasing power the population perceives

WHICH OF THE TWO SETS THE ZONE, AND WHY The depositor's rate. The panel measures who pays; a household does not see the key rate and takes no

	is published as an order of magnitude, not as a calculation
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE LAG IS 26 DAYS	Twenty-six days passed between permission to produce (resolution No. 976 of 5 August 2026) and permission to sell at retail (1 September 2026). This is a datable rung of administrative response and a more informative quantity than the permission itself: it measures the speed at which the circuit removes its own constraints under the pressure of a shortage
THE RETAIL K2-K5 RESOLUTION IS NOT YET ENTERED ON THE PANEL	It is known only from an Energy Ministry press release of 31 August 2026; the number and text of the act have not been published. The record will appear once it is published on pravo.gov.ru. Until then the rung is dated by the press release and marked as awaiting confirmation
RUNG 3 – A LOWER EMISSIONS CLASS, TWO WAVES IN FIVE WEEKS	2 Jul 2026, decree No. 819 ¹² : petrol with sulphur content up to 150 mg/kg was allowed into circulation — effectively Euro-3, withdrawn from circulation in 2016; valid to 31 Dec 2026, and diesel likewise. On 5 Aug 2026 decree No. 976 annulled the previous one and widened the permission to classes Euro-2, Euro-3 and Euro-4 with a methanol share of up to 3%, and Euro-5, extending the term to 1 Jul 2027. At the same time the right to blend with additives was granted to fuel depots and not only to refineries, and the permitted additive share was raised from 10% to 20%. The payer for this rung is named outright: the shortage is being closed by quality rather than by volume, and the bill passes to the car owner in the form of engine wear and repair. Deepening the measure five weeks after introducing it means the first wave did not solve the problem
RUNG 5 – WHERE IT OPERATES AS OF 21 AUG 2026	Seven regions: Nizhny Novgorod oblast (chain filling stations, with exceptions along the M-12 highway; regime confirmed 11 Aug) · Mordovia (a one-day pause on 1 Aug, regime restored 2 Aug) · Kursk oblast · Lipetsk oblast, reimposed from 13 Aug, plus a 30-litre cap · Orenburg oblast from 12 Aug, plus a 30-litre cap and diesel restrictions · Astrakhan oblast, reimposed from 18 Aug, plus a 40-litre cap and shortened station opening hours · Tambov oblast partially: lifted at independent stations from 14 Aug, retained at Rosneft and Lukoil
LIFTING AND REIMPOSITION IS A READING IN ITS OWN RIGHT	Lipetsk and Astrakhan oblasts: the restriction was lifted and then reimposed. Volgograd, a city of over a million: Lukoil and Gazprom lifted their caps on 28 Jul, and by 1 Aug restrictions had to be brought back, with

	decisions on it — it sees the deposit rate and the prices in the shop. The key rate must not be combined with perceived inflation: these are different agents. The policy rate is published as it stands, as the familiar figure, and does not enter the definition of the zone
THE PRICE OF A LIABILITY AGAINST THE PRICE OF POLICY	The spread of the top-ten average maximum deposit rate over the key rate: −1.12 pp in the first ten days of August 2026 (12.885 – 14.00), narrowing for five consecutive ten-day periods from −1.64 pp (second period of June). The deposit rate itself has risen for four consecutive periods from a low of 12.756% (third period of June), even though the key rate was cut twice over the same span — to 14.25% on 19 Jun and to 14.00% on 24 Jul. The turn began before the July cut rather than in response to it. The quantity is market-determined, published every ten days and not administered by methodology — unlike either real rate, each of which embeds a chosen deflator. Caveat: a comparable four-period rise already occurred in November–December 2025 (+0.31 pp, twice as strong) and then reversed; that episode is explained by the pre-New-Year deposit campaign, while the current one falls in summer. The CBR series begins in October 2024, so there is no summer 2024 analogue against which to test seasonality. Confidence M
THE PROJECT’S WORKING DEFLATOR	13–15%, triangulated from three independent sources: the InFOM survey, federal budget spending at constant physical volumes, and non-oil-and-gas revenue net of the VAT rate effect
– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION The average maximum top-ten rate on term deposits is 12.89% (first ten days of August 2026) against observed inflation of 15.1%: the real rate for the depositor is negative, at −2.2 pp. The payer is the depositor; the observable consequence is that the term-deposit share of M2 is falling by 0.3 pp a month. – WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS Observed InFOM inflation falls below 10% and the real key rate moves into sustained positive territory while the claim of around ₺16 trn persists. That would mean the bill was not paid by the holder of rubles. CONF. H PRICE REVERSIBLE AT A COST	
DIRECTION	A rise = deterioration
FREQUENCY	Monthly, InFOM for the CBR, around the 20th
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	~20 Aug 2026

	Lukoil capping at 40 litres per transaction. Mordovia: a pause on 1 Aug, restored on 2 Aug. An attempt to relieve the balance was made and did not hold — for the panel that is more informative than the number of regions: it shows that the restriction is lifted not by decision but only when the cause is removed, and the cause has not been removed. A candidate for the log of relieved balances that did not materialise
RUNG 5 — WHERE AND WHEN	Oryol oblast, 4 Jul 2026, the first region, lifted on 16 Jul while volume caps remained · Tambov oblast from 20 Jul at all filling stations · Orenburg oblast from 12 Aug at all stations after the strikes on Orsk on 11 Aug and Nizhnekamsk on 10 Aug, with a 15–30 litre cap and jerrycans banned outright
RUNG 7 — PARTIAL	The Orenburg operational headquarters justified the restriction by the need to keep ambulances, fire services, police and public transport running without interruption: prioritisation of protected categories is stated explicitly, though retail is not yet being displaced
THE -20% FIGURE IS A CALIBRATION POINT, NOT THE CURRENT STATE	The fall in domestic supply at which rung 4 was reached in June 2026, on the first wave of strikes. The figure is recorded as the date the scale was calibrated. The current state is worse: output covers about 65% of seasonal demand, i.e. a gap of roughly -35%
SEASONALITY	An amplitude of 10–15% from the summer peak to the winter trough (M). Rung 4 or higher persisting through December–February removes the seasonal explanation entirely
WHY PETROL AND NOT DIESEL	Diesel demand is compressed by decision, through administered consumers. Petrol demand is atomised: rationing petrol is a public demonstration of incapacity rather than a regulatory measure
THE EXPORT CUSHION	10–15% of output for petrol against about 50% for diesel (M): an export ban buys weeks, not quarters
WHY DIESEL CANNOT REPLACE PETROL AS THE INDICATOR	No reliable diesel series exists, and its appearance would not solve the problem: a large part of diesel consumption is administered by the state, so a shortage is absorbed by prioritising deliveries by category and stays invisible in the statistics.
----- – COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION	
The loss of secondary refining units is irreversible over a long horizon, often 12–18 months: restoring catalytic cracking, reforming and hydrotreating requires imported catalysts and licensed equipment. Export infrastructure is usually restored in full within weeks.	

SOURCE	InFOM / Bank of Russia
OBSERVATION DATE	31 Jul 2026
----- – BREAKDOWN	
Why InFOM and not the GDP deflator. The GDP deflator is derived from the same Rosstat price observations; substituting one series from a source for another from the same source masks the problem. A deflator must be independent of the series being deflated by construction — otherwise it is a tautology.	
The ‘what about Turkey’ objection. Turkey has lived for years with inflation many times higher than Russia’s, and neither its society nor its state collapsed. The objection is fair, and the panel does not argue against it: it does not claim that inflation ends wars. The widget measures not inflation but the real rate for the depositor — that is, who pays for the gap. The Turkish case confirms that a population can bear such a price for years; which is precisely why the panel does not predict the moment of decision.	
For the question of continuing the war the analogy fails for three reasons, all of them structural. First, what finances the gap. Turkey runs a persistent current account deficit covered by external borrowing: part of the inflationary pressure is exported. The external capital market is closed to Russia entirely, and the same gap must be absorbed by the domestic depositor — which is the quantity this widget measures. Second, what a weaker currency acts on. The Turkish basket is manufacturing at over 20% of GDP, plus tourism and transport services, inside a customs union with the EU since 1995: there, price is an instrument, even if the evidence shows it works less well than expected. The Russian basket is hydrocarbons and grain, whose prices are set on world markets. A weaker ruble does not buy market share, because that share does not depend on the ruble price. Third, and decisive, reversibility. Turkish inflation followed from a choice of interest rate, and the choice was reversed: in 2023 the central bank raised the rate from 9% to over 40%, after which the dynamics turned. The source of Russian inflationary pressure is the war budget, and cancelling it means ending the war: here the instrument and the object coincide, whereas in the Turkish case they did not.	
What would refute this reasoning. A sustained fall in observed inflation while military spending stays at its current level and the external capital market remains closed.	

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Volume caps lifted in most regions · domestic supply returning to last year’s level · free export resumed.

CONF. H ON THE RUNG AND THE NUMBER OF REGIONS · M ON COVERAGE AND ON –20%	
CONSTRAINT	PARTIAL · REFINING IRREVERSIBLE 18+ MONTHS

DIRECTION	A higher rung = deterioration
FREQUENCY	As administrative decisions occur
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	December–February — a dated seasonality marker
SOURCE	Regional decrees, reports of limits being introduced
OBSERVATION DATE	1 Aug 2026

– BREAKDOWN

The distinction between rungs, without which all four read as one thing called ‘rationing’.
Rungs 2 and 4 limit the volume of a single purchase; the buyer can refill later the same day. Rung 5 limits the frequency of access — that is a refusal to sell to a particular person on a particular day. Rung 6 introduces personalised accounting and turns fuel from a good into an allocated resource.

Why the threshold is 20% and not 15 or 40. The answer is given by a fact rather than by the analyst’s choice: 20% is the level at which rung 4 was reached. The scale keeps registering deterioration after the percentage threshold has been crossed once.

Army use of petrol — motorcycles, buggies, civilian supply vehicles, small portable generators.

2.1

Debt service to budget revenue

10.3 % of revenue, H1 2026

Debt service of ₪3.9 trn, up 23% year on year. The denominator is budget revenue, not GDP: payment is made out of revenue. Substituting the denominator understates the burden by a factor of three to four (1.7% of GDP against 10.3% of revenue).



— current value

1.7 pp to the orange zone.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

MANDATORY CAVEAT

Debt service costs fall relative to plan when the market is closed — placements that do not happen create no coupon obligations. The indicator cannot be read apart from the volume of placements and from whatever source is covering the deficit in place of borrowing. Every trillion raised by selling gold likewise creates no coupon obligations and does not appear in the debt-service-to-revenue ratio at all. For that reason 2.1 is not published without the share of the need closed by sources that create no debt obligations — balances, the NWF and gold, see [1.1](#) and [2.6](#). If that share is rising while 2.1 falls, the improvement is an artefact, and the widget is obliged to say so in the same frame. Published alongside the real rate for the depositor and the volume of placements.

THE SENSITIVITY MECHANISM

1 pp on the key rate ≈ ₪117 bn ≈ 0.28 pp of the revenue share. The carrier is the floating-rate OFZ portfolio: after the placement of 29031, ₪1 trn on 2 September 2026, it grew from roughly ₪10.7 to 11.7 trn and its share from 33% to about 35%. The earlier sensitivity of ₪107 bn applied to the portfolio before that placement. The figure is to be recomputed against primary data on the floating-rate portfolio

THE SAME RATE STEP AMONG COMPARABLE STATES

0.1–0.2 pp — Russian sensitivity is roughly twice as high: the floater share has fallen from 43% (end-2024) to 33%

2.2

OFZ auctions

What is measured is the concentration of borrowing, not the availability of the channel: the channel reopened on 2 September 2026, and the day counter stopped measuring what it was set up to measure

99 % of quarterly borrowing raised in one session

The second quantity in the body: the share of productive auction days, 2 of 14. The anomaly is stated not as an unprecedented volume but as concentration above the historical maximum, in an emergency mode applied a quarter earlier than usual.



— current value

99% against a historical maximum of concentration of the order of 50-60%, not against a norm of 20%.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

THE FUNDING SOURCE OF THE BUYERS

Not established. The test is one-sided by construction: a rise in banks' debt to the Bank of Russia under repo of a comparable size within 90 days establishes monetisation; the absence of a rise establishes nothing, because the term of liquidity provision is at the disposal of the same party that disposes of the decision to buy. With the state holding around 65% of banking assets, the outcome of an auction carries no information about the market's willingness to lend to the budget: lender, borrower and intermediary have a single principal. The amount raised is counted in full and on receipt of funds by the budget; the source is handled by labelling, not by subtraction. Control points are 2 Oct, 1 Nov and 1 Dec 2026.

RAISED IN Q3

₪933.9 bn of 1,500¹⁶ (62%). Against the annual plan, 71% including yuan-denominated OFZ

THE AUCTION OF 2 SEP 2026

Floating-rate OFZ 29031¹⁷, maturing 29 Jul 2042. The entire issue was placed: ₪1,000 bn at par. Proceeds ₪938.872 bn, of which ₪925.1 bn net and ₪13.8 bn accrued interest. Weighted average price 92.5122%, cut-off 92.5000%. Demand ₪1,424.7 bn

COMPARISON	Italy 7.7% with debt at 138% of GDP · France 4.1% at 118% · Japan 6–8% at 204% · China about 5% at 107% · the United States 19% at 126% (though the dollar is a reserve currency). Debt to GDP is general government, IMF forecast for 2026 ¹⁵
FULL-YEAR ESTIMATE	9.4–10.0% against 8.6% (2025 actual) and 9.7% (2026 plan). The half-year figure of 10.3% is above the full-year estimate because of the coupon payment calendar

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

The trap works both ways: raising the rate bites immediately, and cutting it does not reopen the market. The key rate ceases to be an instrument of tightening and becomes a parameter of a subsidy — the CBR becomes the marginal funder of the budget.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

The indicator for October comes in below 10.8% while the quarterly borrowing plan is met — that is, the improvement was not achieved by closing the market [activated 2 Sep 2026: until auctions resumed the second condition was unreachable].

CONF. H

MECHANISM

REVERSIBLE

DIRECTION	A rise = deterioration
FREQUENCY	With budget execution, monthly
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	~9–10 Oct 2026 — nine-month execution, a forecast check
SOURCE	Russian Finance Ministry, federal budget execution
OBSERVATION DATE	12 Sep 2026

THE QUARTER’S CALENDAR	14 auction days: 5 in July, 4 in August, 5 in September. Placements occurred on two. 1 Jul — OFZ-PD 26251RMFS ¹⁷ , maturing 28 Aug 2030: ₸10.4 bn at par, ₸8.8 bn net, ₸9.1 bn of proceeds including accrued interest; weighted average price 84.9218%, cut-off 84.9032%, yield 14.96% on both. A tap of an existing issue in the volume of available residuals, not a new issue. Plan execution counts the net ₸8.8 bn: the quarterly plan is set in net prices. 15 Jul — the auction was declared void, no bids at acceptable prices. August — no placements at all
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CONCENTRATED FLOATER BORROWING IS AN ESTABLISHED EMERGENCY MODE	It was used in November 2022, December 2024 and November 2025. Its institutional form is the unlimited auction, first used in November 2022. Whether the auction of 2 Sep 2026 was unlimited is not established; a Finance Ministry information release is awaited
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BID-TO-COVER	1.42 against 2.13 (12 Nov 2025) and 1.84 (11 Dec 2024)
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THE PLAN AS A DENOMINATOR	Not used. Q4 2022: a plan of ₸150 bn against ₸1.648 trn raised over October–November — an elevenfold overrun. A denominator that admits of that measures nothing; the figure is published as an orientation
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THE DISCRIMINATOR	The tier 3 series for the share of systemically important banks at auctions has been tracked monthly since August 2025: 29.1 · 28.6 · 52.4 · 61.0 (November, peak) · 54.0 · 37.0 · 40.3 · 36.3 · 42.5 · 41.0 · 19.3 (July, low). The September value is released at the end of October
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– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

The floater is the last non-market-but-not-emission instrument: the buyer takes no interest rate risk. On 15 July 2026 the auction in floater 29028 was declared void — no bids arrived at prices acceptable to the Finance Ministry, which is a refusal by the issuer to pay a premium rather than an absence of demand. Six weeks later the entire 29031 issue went in a single session.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Q4 2026 closes with placements on six or more auction days and the largest session below 40% — in which case the concentration of Q3 was a one-off episode rather than a mode, and the reading is withdrawn.

CONF. H ON VOLUMES, PRICES AND THE CALENDAR · L ON THE HISTORICAL NORM OF CONCENTRATION	
MECHANISM	REVERSIBLE

DIRECTION	Rising concentration = deterioration
FREQUENCY	Weekly, auction day is Wednesday
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	30 Sep 2026 — Q3 outcome · end of October — the September share of systemically important banks
SOURCE	Russian Finance Ministry: auction results and information releases
OBSERVATION DATE	12 Sep 2026

– BREAKDOWN

In Q3 2026 the Finance Ministry scheduled fourteen auction days and raised 62% of the quarterly plan. Placements occurred on two days out of fourteen; 99% of quarterly borrowing was raised on 2 September, when the entire 29031 issue of ₺1 trn was sold in a single session. Six weeks earlier a floater auction had been declared void for want of bids at acceptable prices. The size of the session is not in itself a record — on 12 November 2025 ₺1.86 trn was placed in a day. What is anomalous is the share of one session in the quarter, and that an emergency borrowing mode previously used in November and December was used in September. The placement price was 92.51% of par against 93.82% a year earlier; the price concession is small. The funding source of the buyers is not established.


The null hypothesis. If demand for floaters holds, the remainder of the annual plan is spread evenly over September-December without a repeat of the concentrated session, and the concentration of Q3 is explained by a six-week pause and a return to the market after the key rate was cut from 16% to 14%, rather than by a financing mode. The hypothesis is tested by the same observation as the main reading, on 15 January 2027.

Net hydrocarbon revenue

Subtracted or added month by month, depending on the sign of the damper that month

17.1 % of revenue, January–July

(4,594.7 – 814.6) / 22,112 = 17.1%. First half: (3,660.7 – 701.6) / 18,622 = 15.9%. Damper payments are a counter-flow from the same budget back into the same industry.



0.9 pp up to the yellow zone, 5.1 pp down to the red. Orange means the budget rests on domestic turnover and is vulnerable to a narrowing VAT base under sequestration.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

THE DAMPER SERIES, ₪BN	January –18.8 · February –15.0 · April 207.5 · June 210.6 · July 113.0 · first half 701.6. March and May are known only as a combined 317.3
FOR COMPARISON	the whole of 2025 — 881.8 · 2024 — 1,815
STRUCTURAL COMPARISON	2021: 30–35% gross · 2026: 15.9–17.1% net
CAVEAT ON JULY	The July spike is a one-off quarterly profit-tax payment. Without it the month would have shown a decline

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

The share is being held up in three ways, and all three have a payer. First, the damper: ₪814.6 bn over seven months goes back to the refiner so that the retail price does not catch up with inflation; the bill is paid by the budget and the gain goes to the fuel consumer, so the measure competes with pay indexation for the same ruble. Second, the exchange rate: a weaker ruble raises ruble revenue at unchanged physical volumes, and the bill passes to the holder of rubles through the import component of prices. Third, the tax structure: a rising share of the profit-based tax shifts receipts to a quarterly rhythm, which improves some months and worsens the ones in between without changing the year; July 2026 is exactly such a case. A position working the other way: a plant shut down by strikes receives no damper. Reduced refining mechanically reduces the subtrahend and improves this widget’s reading. Part of the observed improvement in the net share is a consequence of the destruction of refining capacity rather than of budget resilience. Decomposing the effect into components is barely feasible with the available sources.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Expenditure ladder

Ordered by payer rather than by amount. The sequence in which rungs are passed is more informative than the decision itself

1–2 of 6

level on the expenditure ladder · rungs 3 and 4 partly engaged

Rungs 3 and 4 are already engaged in concealed form — not by a decision to cut, but by a decision to index far below inflation. Observation window: September–November 2026, three budget readings and the indexation decrees.

LVL	RUNG · WHO PAYS · WHICH BALANCE DEGRADES	ZONE	REV.
1	National projects · the future, which cannot answer back · the long-run productive base		CURRENT
2	Transfers to regions · the region that goes to borrow from a bank · local debt and the region’s ability to fund recruitment		CURRENT
3	Public sector pay · the household directly · consumption → the VAT base		partial
3a	Pay for the security services and equivalents — Rosgvardia, MVD, FSB, FSIN, the prosecution service · the coercive apparatus · loyalty and manning — PRE-BREAK		partial
4	Pensions · the loyal base · consumption and political resource — THE BREAK		partial
5	Military payments — terminal · the recruitment mechanism itself · reproduction of manpower		IRREVERSIBLE
6	Reverse move: new payments with an empty treasury · political risk accepted above fiscal risk		—

The timing is set not by market conditions but by the cash box: a Treasury balance of ₪4.5 trn against an operating range of ₪2.0–3.0 trn is exhausted, at the current rate of use, in December–January. A price premium from favourable hydrocarbon conditions moves the date but does not remove it, because it flows into the same balance where the seven-month deficit already stands at 170% of the annual plan. The threshold for an entry in the Conversion log is full passage of rung 3.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

MANDATORY CAVEAT	Fiscal consolidation measures were announced against a widening deficit and then deferred indefinitely after the March jump in oil prices caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Movement along the ladder was halted by an external price event.
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Hydrocarbon revenue up by ₺4 trn or more annualised · the net share returning above 18% for three consecutive months without one-off payments.

CONF. H

CONSTRAINT

DERIVED

DIRECTION	A fall = deterioration
FREQUENCY	Monthly
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	~mid-September
SOURCE	Russian Finance Ministry, hydrocarbon revenue and damper payments
OBSERVATION DATE	31 Jul 2026

Unplanned external events limit the scale’s predictive power over time in both directions — deceleration as well as acceleration.

CONCEALED PASSAGE OF RUNGS 3, 3A AND 4	Indexation below inflation is a cut in spending dressed as a rise. At a deflator of 13–15%: the lower-paid public employees covered by the ‘May decrees’ (teachers, doctors, social workers, culture) received +7.6% from 1 Jan 2026 — prices outrun pay by 7.0%. All other public employees, civil servants, military personnel and equivalents received +4% — an overrun of 8.7–10.7%. No decision to cut was taken, the payer stays silent, and the result shows up only in the VAT base and in retail turnover
THE ORDER OF PROTECTION, OBSERVED THROUGH THE 2026 INDEXATIONS	Insurance pensions +7.6% from 1 Jan · May-decree public employees +7.6% from 1 Jan · social pensions +6.8% from 1 Apr · military personnel, equivalents and other civil servants +4% from 1 Oct. Prices outrun the payment, at a deflator of 13–15%, by 7.0% · 7.0% · 7.8% · 8.7–10.7%, with a nine-month lag
WHY 7.6% IS NOT A PRIVILEGE	The 7.6% indexation is tied to the ‘May decrees’, under which pay for teachers, doctors and social workers is formulaically linked to the regional average wage. The formula is not discretionary and requires growth in line with nominal wages — that is, 13–15%. What was granted was 7.6%. So this group is under-indexed too, only relative to a legal obligation rather than to inflation. There are not two tiers of favour: there is one tier of underpayment measured against two different bases
WHY THE SECURITY SERVICES CAN BE PAID LESS — A WORKING HYPOTHESIS	The most plausible explanation is that part of a security officer’s compensation is non-monetary. Service in Rosgvardia, the MVD, the FSB and FSIN confers de facto protection from contract recruitment and mobilisation pressure. In a market where the alternative is a signing bonus of ₺1.65 mn ¹⁸ plus the risk of death, that protection has measurable value, and the regime is using it to pay for the indexation gap. If the hypothesis holds, the regime has monetised the last non-monetary asset it had left — exemption from the war
HOW THIS IS TESTED	Both hypotheses are tested by one series: the share of MVD and Rosgvardia personnel leaving for a military contract, and undermanning in regional units. If protection works as payment, the flow is low. A rising flow means the non-monetary compensation has depreciated and the indexation gap has become uncovered. The series is not collected

LIMITATION OF THE INDICATOR	Indexation applies to base pay; supplements for length of service, secrecy and special conditions are calculated from base pay and rise with it, but discretionary bonuses and regional supplements are not indexed and are not observable. Metropolitan and senior categories may make up the difference through those channels, so confidence on rung 3a is lowered to L and the indicator reads as a lower bound on erosion rather than a measurement of it
THE 2027 OBLIGATION AS A CHECKPOINT	From 2027 the law provides for two annual indexations of insurance pensions: on 1 February by the previous year's inflation and on 1 April additionally by the growth of Social Fund revenue. At observed inflation of 13–15%, meeting that obligation costs several times more than the current 7.6%. Failure to meet it, or replacement with a single indexation, is full passage of rung 4 and is dateable
THE OBSERVABLE CONSEQUENCE FOR RUNG 3A	The mechanism is testable: with allowances eroding by around 10% a year and a contract signing bonus of ₺1.65 mn, the flow runs one way. The marker is undermanning in regional MVD and Rosgvardia units and the share leaving for a contract. The series is not collected; the slot is reserved
WHY RUNGS 2 AND 3 ARE KEPT APART	Cutting transfers moves the bill to a region that then goes to borrow: the bill is deferred, the payer stays silent, and it is observed through rising regional debt rather than through people's reactions. Cutting wages moves the bill straight to the household
OBSERVED CONFIRMATION OF THE CHAIN	Late 2025: regions were reducing contract signing bonuses because of deficits in their own budgets. Rung 2 realised in full: the transfer was cut → the region could not pay for recruitment → the manpower reproduction balance degraded
WHY THE DATE OF THE DECISION MATTERS MORE THAN ITS SIZE	Annual capacity is barely applicable to the 2026 deficit: one quarter remains to year-end, and the part of spending being cut is where payments on already executed contracts are concentrated. A fourth-quarter sequestration of commitments already entered into is non-payment rather than saving: the bill passes to the supplier as accounts payable and returns to the consolidated claim as a line of defence-industry working capital. The observable marker is a rise in overdue budget payables and a rise in bank working-capital lending to defence order contractors in Q4 alongside announced spending cuts
RUNG 6	The only rung where the signal of deterioration comes with an outwardly generous decision. Also entered in

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

Net sequestration capacity is ₺1.5–2.5 trn annualised; a quarter of that is available in 2026, because the decision cannot be taken before October. And this is not an ordinary sequestration. The proportions of 2015–2017 do not apply: the protected core has tripled, while the unprotected part has been cut several times already. What is left is cut into the bone: every item has a named payer and a political price, and compressing consumption narrows the VAT base, so part of the saving comes back as forgone revenue. Sequestration has stopped being free — the fact of carrying it out is itself a signal rather than a measure.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Indexation for 2027 announced at or above observed inflation — that would mean no concealed passage of rungs 3 and 4 is occurring · passage of rung 3 and above reversed while the market stays closed and the claim of around ₺16 trn persists.

CONF. M	MECHANISM	BY RUNG, SEE TABLE
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DIRECTION	A higher level = deterioration
FREQUENCY	As decisions occur
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	October–November — three readings of the 2027 budget
SOURCE	Draft budget, indexation decrees
OBSERVATION DATE	4 Aug 2026

– BREAKDOWN

The remaining sequestration options, from least to most expensive.

ITEM	WHO PAYS	POLITICAL PRICE AND OFFSETTING EFFECT
Further cuts to national projects	The future productive base	Zero cost today, full cost later. The resource is nearly exhausted: cut three times already
Transfers to regions	The region that goes to borrow from a bank	Regional debt of ₺3.5 trn is a 15-year record, with deficits of ₺1.9–2.0 trn. A direct consequence has already been observed: in late 2025 regions cut contract signing bonuses
Further under-indexation of wages and pensions	The household	Yields goods rather than money: the fiscal effect is close to zero, while compressed consumption cuts the VAT base. Organic growth of that base over January–July already fails to exceed inflation

ITEM	WHO PAYS	POLITICAL PRICE AND OFFSETTING EFFECT
Pay for the security services	The coercive apparatus	Already under way covertly, through the 4%. An open cut hits the manning of the very thing used to suppress reactions to everything else on this list
Military payments and signing bonuses	The recruitment mechanism	The terminal rung: irreversible, since it destroys the only working channel for replacing losses. Rung 3 of the quiet mobilisation ladder

All figures in the table are annual. Roughly a quarter of each applies to what remains of 2026: the decision cannot be taken before October.

The common property of what is left: every item either yields no money or destroys the mechanism holding everything else up. That is what it means to say that the capacity of sequestration is smaller than its nominal size.

Terms of trade: Russia–China

Paid by the budget, the regions and businesses in forgone taxes and revenue: for past decisions now, for current ones next month or next quarter

4 of 6 rung of concessions to the external channel

The widget measures the weakening of Russia’s negotiating position without measuring the volume of Chinese support: it answers the question of dependence without becoming a calculator of sufficiency.

RUNG	WHAT HAS BEEN CONCEDED · THE OBSERVABLE	ZONE	STATUS
0	Market terms; each side is replaceable for the other		passed
1	A systematic price discount within the transport and insurance premium		passed
2	The discount exceeds what logistics explains; the buyer names the price		passed
3	Infrastructure built at the seller’s expense for a single buyer		passed
4	Protection of the domestic market and of domestic producers abandoned to keep the channel		CURRENT
5	Access to assets, subsoil and legal regimes as part of the deal		PARTIAL · IMTOR from 1 Jan 2026
6	Monopsony in action: the buyer worsens terms or cuts purchases and does not lose the supplier, because the seller has nowhere to go		

One rung to the red zone. Rung 5 is partly passed: Power of Siberia 2 remains unsigned precisely because China is demanding prices at the level of the subsidised domestic market – the red condition has already been put on the table for the key contract but has not been accepted. A marker of rung 6 is being observed ahead of schedule: China cut purchases of Russian sawn timber by 30% over four months of 2026 and restarted its own logging in Guangxi, Fujian, Yunnan and Guizhou, even though Russia accounts for 42% of Chinese sawn timber imports.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

DETAIL BY RUNG


Rung 2 – the buyer names the price. On General Administration of Customs data¹⁹, gas to China was \$258.8 per 1,000 m³ in 2026 against roughly \$390 for Europe and Turkey, a third lower; in 2025 it was \$248.7 against \$401.9. **Rung 3 – infrastructure at the seller’s expense.** Power of Siberia reached its design capacity of 38.8 bcm against a planned 38; Power of Siberia 2 is being designed through Mongolia

Gold: reserve depletion

Paid by the future budget: the only large non-market resource whose expenditure is irreversible in physical stock

2.2 % of the stock sold over 12 months · actual

The widget measures the speed at which the physical stock is being spent and the price that spending imposes on third parties.



One quantity, three denominators. One flow – 49.7 t over seven months: the first line is the fact, the second and third are the same fact annualised against two different denominators.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

WHAT IS ESTABLISHED

The flow is attributed, and that is a fact: in World Gold Council data for Q2 2026, published on 30 July 2026, the Bank of Russia is the only sizeable seller of gold among the world’s central banks, 21.77 t against 4.23 t for Turkey²¹.

THE LINE OF ARGUMENT

Gold is a financing mechanism: a sale gives the budget roubles today. Its limit is set by someone other than the regime, so the question is not how much gold is left but at what volume the mechanism runs into something. There are two limits, and they are computed separately. The first is the sales channel: up to what volume the metal moves without a noticeable discount; the answer is 200-300 t a year. The second is the patience of holders: at what volume a fall in the price becomes economically significant for China, India and Turkey. That one is measured three ways – loss in tonne-equivalent, loss against a year’s benefit from the relationship with Russia, loss against the capacity of reserves – and gives a calculated band of 344-978 t on the first measure, while the band in

at 50 bcm. **Rung 4 — protection of the domestic market abandoned.** 98.3% of machine tools are imported, with China at 60–70% of machine tool imports and up to 90% in some categories against roughly 20% before 2022; about two thirds of the car market is Chinese brands

RUNG 5 PARTIAL — INTERNATIONAL PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT TERRITORIES

From 1 Jan 2026 the IMTOR regime operates in the Far East. What a resident is granted: a zero federal profit tax rate for 10 years · social contributions at 7.6% for 10 years · a guarantee of legal stability for 15 years · a free customs zone · a special inspection regime · restricted disclosure of owners and directors in the state company register · recruitment of foreign workers outside the general quotas · land and infrastructure included in the regime. Formally the regime is open to foreign partners in general; in practice the first construction is being built with China: a draft intergovernmental agreement on Primorye was handed to the Chinese side, initially around a grain terminal and agricultural processing at Sukhodol; on 13 Aug 2026 the regime was presented to ten Chinese manufacturers of semiconductors, lasers and medical equipment in Amur oblast

THE NEGOTIATING ASYMMETRY IS STATED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE

Primorye Chamber of Commerce and Industry, March 2026: the Chinese side sets its own terms and prefers projects in logistics and resource export, while the Russian side is pressing for high value-added projects. Direct evidence on the direction of concessions, recorded by a participant in the negotiations rather than by an analyst

WHY IMTOR COUNTS ONLY PARTIALLY

Rung 5 requires access to assets, subsoil and legal regimes as part of the deal. The legal regime has been conceded in full and observably; access to assets and subsoil under IMTOR has not yet been recorded. The restriction on disclosure of beneficiaries is noted separately: it reduces the observability of the rung itself, so the concession includes a concession in transparency

THE PRICE OF THE CHANNEL, MEASURED DIRECTLY

Goods subject to Chinese export controls became 87% more expensive for Russia on average over 2021–2024. That is neither a market price nor logistics: it is the charge for having no alternative supplier

THE PRICE OF THE CHANNEL IN GAS

At deliveries of 38.8 bcm, the gap against the Western price implies forgone revenue of roughly \$5–6 bn a year — comparable to the annual volume of damper payments

which all three yield significant magnitudes is roughly 300-500 t. Both bands are outputs of a scenario model, not thresholds at which anything is obliged to happen. Only the first limit passes into the cash column of widget [1.1](#); the second is not converted into money.

A CHANGE OF REGIME: 2025 → 2026

Over the whole of 2025 the Bank of Russia sold 6 t — 0.26% of the stock — and was one of only four sellers among the world’s central banks²². The quantity is negligible, but it is the first annual reduction of the stock in twenty years. Over January-July 2026, 49.7 t were sold²⁰, an annualised pace of 85.2 t — roughly fourteen times the 2025 rate. What matters is not the move from zero to sales but that an almost immobile stock has given way to systematic monthly selling.

THE RED THRESHOLD AND WHERE IT COMES FROM

Up to 3% is use of a reserve; 3-5% is the top of a technically manageable regime; 5-10% is accelerated use; above 10% is plain expenditure of a strategic reserve.

RUSSIA WAS SELLING IN THE QUARTER WHEN THE OFFICIAL SECTOR WAS BUYING AT A RECORD

In Q2 2026 the Bank of Russia sold 21.77 t and was the only sizeable seller among central banks: the second, Turkey, sold 4.23 t. At the same time the official sector bought a net 289 t — a record for a second quarter and five times the revised Q1 estimate of 57 t²¹. The gold price fell by roughly 16% in the quarter, the worst quarter in thirteen years. No causation is asserted: investment flows move the price more than any central bank sale at ordinary volumes. What matters is not the price but the divergence in behaviour. Third parties react not to the price but to the flow, and the flow is published quarterly. What follows is their decision, not a secret of the regime.

THE SALES CHANNEL, AND THE VOLUME AT WHICH A DISCOUNT APPEARS

The capacity of the domestic channel is taken up by Russia’s own output: Russia mines 300-330 t a year, and that output is looking for the same buyers. At 300 t of Bank of Russia sales the combined volume seeking a buyer approaches 600 t — a quantity the domestic market does not absorb and which has to go to export, that is under a discount and into mirror statistics. The practical conclusion: 100-200 t plausibly clear through the domestic channel at a small discount, and from roughly 200-300 t the class of the problem changes. The sale stops being a domestic operation and becomes a large international flow dependent on final demand, the sales discount and sanctions infrastructure. Constraints and a

A SECOND SECTOR WITH THE SAME PATTERN — COAL	From 1 Jan 2024 China restored import duties on Russian coal: 3% on coking coal and anthracite, 6% on thermal — around \$0.4 bn a year. Australia and Indonesia are exempt from the same duties under free trade agreements, so the measure discriminates against Russia specifically. Chinese buyers additionally require the supplier to absorb the duty. Russia's share of Chinese coal imports has fallen from 23% to 18% in two years
THE STRUCTURE OF THE EXCHANGE	January–July 2026: Russian exports to China \$86.4 bn (+23.7%), imports from China \$72.84 bn (+29.5%). Imports are growing faster than exports. China accounts for 43% of Russian imports of industrial equipment
REGIME CONCESSIONS	Visa-free travel was introduced by decree on 1 Dec 2025 and extended to 31 Dec 2027 — that is, beyond the horizon the panel currently works on

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

Irreversible. The deepening of dependence is self-reinforcing: each concession worsens the position in the next round, and infrastructure built for a single buyer has no alternative use. Movement in the opposite direction is observed only on the buyer's side: the restart of domestic logging in China shows that what is replaceable here is the seller, not the buyer.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Power of Siberia 2 signed on export parity terms · the gas discount narrowing to the transport and insurance premium · China's share of machine tool and industrial equipment imports falling below 40% · Russian exports to China growing faster than imports from China for three consecutive quarters.

CONF. H ON PRICE AND TRADE QUANTITIES · M ON THE RUNG · L ON THE TERMS OF ACCESS TO ASSETS	
PRICE	IRREVERSIBLE
DIRECTION	A higher rung = deterioration
FREQUENCY	Monthly, on Chinese customs statistics
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	as negotiations and customs publications occur
SOURCE	General Administration of Customs of China, Gazprom, Russian socio-economic forecast, machine tool industry reviews
OBSERVATION DATE	7 Aug 2026

– BREAKDOWN

WHERE THE 100-200 AND 300 T IN WIDGET 1.1 COME FROM	discount on the incremental volume are highly likely; their size is not established. The cash column for gold in 1.1 is taken from here and from nowhere else: 100-200 t stand there as ₺1.18-2.32 trn unimpeded, and 300 t as a maximum of ₺3.40 trn. Above 300 t no money is entered into 1.1: the size of the discount on the incremental volume and the reaction of third parties are not established, and the band is left open.
THE MEASURE OF LOSS AGAINST THE VALUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP	China's annual economic benefit from the relationship with Russia is of the order of \$11 bn: exports of about \$120 bn a year ²³ at a net margin of around 5% ²⁴ , plus the saving on the crude discount of about \$5 bn a year ²⁵ . At sales of 300 t, China's stock would be worth \$23 bn less — two years of the entire benefit of the relationship; at 500 t, \$43 bn less, or nearly four years. The calculation for all three countries and every volume is in the widget breakdown .
THE THREE MEASURES RANK THE ACTORS DIFFERENTLY, AND THAT IS NOT A DEFECT	On tonne-equivalent and on the value of the relationship, China binds first; on relative pain, Turkey. Both bands are named in the line of argument above.
HUNDREDS OF TONNES OF OFFICIAL GOLD HAVE HISTORICALLY NOT BEEN SOLD AS A LIQUID ASSET	Three precedents. The Swiss National Bank stretched the sale of 1,300 t over about five years at annual quotas mostly of 120-284 t ²⁶ . The European gold agreements capped combined official sales at 400-500 t a year, and at 400 t a year for 2009-2014 ²⁷ . The IMF, out of a 403.3 t programme, first sold 212 t directly to official holders and phased only the remaining 191.3 t onto the market ²⁸ . The objection that hundreds of tonnes were after all absorbed needs no answer: the panel has already accepted it. The precedent says something else. At the SNB it was a single seller who announced the programme in advance, in a market where nobody else was unloading. Here the same pace has to be sustained for five consecutive years by the Bank of Russia alone, and nobody else must start selling. What the precedents establish is therefore not a physical limit but a necessary condition: organisation, announcement, phasing, and the seller being alone. A sanctioned seller at war has none of the four. The CBGA agreements do not transfer to the Russian case, for three reasons. The 400-500 t ceiling was combined across all signatories, not a quota for one seller. The sales ran in a rising market, where the revaluation of other holders's stock did not

Why this belongs on the panel. The widget measures one of the few constraints that cannot be lifted by a Kremlin decision — a price set by the other side.

Why the scale is ordered by what has been conceded rather than by volume. Growth in trade turnover says nothing by itself: it can mean a strengthened position or a lost one. What discriminates is not the volume but what was paid for it. The ordering of the rungs reproduces the ‘who pays’ principle: the price discount is paid by the exporter, the infrastructure by the budget and Gazprom, the abandonment of market protection by the Russian producer, access to assets by the owner, and monopsony by all of them at once.

The pattern repeats in three sectors. Gas: a price a third below the European one, on infrastructure built at the seller’s expense. Coal: targeted duties from which competitors are exempt, plus a demand that the supplier absorb them. Timber: reduced purchases alongside a restart of domestic logging. In no case did Russia receive compensation in another sector for a concession made — which is what distinguishes dependence from partnership.

An observation that works against the expected picture. China is not increasing extraction; it is cutting purchases. In the first half of 2026 Chinese imports of forest products fell 5% by tonnage and 4% by value, Russian deliveries fell further, and China simultaneously restarted its own logging. This is not a weakening of Russian dependence but a demonstration of it: the buyer can reduce volume without loss, and the seller cannot find a replacement. Monopsony shows itself in the ability to cut, not only in the ability to demand.

What this widget does not do. It does not assess the sufficiency of Chinese support and contains no thresholds at which that support becomes decisive. Such an assessment is an operational quantity for a third party and does not belong on the panel.

suffer. And the sellers were Western states and Japan — holders of reserve currencies and co-authors of the sanctions regime; gold as an asset outside Western control is held by China, India and Turkey, and against Switzerland or France they had neither a grievance nor a lever. Against Russia they have both: dual-use goods, the payment channel, the share of imports, an overwhelming share in buying its oil, and grey imports around sanctions.

THE IMF: DAMAGE TO OTHER HOLDERS
IS INSTITUTIONALLY ACKNOWLEDGED

Under the 403.3 t programme the IMF Executive Board established the principle of not disrupting the market in a way that would adversely affect gold holders, producers and the functioning of the market; that is precisely why the volume was capped, part was offered directly to other official holders, and the remainder was phased out²⁸. This gives no elasticity for Russian sales, but it removes the objection that the damage to third-party holders was invented by the panel. It is the stated position of the official sector on how those who hold gold view a large official liquidation.

THE BASE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE
OUTSIDE BUYER IS INDIFFERENT IS
NOT NEUTRAL

The assumption that China, India and Turkey will absorb the Russian flow and tolerate the depreciation of their own stock is a substantive hypothesis, not a neutral starting point. A revealed preference in a different negotiation: on Power of Siberia 2 the talks stalled on price in 2026, with Beijing pressing for a level comparable with the subsidised Russian domestic market²⁹. Carrying that over to gold is an analogy, not proof: a different asset and a different negotiating structure. A second asymmetry: China accumulates gold as an asset outside Western control, that is, it buys from those it cannot coerce. Russia stands apart in that list: China can coerce Russia, and the levers are named above. So the absence of pressure at fifty tonnes a year is not indifference, it is the absence of a reason — and the purchase of 33 t in Q2 cannot be read as approval: it is compensation for one’s own revaluation, not consent. The panel does not know at what loss any of the three would force the issue, and does not claim that any of them will; it publishes the price of inaction for each.

AGAINST THE READING OF THIS
WIDGET

Sales over the trailing 12 months are 2.2% of the stock: the green zone, below every threshold on the scale. The gold price is holding near its historic high, and the remaining stock is worth more in dollars than it was a year ago. The bulk of the 49.7 t went to domestic buyers without a sales discount. The series

	is not closed: tonnage and dates are published monthly by the Bank of Russia ²⁹ and duplicated by quarterly World Gold Council data. The official sector closed the first half of 2026 with net purchases of 345 t — the lowest since 2022 — and the Q2 record does not describe the half-year. And above all: the reaction threshold has never been observed anywhere — there is no case in history of gold holders politically constraining an official seller, and at the current volume it cannot be tested.
LINKS	Residual capacity of gold passes to 1.1 as the cash column · gold belongs to the list of sources that create no debt obligations in 2.1 · the calculated band of 344-978 t connects to the Chinese contour in 2.5 · the irreversibility record sits in Conversion and on the refinancing ladder .
SIGNS OF APPROACH TO THE THRESHOLD, OBSERVABLE WITHOUT CALCULATION	A stop or reversal of purchases by the central bank of China · OFAC action on operations in gold connected with the Bank of Russia · delisting of refineries from Good Delivery · a reversal in mirror import statistics.

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

Irreversible in physical stock. The price of the mechanism is the write-down of the unsold remainder, and by construction it depends on the elasticity assumed: the central scenario is $p = k \cdot S / 100 \cdot (1 + \lambda \cdot S / 800)$ with $k = 2$ and $\lambda = 0.5$, where 800 is a scale parameter of the curve. The formula is heuristic: it sets a plausible shape for the relationship, in which the write-down grows faster than the volume, and it makes no claim to precision in the magnitude; the three parameters are calibrated together and are not moved singly. The sales discount d is convex in volume: 2% at 100 t, 3.5% at 300, 6% at 500, 12% at 1,000, with linear interpolation between nodes. At a pace of 300 t the remainder would be worth \$19.9 bn more than it will be, against \$39.4 bn raised to close the gap. The elasticity is named here rather than substituted silently: in the soft scenario the write-down is \$9.1 bn, in the hard one \$34.5 bn.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Sales over a trailing 12 months fall below 1% of the stock across two consecutive quarterly World Gold Council releases while the deficit persists — in which case gold is not an operating financing mechanism and the widget is withdrawn · or the Bank of Russia resumes net purchases.

CONF. L ON THE DAMAGE AND THRESHOLD CONSTRUCTION · H ON TONNAGE, DATES AND THE CENTRAL-BANK PURCHASE SHARE	
RESERVE	IRREVERSIBLE
DIRECTION	A rising share = faster depletion of the stock
FREQUENCY	Monthly on Bank of Russia tonnage, quarterly on World Gold Council

NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	the quarterly World Gold Council release; monthly Bank of Russia tonnage
SOURCE	Bank of Russia (international reserves), World Gold Council, China customs, China NBS, MERICS
OBSERVATION DATE	12 Sep 2026

– BREAKDOWN

Why this is a separate widget. It is the only conversion mechanism whose ceiling is set by someone other than the regime: every other rung of the ladder is bounded by internal cost, this one by the patience of third parties.

Cash coverage and balance-sheet revaluation are not netted. The roubles raised go against the gap in full. The write-down of the unsold remainder is a separate figure: it shows the price of the operation and shrinks the future resource, but it takes not one rouble out of today's coverage. Subtracting the second from the first would understate the regime's ability to close the gap, which is to err in the direction of the panel's own thesis.

PACE, T/YR	ASSUMED PRICE FALL	CLOSES THE GAP	₽ TRN	% OF CSC 16.1	WRITE-DOWN OF REMAINDER	RATIO
100	2.1%	\$13.7 bn	1.18	7%	−\$6.5 bn	2.1 : 1
200	4.5%	\$26.8 bn	2.32	14%	−\$13.2 bn	2.0 : 1
300	7.1%	\$39.4 bn	3.40	21%	−\$19.9 bn	2.0 : 1
500	13.1%	\$61.9 bn	5.35	33%	−\$32.9 bn	1.9 : 1
700	20.1%	\$81.3 bn	7.03	44%	−\$44.7 bn	1.8 : 1
1,000	32.5%	\$103.9 bn	8.98	56%	−\$58.5 bn	1.8 : 1

The scenario band for 300 t is ₽3.26–3.53 trn of cash coverage. It is narrow because a higher realised price is almost offset by selling the same tonnage. All of the uncertainty has moved into the balance-sheet revaluation: from −\$9.1 bn in the soft scenario to −\$34.5 bn in the hard one, a spread of nearly four times.

The full scale of the share in world purchases. The denominator is a working figure of 800 t a year: close to the 2025 outturn (863 t) and above the pace taking shape in 2026 (about 690 t annualised), that is, in the regime's favour.

RUSSIAN SALES	SHARE OF WORLD CENTRAL BANK NET PURCHASES, WORKING FIGURE 800 T/YR
85.2 t — current pace	11%
100 t	13%
300 t	38%
500 t	63%
800 t	100% — the central bank sector stops being a net buyer

The regime’s dilemma, stated plainly. Every dollar raised to close the gap costs the regime around fifty cents of the value of what remains, and it grows more expensive with volume: the ratio column in the table above.

Thresholds in tonne-equivalent. The comparison runs in tonne-equivalent rather than in shares of somebody else’s purchase budget: dividing a loss by one’s own budget normalises aggregation away. There are no fitted parameters. With the price falling by p, a holder of H tonnes loses H·p tonnes of value while Russia raises $S \cdot (1 - p/2)(1 - d)$ tonnes.

RUSSIAN SALES	RUSSIA RAISED, T-EQ	CHINA	INDIA	TURKEY	THE THREE	THREE / RUSSIA
100 t	97	49	19	13	80	0.83
300 t	279	164	63	42	270	0.97
400 t	362	231	88	60	378	1.05
500 t	439	303	116	78	497	1.13
1,000 t	737	750	286	193	1,230	1.67

Crossing points in the central scenario: China alone at 978 t, China with India at 562 t, the three together at **344 t**. The working band is 344–978 t. These are outputs of a scenario model, not thresholds of political decision: the panel does not claim that at 344 t anyone is obliged to act.

Loss against the capacity of reserves. Turkey carries a relative loss exactly 4.7 times heavier than China at any volume, and for Turkey gold is the last reserve. Its position is ambivalent: Turkey earns on reselling Russian gold, which is exactly why a turn in Turkish behaviour would be an early sign.

RUSSIAN SALES	CHINA	INDIA	TURKEY
100 t	0.21%	0.38%	0.99%
300 t	0.71%	1.26%	3.32%
500 t	1.31%	2.33%	6.12%
1,000 t	3.25%	5.76%	15.15%

The point at which losses match a year's profit on exports to Russia. The current annual pace of sales is 85.2 t, and all three marks have been passed or are being passed now. A small volume of sales produces a noticeable sum not because the volume is large but because the calculated price fall applies to the holder's entire stock: 0.19% on 880 tonnes of Indian gold is exactly that \$0.24 bn. Profit is computed as exports to Russia in 2024 at a net margin of 5%, with the band at 3% and 8%³⁰.

	GOLD STOCK	PROFIT ON EXPORTS TO RUSSIA	RUSSIAN SALES AT WHICH LOSSES MATCH	CALCULATED PRICE FALL AT THAT POINT	BAND ON MARGIN
India	880 t	\$0.24 bn	10 t/yr	0.19%	6–15 t
Turkey	594 t	\$0.43 bn	25 t/yr	0.51%	15–41 t
China	2,308 t	\$6.0 bn	87 t/yr	1.84%	54–136 t
The three together	3,782 t	\$6.67 bn	60 t/yr	1.25%	—

A revaluation of stock is on paper and is realised only on sale, while profit on exports is cash; in cash terms this is not a loss. What is at stake here is political: relations with Russia stop being economically advantageous for all three countries once gold is counted as part of the balance. Export figures and margins are estimates.

What this widget does not do. It does not assess whether the reserve suffices to continue the war. The arithmetic of a stock answers the question facing an isolated state; the question here is the one facing a state at war, and the point of breakdown or halt therefore does not require the reserves to be exhausted.

Military group military inputs to the fiscal calculation

3 widgets

This is not a front-line panel. What is here are the quantities that enter the financial calculation: manpower reproduction and the price of ground, plus a widget on the depth of strikes into the Russian rear. Drone counts, advances and equipment losses are the province of [ISW](https://www.understandingwar.org) (<https://www.understandingwar.org>), [DeepState](https://deepstatemap.live) (<https://deepstatemap.live>), and other professional sources, and are deliberately absent here.

M.1

Manpower reproduction

Whether manpower reproduction works, and at what price

30 / 32 recruitment against losses, thousand/month

Recruitment of about 30,000 a month (Q2 2026) against a median loss estimate of 32,000 a month, on a CSIS range of 30–34. A crossover at the lower bound is not established; at the upper bound the excess is within 13%.



In grey, the [CSIS](https://www.csis.org) (<https://www.csis.org>) loss estimate range of 30–34 thousand a month. Selection rule: the median of the range, checked against ‘not below the Kluge estimate’; where it exceeds, the Kluge estimate is taken as resting on more series.

The zone is orange: losses exceed recruitment, recorded for less than three months. Three consecutive months takes it to red. Green requires recruitment to exceed losses; yellow requires parity within ±5%.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

THE PRICE OF A CONTRACT IS RISING WITHOUT RAISING RECRUITMENT	Average regional signing bonuses went from ₺1.47 mn in March to ₺1.65 mn in August 2026, an all-time high. Deflated by InFOM, not by Rosstat
WHY PRICE CANNOT BE THE LEAD INDICATOR	It is informative only while recruitment runs on money. Once coercion takes over — widened categories, conscripts, administrative pressure — the price stops rising or falls while the shortfall worsens, and a lead indicator would turn in the opposite direction to what it measures. The quiet mobilisation ladder is already at rung 2, and elements of rung 4 are observed
HOW RECRUITMENT IS COUNTED	From budget spending only, without relying on official statements. Q1: 71,200 contracts ≈ 23,700 a month (₺28.5 bn of federal signing bonuses at a ₺400,000 rate); a cross-check across 40 regions gives ≈ 70,500. Q2: about 30,000 a month — reaching a plateau
KNOWN WEAKNESSES OF THE BALANCE	Wounded personnel returning to service, wounded counted as new contracts, unrecorded non-combat losses, and discrepancies in official recruitment data.

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

M.2

Price of ground

The form ‘km² per 1,000 losses’ is bounded below by zero, unlike its inverse. Zones are measured against the 2025 level

1.18 km² per 1,000 losses · 10% of the 2025 level

Advance into control of 37.85³¹ km² in July 2026 ([ISW](https://www.understandingwar.org) (<https://www.understandingwar.org>)), 1.22 km² a day, against losses of 32,000 a month ([CSIS](https://www.csis.org) (<https://www.csis.org>) median). Zones are measured against the 2025 level — 11.6 km² per 1,000 losses — rather than against an absolute figure: an offensive costing 1 km² per thousand men cannot be treated as a norm.



The base is the 2025 average rate: 4,831 km² against 416,600 losses = 11.6 km² per 1,000. Zones as shares of that base: green ≥100% · yellow 70–100% · orange 30–70% · red under 30% where the second component is also met.

The value stands at 10% of the 2025 level. The zone is red: a three-month moving average of the net balance no greater than 20 km², with the price of ground below 30% of the 2025 base. The zone reflects a physical fact and is not conditional on that fact being acknowledged by the Russian side.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

WHY THE CONSERVATIVE COUNT WAS CHOSEN, AND WHAT IT IS WORTH	Both series are estimates: the indicator is the quotient of ISW-confirmed advance and the CSIS median loss estimate. Alternative series exist — counting infiltration as advance, and losses on Ukrainian General Staff data — and both would give a better picture for Russia on ground taken (though that is without Ukrainian infiltration, which likewise does not enter confirmed control) and a worse one on losses. The panel deliberately takes the smaller variant on both territory and losses, and holds that the alternative series will show up in the conservative one with a lag: infiltration converts into confirmed control within weeks, and higher losses appear in family payments and funerals within one to three months. The indicator lags — and that is its value: it confirms what has already happened rather than what is supposed.
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE BALANCE TURNS NEGATIVE	If a point is reached where the net balance of occupied territory turns negative, an additional widget will be introduced to measure the rollback: the losses and the time spent returning to a level of occupied territory that had already been reached earlier

Three figures that do not add up with one another, because they arise in different cases. — PUTTING A MAN IN THE FIELD: signing bonuses of about ₴2.05 mn (₴400,000 federal plus regional, averaging ₴1.65 mn as of August 2026) plus six months of pay at ₴1.3–1.5 mn; ₴3.4–3.6 mn in total. The six-month horizon is justified by turnover: with recruitment of 360,000–400,000 a year against a force of about a million, a half-year contract is a conservative unit of account rather than a measurement of average time in service. — DEATH: payments to the family of about ₴9–11 mn — the federal lump sum, insurance, and regional payments. — WOUNDING WITH DISABILITY: a lump sum of up to ₴3 mn for injury plus a pension, for which no series has been collected. Adding all three together would embed an implicit distribution of outcomes that the panel does not have: each figure applies to its own event, and the full cost of one man lost depends on the structure of outcomes, which is not published.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

Recruitment exceeds the upper bound of the loss estimate by 10% for three consecutive months · the real price of a contract, deflated by InFOM, falls while recruitment rises at the same time.

CONF. M	CONSTRAINT	DERIVED	IRREVERSIBLE – DEMOGRAPHIC EXPENDITURE
DIRECTION	Losses exceeding recruitment = deterioration		
FREQUENCY	Monthly		
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	as regional budget data are published		
SOURCE	Janis Kluge’s reconstruction from Finance Ministry and regional budget data; CSIS (https://www.csis.org) on losses		
OBSERVATION DATE	1 Aug 2026		

– BREAKDOWN

The six-month horizon used to cost putting a man in the field is justified by turnover: with recruitment on the order of 360,000–400,000 a year against a force of about a million, a half-year contract is a conservative unit of account. It is given as an approximation, not as a measurement of average time in service.

The exchange rate against the cost of the means of destruction. An FPV drone costs \$400–600. Even at ten drones per kill, the exchange is on the order of 1:300 by cost of entry. The figure is computed entirely from open Russian budget data.

The link to the [quiet mobilisation ladder](#). An all-time high in signing bonuses against an uncovered shortfall is rung 1: the mechanism still works, and the regime is paying for it. Rung 3 arrives when the price is no longer raised, not when it rises. That is why the price is read only together with the balance: the same figure means opposite things on different rungs.

YEAR-ON-YEAR COMPARISON	2025: 4,831 km², 13.24 km²/day, 11.6 km² per 1,000 losses. 2024: 4,168 km², 9.87 km²/day, about 9.8 per 1,000. July 2025: 455.74 km² against 37.85 in July 2026 — a twelvefold fall. 2023, counting Ukrainian counter-offensives, gave a net minus on the order of 400–500 km² (L, derived from two different series)
RULE FOR SELECTING THE FIGURE	Advance into control as geolocated and confirmed by ISW is used, rather than the sum including infiltration: infiltration is presence without holding, and ISW (https://www.understandingwar.org) acknowledged on 1 Jul 2026 that its infiltration map overstates Russian presence. Losses are the CSIS median, checked against Kluge. On the sum including infiltration (121.56 km²) and Ukrainian General Staff loss data, the figure would be 2.84 km² per 1,000 losses
RULE FOR THE BOUNDS OF THE SERIES	ISW-confirmed data is the lower bound of Ukrainian gains and unconfirmed OSINT the upper; a trigger is declared on the lower bound

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

The tempo is paid for in assaults, and that is the main line of expenditure. At a median estimate of 30,000–34,000 losses a month and an advance of 37.85 km², Russia is paying about 845 losses for one square kilometre taken — eight to ten times more than the same kilometre cost at the earlier rate of advance. The inverse ratio is given here because in that form the figure is comparable with historical cases where the count was kept the same way. The cases below are heterogeneous in how losses are defined and are offered as an anchor of scale, not as proof. — VERDUN, 21 FEBRUARY TO 18 DECEMBER 1916: 302 days and 714,000 casualties on both sides — 377,000 French and 337,000 German³² — and by December the French were back roughly on the positions from which the battle had begun. That averages 70,000 casualties a month across both sides, or about 35,000 per side: the Verdun rate of expenditure is the present Russian one. The difference is duration: Verdun lasted ten months, while Russia has held this rate for a twenty-ninth consecutive month. — THE BELGOROD–KHARKOV OPERATION &RUMYANTSEV&RQUO;, 3–23 AUGUST 1943: the Red Army lost 255,566 men in twenty-one days — 71,611 irrecoverable and 183,955 sick and wounded, 22% of the initial strength of the force, or 12,170 men a day.³³ What those three weeks bought: Belgorod, Kharkov, Akhtyrka, Bogodukhov, Lebedin, the destruction of the Belgorod–Kharkov grouping, and an advance of 140 km in depth along a front 300–400 km wide. The area liberated is not published directly; the estimate derived from these parameters is no less than 20,000 km², and the lower bound is taken deliberately, since overstating it would work in favour of the panel’s thesis. The comparison is direct: over January–July 2026 the Russian side spent a comparable quantity across seven months, advanced roughly 745 km² — counting infiltration, i.e. on the overstating measure³⁴ — and did not take Kostyantynivka, a town of about 67,000 before the war. **Twenty-seven times less ground over ten times more time: the return per day is lower by a factor of about 270.** Historically, expenditure of this order bought Ukraine’s largest industrial centre and its former capital — together with another major regional centre in Belgorod, the destruction of an enemy grouping and a hundred

kilometres of depth. — WHAT FOLLOWS FROM THIS AND WHAT DOES NOT: it does not follow that a limit is near. What follows is something else — the known historical cases offer no combination of Verdun-scale expenditure with an advance measured in one square kilometre a day, sustained into a third year. Expenditure of that order usually buys either a breakthrough or a halt. Here it buys neither. **This is the quantity that separates exhaustion of the economy from exhaustion of the capacity to attack** — a regime able to do nothing does not pay such a price; see [the distinction the panel draws](#) under Scope and refusals. — Holding here is not only a matter of combat but of reporting: the indicator is held up by the price not being shown. ISW acknowledged on 1 Jul 2026 that its infiltration map overstates Russian presence; Russian units do not report the loss of positions; the Ukrainian command uses the fog of war. All three sources of understatement work in the same direction — toward understating Russian losses and overstating Russian advance — so the real price of ground is higher than the published one.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

A return to 8.1 km² per 1,000 losses — 70% of the 2025 level — with a positive net territorial balance for three consecutive months. The threshold is deliberately set below the 2024 average (about 9.8), so the falsifier counts even at a rate worse than the year before last.

CONF. · H ON ADVANCE · M ON LOSSES · M ON THE RATIO		CONSTRAINT	DERIVED
DIRECTION	A fall = deterioration		
FREQUENCY	Monthly		
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	early September		
SOURCE	ISW (advance and net balance) · CSIS (losses)		
OBSERVATION DATE	1 Aug 2026		

– BREAKDOWN

Why acknowledgement of lost initiative is kept out of the definition of the zone. It has been argued that the red zone should require a second, political condition — that the loss of initiative be registered in Russian public discourse. The condition is not relevant for this panel. The reason: the panel measures observable reality rather than decision-making in the Kremlin, and a zone that depends on one side’s rhetoric makes the scale controllable by that side — a regime that acknowledges nothing would hold the widget at orange indefinitely. Acknowledgement retains significance, but of a different kind: it determines whether the Kremlin can sell the conduct of the war as a success at home, not whether it can continue the war. As a separate observation it remains a useful leading marker — the cheapest version being complaints by Russian military bloggers about unreported losses of positions — but it does not enter the definition of the zone.

A note on interpretation. The objection that a low rate is a choice rather than a limit does not form a separate category. Not choosing reduces to one of three things: incapacity; restraint under an external constraint, which operationally is the same incapacity; or a preference for another way of inflicting damage, which is a choice in favour of greater rather than lesser

effectiveness. The widget measures the price of ground, not intent, and in that formulation the distinction is not required.

Depth of strike on the Russian rear

The ladders are ordered by what stops being protected, not by the number or range of strikes

5 · 6 · 5 · —

rung of 7 on circuits A, B, C, D · winter set from 1 Oct

The widget is one-sided: it measures only the result of Ukrainian strikes on Russia. The rungs are ordered by what the regime ceases to be able to protect — first the periphery, then depth, then the productive core, then the symbolic and strategic centre. What it discriminates is not the scale of the damage but the class of object that has lost protection: a hundred strikes on border-area depots do not change what the regime can promise to defend, while one confirmed strike on an assembly node does.

– A · REFINING AND THE FUEL CIRCUIT

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
0	Strikes do not reach refineries	passed
1	Isolated hits in a border strip up to 300 km; output restored within weeks	passed
2	Repeated hits at 500–1,000 km; cumulative capacity loss up to 10%	passed
3	Secondary refining units hit — cracking, reforming, hydrotreating — with irreversibility often running 12–18 months	PASSED · Orsk refinery, 11 Aug 2026, repairs up to six months per the governor’s statement
4	Cumulative loss above 25% of primary capacity; more than 20 of the 33 largest plants affected	PASSED · the 25% threshold cleared with room to spare: 2.14 mn bbl/day, almost a third of primary capacity, on Energy Intelligence’s assessment as of 11 Jun 2026 ³⁵ . 24 of the 33 largest plants have been affected and 13 halted; after the strike on the Omsk refinery on 6 Jul 2026 not one of the ten largest by capacity remained never attacked ³⁶

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
5	Hits beyond 2,000 km from the border	PASSED · Omsk refinery, the largest in Russia, about 2,500 km, 6 Jul 2026 ¹¹ · Tyumen refinery, about 2,000 km, Oct 2025 · Ukhta refinery, 1,750 km, early 2026
6	The rate of damage exceeds the rate of restoration for three consecutive months while the tank farm is exhausted	not passed · series not collected. Material in favour: the Moscow refinery halted in June with repairs estimated into 2027; actual refining in the first week of June 2026 below 4 mn bbl/day — a 21-year low ³⁵
7	Repair work ceases at half or more of the damaged plants, as an admission that what is repaired cannot be protected	not passed

– B · EXPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND MARITIME LOGISTICS

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
0	Export terminals out of reach	passed
1	Isolated strikes, loading uninterrupted	passed
2	Loading suspended at an individual terminal for up to a week	passed
3	Force majeure declared on export contracts	PASSED · March 2026
4	Simultaneous shutdown of several terminals in one port accounting for more than half the exports of a commodity group	PASSED · NKHP and the Novorossiysk grain terminal on 12 Aug 2026, KSK on 13 Aug — more than half of wheat exports

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
5	Loss of safe-haven status: a rise in the insurance premium or refusal by shipowners to call at the port	PASSED · the Azov and Black Seas. Both conditions of the rung are met separately and confirmed by market series: freight rates for CPC and Novorossiysk more than doubled in two months ³⁷ , the war risk premium doubled ³⁸ , most shipowners decline Russian Black Sea ports, and the Russian state introduced its own reinsurance to keep cover available. Breakdown in the detail below
6	Strikes on export infrastructure, warships and vessels in the Baltic and the Caspian, outside the Black and Azov Seas	PASSED · Ust-Luga and Vysotsk, Baltic oil ports, 6 Jul 2026; Lukoil platforms, dry cargo ships and an Iranian vessel in the Caspian, 25 Jul 2026
7	Strikes on export infrastructure, warships and vessels in the Arctic and other distant seas and oceans	has not occurred

– C · STRATEGIC MILITARY CENTRES, THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND MILITARY PRODUCTION

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
0	Defence plants and command bodies out of reach; strikes confined to the border strip	PASSED
1	Repeated hits at 500–1,000 km: second-tier plants, depots, defence order logistics	PASSED
2	First confirmed hit on a node of a key production cycle — strike UAV assembly, powder and filling plants, electronics, rocket fuel, arsenals	PASSED
3	Repeated strikes on the same node with workshop destruction confirmed by satellite imagery or ground video: the object cannot be protected, rather than having gone unprotected once	PASSED

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
4	Repeated hits in Moscow oblast; hits on missile production plants	PASSED
5	Strategic level: fleet bases, long-range aviation airfields; destruction of more than three ballistic missile launchers in a month	PASSED on the fleet bases component
6	Strikes in Moscow; hits on military command bodies, including the group headquarters in Rostov-on-Don	has not occurred
7	Destruction of military production plants ceases to be an event and becomes a process: confirmed total destruction of plants in different regions, relocation of strategic production and command bodies beyond the Urals	has not occurred

– D • POWER AND HEAT GENERATION • WINTER SET, ACTIVATES 1 OCT

RUNG	WHAT STOPS BEING PROTECTED	STATUS
0	Normal operation, reserve capacity within norms	winter set
1	Local emergency outages explained by wear	winter set
2	Rolling blackouts in a district or a city of over 100,000	winter set
3	Rolling blackouts in a city of over a million	winter set
4	Restricted heat supply during the heating season in a city of over a million	winter set
5	Restricted heat supply simultaneously in more than two federal subjects, in cities of over 100,000	winter set
6	Organised evacuation of the population for lack of heat in a city of over 100,000	winter set
7	Organised evacuation of the population for lack of heat in a city of over a million	winter set

The winter set is not activated. The speed at which rungs are passed is tracked from the opening of the observation window on 1 Jan 2026 and published separately by circuit: rungs on different circuits are opened by different kinds of gate and do not add up across circuits.

– DETAIL AND CAVEATS

MANDATORY CAVEAT — WHAT THE WIDGET DOES NOT MEASURE

Repeated strikes have not stopped production permanently: some plants halted temporarily, some only partially. Over the year the Alabuga special economic zone expanded by 340 hectares, with new hangars going up in its northern part. Output of strike UAVs grew: 11,000 launches against Ukraine in 2024 against 50,000 in 2025, of which more than 30,000 were manufactured there. The ladder measures loss of protection, not the effect of the strikes: a rung means the object cannot be protected, not that it has been suppressed. Reading the widget as “military production has been suppressed” is wrong and is refuted by the figures given here.

CIRCUIT B, RUNG 5 — WHAT IT RESTS ON

Refusals to call. Late July 2026: a trader on the Russian oil market told Reuters that elevated risk was making most shipowners decline Russian Black Sea ports. Two weeks later S&P Global received the same signal from a broker. **Freight prices.** Baltic Exchange, CPC and Novorossiysk tankers: WS230 in mid-June → WS530 on 10 Aug 2026, more than doubling in two months. TCE Novorossiysk–Vadinar: \$262,000 a day on 3 Aug → \$439,000 on 7 Aug. **War risk insurance.** 0.6–0.8% of vessel value after the December attacks → above 1% of hull by 21 Jul 2026, and around 1.5% per voyage with some brokers. On 6 Aug 2026 the Russian National Reinsurance Company set a rate of 1% of hull value for the dangerous areas of the Azov and Black Seas, covering the first seven days alone. **This matters more than the rate itself:** the state had to create a reinsurance mechanism for shipping to continue at all — the commercial market stopped covering the risk on its own. **Administrative closure.** On 10 Jul 2026, after strikes on thirteen vessels including ten tankers, navigation on the Azov–Don canal was halted and applications for passage through the Kerch Strait stopped being accepted; on 13 Jul Reuters confirmed the restrictions remained. Up to 25% of Russian wheat exports pass through that route

CIRCUIT B — CONSEQUENCES, NOT THE BASIS OF THE RUNG

Given separately, because **the ladder measures loss of protection rather than the effect of strikes**, and a rung cannot rest on the volume of lost exports. **Grain.** By 13 Aug 2026 less than 10% of grain export capacity in the Azov–Black Sea basin was operating³⁹, on SovEcon’s assessment. Novorossiysk: NZT, NKHP and KSK halted — about 26.1 mn tonnes a year between them. The Taman grain terminal is closed

and navigation in the Azov has been shut since July. In the previous season the basin accounted for 88% of Russian seaborne grain shipments, 46.3 mn tonnes. SovEcon's forecast of 19 Aug for August wheat exports is 2.2 mn tonnes against 4.5 mn a year earlier: the lowest since 2010. **Oil.** Shipments through Novorossiysk: 0.8–1.0 mn bbl/day in June–July → about 0.4 mn bbl/day in the first half of August (Reuters, 19 Aug). What is observed is a shift from a normal commercial regime to one of risk premiums, refusals, intermittent stoppages and a slipping schedule

CIRCUIT C – WHAT THE RUNGS REST ON

Rung 2, first hit on a node of a cycle. Yelabuga, the Alabuga special economic zone, 1,054 km, Apr 2024 · Kremniy-El, Bryansk, electronics, Mar 2026 · Chapayevsk, Samara oblast, Mar 2026 · the Bryansk chemical plant at Seltso, explosives production, May 2026 · the GRAU arsenal at Kedrovka, Sverdlovsk oblast, 25 Apr 2026. **Rung 3, repetition with confirmed destruction.** Yelabuga: a series in Apr 2025, May 2025 and repeatedly in Jun 2025; the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed damage to the final assembly workshop, and the strike of 15 Jun 2025 was confirmed by OSINT⁴⁰. Dubna: Raduga and Kronshtadt have been targeted more than once, confirmed as of Jul 2026. **Rung 4, Moscow oblast and missile production.** Dubna — the Berezhnyak Raduga machine building plant, part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation, producing Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-69 and Kh-59MK cruise missiles; also the Kronshtadt UAV plant and Angstrom microelectronics; the Dubna space communications centre, 22 Jun 2026 · Zelenograd, the Elma technology park · the Kamensky works, Rostov oblast, 16 Aug 2026: solid rocket motors, six facilities hit, restoration running from several months to several years. **Rung 5, strategic level.** Kronstadt, a Baltic Fleet base, 3 Jun 2026 on the opening day of the St Petersburg forum: the Project 20380 corvette Boiky was hit in dry dock, and again on 6 Jun 2026⁴¹ · Novorossiysk, a Black Sea Fleet base, 12 Aug 2026: four ships hit. Long-range aviation airfields and the count of launchers are not collected

QUANTITATIVE BASIS · MILITARY PRODUCTION

No fewer than fifteen military and dual-use plants⁴² named individually by the Ukrainian General Staff, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, or confirmed by OSINT. Strike UAV assembly: Yelabuga, the Alabuga zone, a series of strikes in 2024–2025. Missiles and aviation: Dubna — the Berezhnyak Raduga machine building

plant, part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation, producing Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-69 and Kh-59MK cruise missiles; the Kronshtadt UAV plant on the same site; Angstrom microelectronics likewise; the Dubna space communications centre, 22 Jun 2026. Electronics: Kremniy-El, Bryansk, Mar 2026; the Elma technology park, Zelenograd; Mikroprotsessornye Tekhnologii. Rocket fuel and explosives: the Kamensky works at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov oblast, 16 Aug 2026 — solid rocket motors, six facilities hit, restoration running from several months to several years; the Bryansk chemical plant at Seltso, May 2026; Chapayevsk, Samara oblast, Mar 2026; the Shchekinoazot chemical works; the Dmitrovsky works, Ivanovo oblast. Arsenal: the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate arsenal at Kedrovka, Sverdlovsk oblast, 25 Apr 2026; an artillery brigade repair and restoration base and logistics depots, 3 Aug 2026. Airfields: Millerovo, Gvardeyskoye and others. The list is knowingly incomplete and is given as a lower bound

QUANTITATIVE BASIS · EXTRACTION,
STORAGE, OFFSHORE FACILITIES

Offshore extraction: all three of Lukoil's fixed platforms in the Russian sector of the Caspian⁴³ — Filanovsky, Korchagin and Grayfer — have been hit repeatedly, in no fewer than four episodes between December 2025 and April 2026; at the Korchagin field critical equipment was damaged and production processes halted; the distance is about a thousand kilometres from the line of contact. Refining inside Moscow's boundaries: the Moscow refinery at Kapotnya was hit on 16 and 18 June 2026⁴⁴, knocking out both primary distillation units in succession, including the ELOU-AVT-6; Reuters sources say the plant will not resume operation for at least six months. Repetition: the Perm refinery, a third strike in a few weeks, May 2026. Storage: oil depots at Ust-Labinsk, the Petergofskaya depot and the Neste terminal at Lomonosov in Leningrad oblast, and the depot at Poltavskaya in Krasnodar krai. In total, on General Staff data as of June 2026, sixteen large refineries and terminals had been hit and more than forty process units shut down. On Reuters' assessment, by the end of May 2026 not one large refinery in European Russia remained never attacked

QUANTITATIVE BASIS · REFINING AND
FUEL

No fewer than 194 strikes on refineries in the first half of 2026¹¹, eleven times more than in the same period of 2025 (Financial Times, July 2026). 24 of the 33 largest plants have been attacked and 13 halted wholly or in part; after 6 Jul 2026 not one of the ten

largest by capacity remained never attacked³⁶.
Capacity taken offline is given as two dated snapshots rather than a single figure — they cannot be combined, a month of strikes separates them, and the two assessments count different things. **11 Jun 2026, Energy Intelligence:** 2.14 mn bbl/day of primary capacity offline, almost a third of the Russian total³⁵. **17 Jun 2026, Novaya Gazeta Europe's own calculation:** thirteen plants halted wholly or partly, with combined capacity of about 109 mn tonnes of crude a year — roughly 40% of refining, up to 41% of petrol and up to 44% of diesel; the publication notes that the exact utilisation of some plants is unknown⁴⁵.
The panel carries the lower of the two estimates and dates it: the figure refers to June rather than to the release anchor date, and strikes continued after June — so it is a lower bound, not the current state. Petrol output covers about 65% of average seasonal demand (Reuters, July 2026)

STORAGE OF CRUDE AND PRODUCTS — A
MODIFIER OF SPEED, NOT A SEPARATE
CIRCUIT

Tank farm capacity cannot be added to refining capacity: different units. But the stock determines the lag between a plant being hit and the administrative response — the larger it is, the later rationing arrives for the same loss of capacity. It is treated as a correction to speed rather than as an addend to capacity

OBSERVED IRREVERSIBILITY

The Orsk refinery was fully halted after the strike of 11 Aug 2026; the governor of Orenburg oblast stated that the equipment is imported, that sanctions will stretch repairs out to six months, and that they were preparing for the worst case. The mechanism of irreversibility is confirmed not by an analyst's assessment but by a statement from the responsible official

THE LINK TO WIDGET 1.3 — WHY THE
FUEL CIRCUIT APPEARS TWICE

Widget 1.3 measures the administrative response: what the state is forced to do to its citizens when petrol runs short. Ladder A measures loss of protection: what the state has ceased to be able to defend. The same strike moves the two scales differently and with different lags — the destruction of a unit registers instantly, while rationing arrives once the tank farm is drawn down. The divergence between the scales is itself a measure of the stock remaining

WHAT IS NOT IN THE WIDGET, AND
WHY

A counter of launches and a counter of objects hit are both excluded for one reason: each measures the input rather than the capacity removed. The rail network was considered and rejected: damage is repaired or bypassed by rerouting, and a large share of

traction is diesel in any case. Ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers were rejected: the shortfall is covered by purchases on the world market

– COST OF HOLDING THE POSITION

By circuit, separately: export infrastructure, weeks; secondary refining units, often 12–18 months; UAV assembly nodes, restored within weeks where imported components are available. **But restoration times are not the whole price. Holding is paid for with air defence, and that bill grows faster than the damage.** Observed forms: air defence assets moved from the front to cover rear facilities; separate units and mobile firing groups formed for the counter-UAV task; fighters and helicopters used as interceptors — engine life spent on a target costing thousands of dollars; surface-to-air missiles expended whose production competes for the same capacity and components as strike weapons. **The consequence is selectivity, declared by the very order of cover.** A limited list of facilities is defended and the rest of the territory is left exposed. This is not an economic decision. A regime whose legitimacy is built on the ability to wage war and to protect is admitting that it cannot protect the population across the whole territory — and the admission is made not by statement but by allocation. **The payer for protection has changed, and this is fixed in law.** Article 16 of Federal Law No. 256-FZ establishes that security measures at energy facilities are financed out of the energy companies’ own funds; article 12 places on the owner the duty to ensure the facility operates safely and permits the engagement of armed physical protection structures. Finance Ministry letter No. 03-03-06/1/77457 of 11 Aug 2025 closes the construction: security costs are deductible against profit tax, and the equipment is depreciated as a fixed asset.⁴⁶ The scheme can be named in full: strikes → the enterprise buys protection at its own expense → the state shares part of the cost through forgone tax but does not pay for the protection itself. For regulated companies the costs can pass into the tariff, that is, to the consumer. **What is recorded here.** The monetary sum is small, and it is not entered in the Conversion log. What is recorded is something else: since March 2026 certain private security companies have been receiving combat small arms from Rosgvardia for temporary use, to counter drones.⁴⁷ A regime whose monopoly on armed violence is a basic condition of its stability is arming non-state structures in order not to pay for cover out of the budget. That is a price not denominated in rubles. **The marker of further movement:** the permission extending beyond energy and strategic facilities, or the appearance of a requirement that owners provide cover at their own expense as a condition of operation.

– WHAT WOULD FALSIFY THIS

A class of object returns to a protected state, confirmed by strikes on that class ceasing for three months while the campaign as a whole continues at the same intensity · any circuit recovering above its rung, confirmed by the reversal of the corresponding administrative action.

CONF. H ON RUSSIAN CAPACITY AND DATEABLE EVENTS · L ON THE SPEED AT WHICH RUNGS ARE PASSED
CONSTRAINT
BY CIRCUIT: EXPORT INFRASTRUCTURE WEEKS, SECONDARY REFINING UNITS OFTEN 12–18 MONTHS

DIRECTION	Moving up a rung = the next class of object loses protection
FREQUENCY	Monthly
NEXT CHECK OF THE SERIES	circuit D — from 1 Oct 2026
SOURCE	Financial Times, Reuters, Ukrainian General Staff, OSINT verification, statements by regional authorities
OBSERVATION DATE	13 Aug 2026
- BREAKDOWN	
Why the ordering is by class of object rather than by range. Range is a technical characteristic of the weapon, not a property of what is being defended. The same range can mean a strike on a depot or a strike on an assembly node — politically and economically these are different events. The class of object that has lost protection tells them apart; a counter of kilometres does not.	

Tier 3 — inputs, confirmations, context

tier 44 entries · live series 49 of 57 · discontinued or unpublished 3 · published but not collected by the project 5.
3 Discontinuing a publication stops being evasion and becomes a reading.

INDICATOR	CURRENT	CONF.	PURPOSE	DATE
Concealment multiple · deferral multiple	How many times larger the volume under deferred recognition is than the volume recognised. Not a measure of falsification: a bank that restructured a loan on the CBR’s direct recommendation broke no rule — it is a measure of how much has been deferred. SMEs 4.0× (about 5% formally impaired against more than 20% impaired and restructured, on NKR and Expert RA forecasts for end-2026) · corporate portfolio 3.2× (arrears 3.6% against impaired 11.7%) and 6.6× on the stock of restructured loans (23.7% of the portfolio excluding SMEs, over ₰20.7 trn cumulatively since 19 Feb 2022) · largest companies 3.0× (25% in the yellow and red zones in the systemically important banks’ survey against 75.4% of debt at EBITDA-to-interest below 3) · unsecured retail 2.3× (5.8% against 13.2%). The range is 2.3–6.6×, at its maximum where the borrower is weaker and concealment is cheaper. CAVEATS: the stock of restructured loans includes the 2022 sanctions reconfiguration, so 23.7% is an outer bound. The figures for the largest companies are not equivalent: a calculation from borrower accounts measures the margin of safety, while the banks’ survey measures markers of loan impairment. WHAT IS INFORMATIVE IS NOT THE LEVEL BUT THE WIDENING GAP: over six months the calculated figure for the largest companies rose 8.8 pp while the banks’ own assessment worsened by 2 pp — the divergence grew by 6.8 pp	M	A measure of volume under deferred recognition. To be checked against the next issues of the CBR bulletin on restructuring dynamics and the banking sector review	1 Jun 2026 CHECK

INDICATOR	CURRENT	CONF.	PURPOSE	DATE
Motor petrol output	Publication discontinued on 29 May 2024 ⁴⁸ (Rosstat / Energy Ministry). The series against which coverage of seasonal demand would be checked does not exist	—	Direct measurement of the fuel balance; replaced by the indirect markers of ladder 1.3	29 May 2024 CHECK
Diesel and petroleum product output	Publication discontinued in August 2024 by government decision ⁴⁸ . The last data are for June 2024: 6.8 mn tonnes for the month, –8.1% year on year	—	The diesel constraint can be read only indirectly, through the petrol ladder and the refining ladder	28 Aug 2024 CHECK
Nominal GDP	2025 GDP = ₹212 ± 3 trn (actual, adopted 17 Aug 2026). Reconstructed 2026 GDP: 9–11% year on year, a level of ₹231–236 trn. GDP deflator 8.5–11.5% by component (consumption 13–15%, general government about 14.5%, capital formation 13–15%, exports in rubles –10 to –18%) plus real growth of 0 to +1%	M	The denominator of widget 1.2 and of every ratio to 2026 GDP. The planned figure — ₹235,067 bn under the 2026 federal budget law ¹ — is published as a reference point and not used as a denominator: it embeds the government's assumptions about real growth and the deflator, which is precisely what the panel is testing.	4 Aug 2026
CBR repo: volume and persistence	₹5,244.1 bn on 18 Aug 2026 ⁴⁹ , all through the main auction; standing facilities at zero. A week earlier the structure was different: ₹4,311.6 bn through the auction plus ₹990.4 bn through the additional facility, with ₹900.3 bn of overnight added on 12 Aug. So the weekly auction stepped up by roughly ₹0.93 trn while the expensive backup channel was folded into it	H	An exhibit against the objection that repo is not monetisation. The instrument does not determine the substance: repo is not monetisation if it is temporary and unwinds. It is monetisation in substance if the stock is persistent, growing and not contracting, and the maturity of the funding is shorter than the maturity of the asset. What is tested is persistence, not the name of the operation	18 Aug 2026
Bank claims on general government	Series not collected. The second series of the exhibit: monthly dynamics of banking sector claims on general government against banks' liabilities to the CBR, with OFZ auction dates on the axis. Synchronous movement around placements would mean the source of the purchases is newly created reserves rather than previously accumulated savings; growth in claims on the state without growth in liabilities to the CBR would mean banks are buying out of deposit inflows — and then the objection stands	—	Refutes the monetisation construction: a reduction in liabilities to the CBR while claims on the state continue to grow	—
Fulfilment of the annual revenue plan	₹22,112 bn over January–July against an annual plan of ₹40,283.3 bn (the 2026 law). Linear extrapolation gives ₹37.9 trn — a shortfall of about ₹2.4 trn. Russian revenue is skewed toward the fourth quarter, so a linear estimate understates; but if the outturn comes in at ₹38 trn, the CSC-to-revenue ratio is 42.4% rather than 40%	M	The denominator of the headline ratio. To be checked on nine-month results	4 Aug 2026
Who buys the OFZ: the systemic banks' share at auctions · series collected	Monthly: 29.1 (Aug 2025) · 28.6 (Sep, the low) · 52.4 (Oct) · 61.0 (Nov, the peak) · 54.0 (Dec) · 37.0 (Jan 2026) · 40.3 (Feb) · 36.3 (Apr) · 42.5 (May) · 41.0 (Jun) · 19.3 (Jul). In July the bulk of the volume went to non-bank financial institutions: 57% under trust management plus 21.8% from their own funds	H	A test of the monetisation construction from the buyer's side. The result is ambiguous and is published as it stands	31 Jul 2026

INDICATOR	CURRENT	CONF.	PURPOSE	DATE
Systemically important banks in the OFZ secondary market · the September value is the decisive check on the episode of 2 Sep 2026	They remain the largest net sellers while buying at auctions: taking new issues from the Finance Ministry and selling old ones out of the portfolio. Aggregate net purchases fell from ₺165 bn in April to ₺85.3 bn in May	M	A discriminator: buying at auction while selling in the secondary market means substitution rather than an inflow of new money into government debt	30 Jun 2026
Floating-rate OFZ share of the portfolio	33% (July 2026): 43% (end-2024) → 38% (end-2025) → 35% (April). The Finance Ministry's target is 25–30%. The fall was passive — the absolute volume did not change, and two thirds of the fall came from dilution of the denominator	H	The carrier of interest rate sensitivity. The direction turned in July 2026 with the registration of 29030 and 29031 for ₺1.5 trn	31 Jul 2026
Depletion of the reserve (NWF)	Gold: 160.2 t (1 Jan) → 145.3 (1 Apr) → 141.08 (1 Jul) → 141.24 t (1 Aug — up by 0.16 t). Yuan: 209.2 (1 Jan) → 189.68 bn (1 Aug). Depletion over 2026: gold –11.8%, yuan –9.3%	H	The lead unit is tonnage, not rubles	1 Aug 2026
Outflow into cash, month on month	₺643.4 bn (July); April about 607, June 449.7. The rate is +2.9% month on month against +2.1% in June	H on the values, L on the trend	The series is ragged and no trend is established. The only flow that does not return to the system	31 Jul 2026
Cash, year on year	+18.5%	H	Red zone under the project's internal rule	31 Jul 2026
The cash-minus-M2 gap	5.3 pp	H	Indirect evidence in the signature tree (the 5 pp threshold has been crossed)	1 Jul 2026
Key rate	14.00% — cut by 25 bp on 24 Jul 2026, the fifth cut of the year against the CBR's own raised inflation forecast (6–7% against 4.5–5.5%)	H	Easing while your own forecast worsens is a revealed preference, not a modelling error. The next meeting is on 11 Sep 2026	24 Jul 2026
Key rate net of inflation	–0.7 pp on expected InFOM inflation, –1.1 pp on observed	M	Negative: the rate has ceased to be an instrument of tightening and become a parameter of a subsidy. It determines the reading regime of widget 1.2	31 Jul 2026
The long OFZ minus key rate spread	+2.0–2.4 pp	H	The market is not pricing in disinflation	1 Aug 2026
₺/\$ rate	82	H	A strong ruble currently works against the budget: export earnings are converted at a less favourable rate	8 Aug 2026
Household term deposits as a share of M2	34.0–34.3%, falling 0.3 pp a month	H	At the current rate the 32% threshold is about seven months away	1 Aug 2026
Bank liabilities to the CBR	₺6.6 trn on 14 Aug 2026 against ₺3.637 trn at end-2025 — up 81% in 7.5 months, a rate of +₺0.40 trn a month	H	Rung 1 of the refinancing ladder. It replaces the cash leak ruble for ruble. The series is the operational one; the balance sheet line for CBR credit is unusable — at 1 Jan 2026 it was inflated by the annual repo peak	14 Aug 2026

INDICATOR	CURRENT	CONF.	PURPOSE	DATE
Structural liquidity deficit	₽2.7 trn — the highest since March 2022 (0.587 in January → 1.0 in April → 2.0 in June)	H	The CBR forecast for end-2026 has been raised to ₽2.4–3.6 trn	13 Aug 2026
Bank provisioning charges	+₽77 bn (+38%) in June	H	A marker that instead of enforcement against a bad borrower there is an extension — the payer of the rollover	30 Jun 2026
State companies' share of corporate portfolio growth	about half (June 2026)	M	A discriminator for the purpose of refinancing. The third falsification statement for the CSC	30 Jun 2026
Bank liabilities to the CBR as % of liabilities	not collected	—	The main candidate on the banking branch	—
Share of restructured corporate loans	not collected	—	Leads overdue debt by two to four quarters	—
Index of maximum deposit rates · series collected	Monthly: 15.63 (Dec 2025) · 15.10 → 14.88 → 14.57 (Jan, by ten-day period) · 14.49 (Feb) · 12.97 (May) · 12.79 → 12.83 → 12.85 (July) · 12.89 (first ten days of August). Down 2.74 pp over eight months, stabilising since May	H	The panel's only ten-day series. The real deposit rate is negative	13 Jul 2026
Crude refining	3.91 mn bbl/day — a 21-year low (previously 5.2)	H	The metric is refining depth and light product yield	31 Jul 2026
Crude loadings at Baltic ports	March 2026: over the last nine days of the month, –53% year on year (Ust-Luga –74%, Primorsk –32%); on 26 and 27 March there were no loadings at any of the main Baltic ports. May brought a recovery at Ust-Luga, +49% against April	H	An indicator of adaptation: export infrastructure recovers in about two months against 18 for secondary refining units. Caveat: revenue barely changed as volumes fell	31 May 2026 CHECK
Loadings on the rail network	not collected	—	Physical tonnes, weekly	—
Electricity consumption (System Operator)	not collected	—	Daily, physical, adjusted for temperature	—
Bankruptcies and liquidations of sole traders and companies, net	31% of SME owners are considering liquidation (+8 pp year on year)	M	A test of the mechanism by which sequestration cuts the VAT base; an observable marker of the payer of the rollover	1 Jul 2026
Substitution of budget loans to regions with commercial ones	not collected	—	A leading marker of rung 2 on the expenditure ladder	—
Government debt	₽36.8 trn ⁵⁰ at 1 Jun 2026 = 15.6% of 2026 GDP (the earlier 17.0% was computed on 2025 GDP of ₽212 trn). The planned trajectory for end-2026 is ₽39–40 trn	H	Low debt with the market closed is not resilience; what is not borrowed is shifted onto the cash balance or onto issuance	1 Jun 2026 CHECK
Regional debt	₽3.5 trn ⁵¹ — a 15-year record; regional deficits of ₽1.9–2.0 trn against ₽0.2–0.3 trn before the war	H	Tier 3 · a leading marker of rung 2	1 Aug 2026

INDICATOR	CURRENT	CONF.	PURPOSE	DATE
Treasury account balances	₽8.0 trn (1 Jan) → ₽4.5 trn (1 Aug) — as of the last publication. Operating minimum ₽2.0–3.0 trn	M	PUBLICATION DISCONTINUED, break ≤10 Aug 2026 (discovered 10 Aug). The only series from which the financing of the deficit could be established has been closed	1 Aug 2026
Bank capital adequacy N1.0	14.1% at 1 Jul 2026, preliminary data (12.9 at 1 Jan → 13.9 at 1 Apr → 14.1); a buffer of 4.4 pp over the norms including add-ons at 1 Apr	L on the level, H on the direction	A candidate for the binding constraint — REJECTED: adequacy has risen for a fourth consecutive quarter	1 Jul 2026
Share of the largest session in quarterly borrowing	The Finance Ministry archive of information releases from 2015. Without the series the statement in widget 2.2 remains a rough approximation: 99% is compared against an estimated historical maximum of 50-60%, not against a measured one	L	Highest priority — the denominator of the headline figure in 2.2	—
Placement price of floating-rate OFZ, % of par	92.5122 (29031, 2 Sep 2026) · 93.8207 (29028, 12 Nov 2025) · issues 29026 and 29027 of December 2024 — prices to be retrieved	M	The price concession as a series rather than a single comparison	—
Placement price of fixed-coupon OFZ, % of par	84.9218 (26251, 1 Jul 2026)	M	Tracked separately from floaters: the price of a fixed-coupon bond is a function of its coupon against market yield, while a floater sits near par by construction and moves by the spread required over RUONIA. In one series the two give a meaningless trend	—
Frequency of revaluation of regional signing bonuses	Number of increases per region per quarter	L	The speed of administrative response to a shortfall of contract soldiers	—
A region's base payment against its own maximum	Pskov ₽0.8 mn against ₽3.0 mn at an average of ₽1.65 mn	L	A local marker of rung 3 on the quiet mobilisation ladder	—
Mirror statistics of gold imports from Russia	Hong Kong, UAE, Turkey, China — monthly, on the receiving side's data. Derived: the excess of exports over output on a trailing 12 months against output of 300-330 t a year	L	Observable control of the sales channel in widget 2.6	—
Declared fuel class on the forecourt sign	Compensates for the contaminated retail availability series after 1 Sep 2026	L	A discriminator: availability rose through substitution or through refining	—
Premium of the Russian domestic gold market over the London fix	The only way to turn the sales discount from an assumption into an observation. It falls entirely on Russia and is not masked by rising world demand	L	Narrows the confidence on the damage construction in widget 2.6	—

5.1 Depletion of the reserve

reserve
depletion

The two series do not add up: the 141.24 t of NWF gold sit inside the 2,277 t of Bank of Russia reserves – [widget 2.6](#)

NWF gold and international reserve gold are different quantities and **do not add up**. NWF: 160.2 t (1 Jan) → 141.24 t (1 Aug), minus 18.96 t. Bank of Russia reserves: about 2,332 t (1 Jan) → 2,277 (1 Aug), minus 49.7 t over January-July. These are two legs of one chain. Before 2026 operations in NWF gold were virtual: the government sold metal to the central bank rather than on the market, the bars stayed in reserves and reserves did not shrink. In 2026 the Bank of Russia physically sells metal to third parties, and only that shrinks reserves. The gap of about 31 t is not explained by 2026 NWF conversion; the candidate is the mirroring of deferred and earlier operations, spread by the Bank of Russia over long periods. **It closes only against a mirroring schedule; until then it is an open item.** One thing is datable independently of the gap: 2026 is the year in which the operation changed its nature, and physical gold is leaving the reserves for the first time since the default of 1998. Tracked by widget [2.6](#).

DATE	LIQUID PART	COMMENT
1 Dec 2025	₽4.115 trn	
1 Jan 2026	₽4.085 trn (\$52.2 bn)	Anchor point
1 Jun 2026	₽3.410 trn	Low of the series
1 Jul 2026	₽3.612 trn (\$46.45 bn)	+₽200 bn in June
1 Aug 2026	₽3.693 trn	+₽81 bn in July; about 7.9% of annual spending

The ruble liquid part of the NWF has risen for two consecutive months. Over seven months of 2026 the decline was –9.6%, not a collapse. The argument that the reserve is melting away does not hold in ruble terms over the 2026 horizon and should not be published in that form.

The physical stock, however, is shrinking: unallocated gold went from 145.2 to 141.08 tonnes over June, with 5.15 tonnes credited in the same month — a net drawdown of about 9 tonnes. Yuan holdings rose from 185.5 to 189.79 bn. Historical comparison: the liquid part has gone from 6.5% of GDP to 1.6%; gold from 405.7 to 141.08 tonnes.

Warning line for this widget: the NWF is not a fuse standing between the state and issuance. The repo circuit operates in parallel and is already in use. The ruble figure rises while the physical stock shrinks — look at the tonnage.

An open question. The NWF is not being drawn on in 2026, because oil and gas revenue has been above the base level for a fourth month (₽4,595 bn against a base of ₽4,467 bn). OFZ auctions are suspended. The seven-month deficit is ₽6.455 trn. What is financing it? One large source remains — Treasury account balances, whose publication the Treasury closed in July 2026.

Conversion

conversion

a register of mechanisms, three ladders and three registers around them

Conversion is the transfer of the bill to a payer: a material constraint is lifted and somebody pays for it. **6.1** is the register of mechanisms: what is already in use and who pays. **6.2–6.4** are ladders for the three mechanisms that have rungs of their own. **6.5–6.7** are not mechanisms of conversion but its surroundings: what the regime feeds on from outside, what it has stopped showing, and what it has given back.

Events in which the regime pays a political price to lift a material constraint. Every entry improves a panel reading and at the same time worsens the position of the regime. This list is the basis of the counter of spent mechanisms in the masthead. The mechanisms are not of equal weight, so each row names its payer and its reversibility: the reader judges the weight of a mechanism by those rather than by the row number.

MECHANISM	STATE	OBSERVABLE	WHO PAYS	REVERSIBILITY
Spending down accumulated cash balances	IN USE	51% of the need over January–July; ₹4.5 trn left against an operating range of ₹2.0–3.0 trn	nobody — this mechanism has no payer	reversible
Tax increases	IN USE	VAT from 20% to 22% from 1 Jan 2026, the simplified-regime threshold cut to ₹20 mn; expected effect ₹1.187 trn	the consumer and business	reversible
Sale of physical gold from Bank of Russia reserves	IN USE	49.7 t over January–July 2026 — the largest sale since the default of 1998. On World Gold Council data for Q2, published on 30 July 2026, the Bank of Russia is the only sizeable seller of gold among the world's central banks. Tracked by widget 2.6	future capacity to defend itself with reserves, and holders of the rouble	irreversible
Sale of NWF assets to the central bank	IN USE	₹0.46 trn in Q1; blocked thereafter by the fiscal rule — oil and gas revenue above the base level	holders of rubles	irreversible in physical stock
Compulsory absorption of sovereign debt	IN USE	the channel is prepared and has not fired: ₹1.5 trn of floating-rate OFZ registered on 23 Jul and unplaced; the floater share is 33% and had been falling until July	the banks	reversible
Absorption funded by CBR refinancing	IN USE	bank liabilities of ₹6.6 trn on 14 Aug 2026 against ₹3.637 trn at end-2025 — up 81% in 7.5 months; rung 1 of 6	depositors and holders of rubles	reversible at a cost
Recapitalisation of state banks from the budget	IN USE	PSB, the defence industry's anchor bank: four capital injections since the start of 2026, including ₹39.3 bn on 15 Jul and ₹3 bn on 10 Jun, against a half-year loss of ₹50 bn versus a ₹72 bn profit a year earlier and provisioning of ₹195.7 bn — four times the first half of 2025. Across the sector, recapitalisation of individual banks came to ₹71 bn in June alone. The loss of the banking circuit is transferred to the budget circuit before it reaches the sector aggregate	the budget	reversible
Spending cuts, rungs 3 and above	not in use	level 1–2; consolidation deferred after the March price spike	public employees, pensioners	reversible
Quiet mobilisation, rung 3 and above	not in use	rung 1: signing bonuses rising faster than inflation — the mechanism still works and the regime is paying for it	the conscripted	irreversible
An administrative measure on retail deposits	not in use	an open question on the banking branch	the depositor	partial
Seizure and sale of private assets	PARTIAL	court decisions, nationalisation, concessions — there is no systematic regime	owners	irreversible

MECHANISM	STATE	OBSERVABLE	WHO PAYS	REVERSIBILITY
Direct monetary financing	not in use	rungs 5–6 of the refinancing ladder; purchase in the primary market would require amending the law on the Bank of Russia	all holders of rubles	reversible at a cost

The first executed entry is 1 Jan 2026. The headline VAT rate was raised from 20% to 22%; the simplified-regime threshold was cut to ₺20 mn and the circle of payers widened. The expected effect is ₺1.187 trn in 2026. The payer is the consumer and business. Reversibility: reversible.

A feature that must be published: the measure **partly cancels itself** — the estimated contribution to inflation is 0.6–0.7 pp, so part of the increment returns to the expenditure side through indexation and more expensive procurement. The observable consequence has already been recorded: organic growth of the tax base over January–July does not exceed inflation.

6.2 The Bank of Russia refinancing ladder refinancing ladder

current: rung 1 of 6

RUNG	OBSERVABLE	WHAT IT MEANS
0	Weekly repo, OFZ collateral, the limit covers demand	Normal
1	Sustained growth in the rollover; the deficit above the CBR's forecast corridor of ₺2.4–3.6 trn	CURRENT ₺2.7 trn, with liabilities of ₺6.6 trn against ₺3.637 trn at end-2025
2	Monthly repo in the main facility; the collateral base widened	The CBR lengthens funding, acknowledging that the deficit is structural (top of the yellow zone)
3	Widespread use of loans against non-marketable assets (regulation 312-P)	The securities collateral base is exhausted · an entry in the Conversion log
4	Specialised refinancing facilities for specific programmes (the defence order, mortgages)	Targeted issuance for a designated purpose (red zone)
5	Direct purchase of OFZ by the Bank of Russia in the secondary market	Declared monetisation
6	Purchase in the primary market	Requires amending the law on the Bank of Russia

An objection from the Bank of Russia that has to be recorded. The CBR, 14 Aug 2026: the structural liquidity deficit is small compared with the 2012–2017 period. The objection is factually correct: the deficit reached larger figures then. The difference is not in size but in purpose — in 2012–2017 refinancing funded credit to the economy, whereas now it replaces a cash leak and frees up balance sheet for government debt. The discriminator is observable: the share of OFZ in the repo collateral pool and the share of corporate portfolio growth going to the largest state companies (about half in June 2026). If both shares rise, the purpose has changed; if they are stable, the CBR objection is accepted.

6.3 The quiet mobilisation ladder recording threshold — rung 3

rungs 1 and 2 passed · elements of 4 observed

RUNG	OBSERVABLE	WHAT IT MEANS
0	The contract is voluntary and the real price is stable	PASSED
1	Signing bonuses rising faster than InFOM inflation	CURRENT Signing bonuses of ₺1.65 mn, an all-time high — they are buying at a higher price and the supply is narrowing

RUNG	OBSERVABLE	WHAT IT MEANS
2	Categories widened: age, medical and criminal-record restrictions, foreigners, conscripts	PASSED: on 4 Aug 2026 a law was signed widening the range of people with convictions who may serve — banditry, organising a criminal association, cash smuggling, illegal migration, eleven criminal code articles in all. The stated rationale in the explanatory note: to meet the planned targets for selecting citizens to bring the armed forces up to strength in 2026
3	A real cut or a freeze in signing bonuses while the shortfall persists	RECORDING THRESHOLD: the switch from price to coercion
4	Administrative coercion: the summons register, restriction of rights, sweeps	PARTIAL The mechanism is built and operating: since March 2026 the summons register imposes bundled restrictions without a court — a travel ban, a bar on registering as a sole trader or self-employed, suspension of property registration, restriction of driving and vehicle registration rights, and refusal of credit. It is applied to the conscription cycle rather than to contract recruitment: the apparatus is ready and its purpose is unchanged
5	Declared mobilisation or de facto mobilisation	The political price has been accepted — openly or by fait accompli. De facto markers, any two simultaneously and persistently: summonses served away from enlistment offices in places of mass transit — transport hubs, the metro, shopping centres · quotas for worker attendance handed down to enterprises · restriction of travel or access to services for those who have not complied · call-up to service outside the contract form on a scale comparable with monthly contract recruitment. The rung is declared on observable markers and does not wait for acknowledgement: a regime that refuses to call a measure mobilisation cannot stop the count by refusing

The rungs are not passed in order. The ladder is ordered by the price the regime pays rather than by time: rung 1 is current, rung 2 is passed, elements of rung 4 are observed, and rung 3 is not passed. Simultaneity is normal — the regime raises the price and widens the categories at the same time. What matters is not the highest number passed but rung 3.

Why the key rung is the third and not the first. Rising signing bonuses mean the mechanism works and the regime is paying for it. What is alarming is a refusal to raise the price while the shortfall remains uncovered: that means the regime has chosen to pay in coercion instead of money. It is observable, dateable, and requires no decree. What to watch: the median and maximum of regional lump-sum payments, deflated by InFOM; the rules on absence without leave; the terms for terminating a contract; the share of intake from prisons and from foreign nationals. Separately, divergent regional movements: signing bonuses falling in one region while the fee for bringing in a recruit from outside rises is a local marker of rung 3.

Markers of preparation. Separately from the rungs already passed, there are actions that build a capability and do not use it. They do not form rungs: the ladder counts the price the regime has already paid, and a mechanism that is built but not engaged costs nothing.

Observed. On 20 Aug 2026 the government introduced bill No. 1322096-8 in the State Duma — administrative liability for failing to comply with decisions of a regional head, or of an operational headquarters created by that head on the president’s instruction.⁵² The object of the offence is named outright in the text: **the conduct of mobilisation measures** and meeting the needs of the armed forces. The penalty is set by analogy with that for failing to comply with the decisions of the counter-terrorism coordinating body.

The reading lies in the level at which the decision was placed. The headquarters are created on the president’s instruction but subordinated to the regional head, and liability is introduced for failing to comply with a governor’s decisions. The capacity for coercion is being built, and the name attached to it is regional. The regime accepts organisational costs in order not to accept political ones — and that indirectly measures **the expected price of mobilisation in its own estimation:** it is judged high enough to be worth paying in advance for deniability.

The date adds a second reading. The last plenary session of the eighth Duma was held on 27 Jul 2026, and elections are set for 18–20 September. The bill was introduced in a chamber that no longer sits, a month before it is replaced.

What would move this to rung 5. Application of operational headquarters decisions to manning — to contract recruitment or to call-up outside the contract form — observed through two of the de facto markers listed under rung 5, simultaneously and persistently. **What would withdraw the observation.** Application solely to the information regime and to economic tasks through the heating season, without a single case of application to manning. The first known application concerns the information regime: a regional head’s ban on filming and publishing the aftermath of drone attacks falls under the provision.

The rungs are ordered by **what the state ceases to be able to supply**. The question the ladder answers: **which observable actions by the population, by business and by the state itself show that material pressure has become strong enough that the ordinary mechanisms of adaptation stop working — even where the regime retains full control and can repress discontent**.

The panel is not interested in when the population might force the leadership to stop. It is interested in the actions of people, businesses and local authorities as markers of pressure: at what level of it they begin to break prohibitions, risk repression, leave official exchange and take resources by force — simply because the previous way of surviving has stopped working.

So a protest, a looting or an attack on a government building is of interest here **not as a step toward regime change but as a costly revealed preference**: a person knows the price of disobedience and chooses it anyway, because the price of continuing as before has become higher still. The harsher the expected punishment, the greater the informational value of the breach.

The ladder does not measure protest, and that is a deliberate choice. Repression can end a protest. It cannot end the need to eat. An economic breach is the only thing that survives suppression, and is therefore fit for measurement: protest measures resolve, an economic breach measures price. Iran in 2025–2026 shows this directly: the demonstrations were put down, the queues and the blackouts remained.

Several rungs being occupied at once is the norm rather than an anomaly: as in widget [2.4](#), where rungs 3 and 4 are engaged at level 1–2.

RUNG	THE STATE CEASES TO BE ABLE TO	OBSERVABLE · HISTORICAL ANCHOR
1	Supply the accustomed quality and volume	ENGAGED Reduced quality and volume of consumption, a shift to cheap substitutes
2	Supply reliably and on time	ENGAGED The ration is delayed or trimmed; prolonged regular outages. Anchor: Iran 2025–2026 — rolling blackouts with the demonstrations suppressed
3	Be the channel of exchange	PARTLY ENGAGED Grey market, barter, self-supply; traders stop selling legally. Anchor: Venezuela 2014–2019 — a grey market, dollarisation, multiple exchange rates. In the matrix: barter and offsetting between state enterprises, circuit I depth 3
4	Hold a monopoly on distribution	Seizure of food and fuel, looting of cargo, clashes around distribution points. They must be recurrent, otherwise this is ordinary crime. Anchor: Venezuela 2016–2017
5	Fund the ration from its own resources	International assistance is required to maintain the ordinary ration. Anchor: Cuba 2024 — the first appeal in its history to the World Food Programme in order to maintain the children’s milk ration, confirmed 4 Mar 2024; in February of the same year the subsidised bread ration was cut by a quarter, from 80 to 60 grams ⁵³
6	Be a distributor at all	The population obtains basic goods mainly outside the state system. Anchor: North Korea from the 1990s — the state ration replaced by grassroots trade while the regime held power

What this ladder measures and what it does not. It does not date a decision and does not measure the probability of regime change. Cuba stands on the fifth rung — the state cannot fund the children’s milk ration itself — and continues. North Korea passed the sixth and continued. A position on the ladder says what the population is paying, not what the leadership will do.

The ladder measures the residual. Spending priority goes to the front, and the population receives what is left after it. Movement up the ladder is therefore a measure of how far the front is crowding the population out of the budget, and that quantity belongs to the ‘who pays’ frame rather than to the ‘is the regime stable’ frame.

Hence the limit on how far these cases carry over. In Cuba and North Korea the population was the only payer, and its price was the whole story. Here it is a second-order payer, and its price is derived from the first. For them the upper rungs of this ladder meant a terminal state; here they indicate how much has already been crowded out.

Separately: the durability of those regimes does not imply an ability to wage war. See [the distinction the panel draws](#).

Qualifying filters are applied before any size threshold: the lender is a non-resident; the money is new rather than a refinancing; the term exceeds one year; and it is not prepayment for a specific delivery of goods. Thresholds at a GFN of about \$150 bn: registration at $\geq 1\%$ of GFN · recomputation of widget 1.1 at $\geq 5\%$ · a change of zone in 1.1 at $\geq 20\%$. Separately and outside any size threshold: any sum from a Chinese policy bank — the Export-Import Bank or the China Development Bank — or an expansion of the Bank of Russia swap line with the People's Bank of China is registered regardless of size.

The reason: in this channel what is informative is the fact of the decision rather than its magnitude, so a size threshold does not apply. The event requires further observation whatever its size.

Seizures of property are not entered in the log, and the refusal is more informative here than an entry would be. The mechanism fits in form — the payer is named and the action is administrative — but fails on effect: the share of seized property successfully sold does not exceed 8% of the volume, and estimates of the volume itself differ by orders of magnitude (up to ₺6.5 trn on The Bell's count against around ₺100 bn on Audit Chamber figures)⁵⁴. **What is recorded is something else, and it cuts against the convenient reading:** the regime bears the political costs of expropriation without receiving money for them. What is being bought, then, is not war financing but redistribution inside the loyal circle. The claim that seizures finance the war is not supported by this panel.

Why the amount does not matter here. A loan from a Chinese policy bank, or an expansion of the swap line, would be read in Europe, the United States, India and Japan as a decision by Beijing to support Russia openly and accept the secondary consequences. The most likely result is the reclassification of China from a party profiting from the war to a party financing it directly, with the balance of relations shifting first of all on the European side. A loan from a non-policy bank would be read through the same lens, though the set of responses would be less clear-cut.

The sign of the net effect for Russia is not determined in advance. Such a step triggers second-order effects — tighter secondary measures, the loss of residual neutrality among third parties — that may outweigh the sum received. The panel does not assess them and will not: that is the domain of intentions and political decisions rather than observable quantities. **The table below shows only the monetary effect** — the government's access to additional financing. A positive sign in that column refers to this and to nothing else.

EVENT	SIGN	SIGNIFICANCE	STATUS
A yuan loan from a Chinese bank	positive if it occurs	The only remaining non-issuance channel	not observed
Power of Siberia 2 unsigned	negative	A demand for prices at the level of the subsidised domestic market	recorded
Yuan-denominated OFZ placement, 3 Jun 2026	NOT REGISTERED	¥10 bn at 7.65% for 10 years; the audience was the yuan balances of Russian exporters, and 30% was paid in rubles. It fails the non-resident filter	rejected
North Korean infantry	positive, one-off, at a scale that does not affect the course of the war	Record the numbers and the date; do not convert into a flow	recorded
North Korean munitions and missiles	positive	On confirmation	recorded
Closed Russian–Chinese exercises (July 2026)	neutral	A signal about the character of the relationship, not about resources	recorded
Beijing widening its contacts in the Russian establishment beyond Putin's circle	neutral / negative	Hedging the transition	observed
Motor fuel deliveries from Belarus	positive, counted	June 2026 was a monthly record, up to 6,000 tonnes of petrol a day. Counted as an extension of the Russian circuit rather than an external channel: it covers roughly 6% of daily consumption and does not close the gap	recorded
Seaborne petrol imports from India	not registered	Isolated cargoes of around 40,000 tonnes with a delivery time of about 45 days — less than one day of national consumption. It fails the materiality threshold and is not treated as a scalable channel	rejected

6.6 Went dark

went dark — series that stopped, and what each stoppage says

records with an exit state are at the bottom

Column convention: the break date is a date, or — where there was no break event; the agency and the status go in the note. The log has an exit state: a record marked **reopened** keeps its break date, gains a reopening date and is not deleted. A log that cannot be exited cannot be refuted.

SERIES	DATE IT STOPPED	LAST VALUE	WHAT THE STOPPAGE SAYS	STATUS · NOTE
Motor petrol output	May 2024	weekly data on motor fuel output	Closed on 29 May 2024 for purposes described as ensuring the information security of the petroleum products market	Rosstat and the Energy Ministry
Diesel and petroleum product output	Aug 2024	June 2024: output of 6.8 mn tonnes for the month, −8.1% year on year; 42.7 mn tonnes over January–June	Closed by government decision, following petrol. The series from which the ratio of diesel to domestic demand would be computed has not existed since that date	Rosstat
Treasury account balances	≤10 Aug 2026	₽4.5 trn at 1 Aug 2026 — as of the last publication	The only series from which the financing of the deficit could be established, with auctions suspended, has been closed. Two things were removed: daily statistics on the placement of rouble reserves with banks and on the money market, and data on the aggregate free funds of budgets at all levels	Discovered 10 Aug 2026, published 13 Aug. The actual date of removal is not established
Controlling beneficiaries of banks	—	—	Banks have been permitted not to disclose controlling owners. Case: the change of controlling shareholder at Moscow Credit Bank in the summer of 2026 — the new owner was not named. What is lost is the ability to connect the condition of a bank to the interest of its owner. There is no mirror series — disclosure is made only by the object itself	The permission is in force; there is no break date because there was no break event
Diesel to domestic demand	—	—	An indicator important for locating a possible breaking point is not published at all — possibly deliberately. The diesel constraint is read indirectly through the petrol ladder and the refining ladder	The series never existed; this is an absence, not a break
OFZ auctions	20 Jul 2026 → 2 Sep 2026	last before the break — 1 Jul 2026, ₽10.4 bn at 14.96%	Silence for 44 days. Reopened on 2 September 2026: the entire 29031 issue of ₽1 trn was placed in a single session. The record is not deleted — the break date is a fact, and removing the record would erase it. Tracked in parallel as widget 2.2	reopened · The first record with an exit state
Monthly reports on regional budget execution	spring 2026 → reopened	April data had not appeared by 10 May 2026	The Finance Ministry and the regions delayed or suspended publication; publication has since resumed. The episode can be entered only because an exit state exists: without one the record would have to be either deleted or left false	reopened · Confirms that a break with a return is not a one-off

The one-way direction of the bill. On the quantities the panel tracks, not one payer has been relieved since the count opened. The claim is not about the nature of history or the fate of the regime: it is about the specific list below, and it is refuted by **a single observation**. The log was opened empty and is kept so that movement in the opposite direction is recorded automatically: the criteria for filling it are published in advance and coincide with the falsification conditions already in force for individual widgets. An observation that refutes any one widget enters the log, and there is no way to avoid the entry without abandoning one’s own falsifier.

CLASS	WHAT HAPPENED	WHERE IT GOES
Relief	A payer stopped paying and nobody picked up the bill. The constraint has been lifted	This log. Refutes one-way direction
Transfer	Payer A stopped, payer B started	The Conversion log. Confirms one-way direction
Lapse	The pressure went away for an external reason, without a decision: the exchange rate strengthened, the price rose, the constraint stopped binding of its own accord	Flagged in this log, but not counted as an entry

An objection: is luck not a resource? A respite changes the tempo, not the stock: an external event spends no decision and therefore does not enter the counter, but it does change the state — and that is already reflected in the widgets themselves, where a higher oil price improves 2.3 and may change a zone. The objection would become fully valid if a respite lasted long enough to restore a spent mechanism — to replenish the liquid part of the NWF, to bring back the OFZ market. The criteria are published below; the log is empty because such cases have not occurred.

A worked example. Five key rate cuts in 2026: the borrower got relief and the depositor picked up the bill through a negative real rate. That is a **transfer**, not relief, and it is already counted under conversion. The mandatory sale of export earnings was introduced and weakened before the window opened — it goes into the baseline state; any further weakening inside the window becomes a candidate for this log.

THE OBSERVATION THAT WOULD OPEN AN ENTRY	WHICH BALANCE IS RELIEVED	FALSIFIER OF
The real price of a contract falls while recruitment holds up	Manpower reproduction	M.1
OFZ auctions resume with fixed-coupon issues and the quarterly plan 70% fulfilled or better	The market has returned as a source	1.1, 2.2
A non-resident loan above 5% of GFN, or non-residents returning to OFZ	The external channel has opened	1.1, 6.2
Indexation for 2027 at or above observed inflation	Public employees and pensioners compensated retrospectively	2.4
Fuel caps lifted in most regions, outside any seasonal explanation	The physical constraint has been lifted	1.3
Bank liabilities to the CBR fall while credit to the economy grows	The bank balance sheet has been freed	1.2
The real rate for the depositor moves into sustained positive territory without the CSC shrinking	The depositor has been compensated	1.2, 1.4
The term-deposit share of M2 rises for three consecutive months	Disintermediation has reversed	1.2
The top-ten maximum deposit rate follows the key rate down at two consecutive decisions	The floor under the key rate is gone and liabilities have stopped getting more expensive	1.2, 1.4

THE OBSERVATION THAT WOULD OPEN AN ENTRY	WHICH BALANCE IS RELIEVED	FALSIFIER OF
Further weakening or abolition of the mandatory sale of export earnings	The exporter has been relieved	baseline state
A confirmed start-up of a secondary refining unit on a domestically produced catalyst	The irreversible has turned out to be reversible	1.3, M.3-A
A cell of the manifestation matrix emptying	Direct refutation	the matrix

The three logs mirror one another: Went dark — what stopped being shown; Conversion — what was paid for; Relieved balances — what was given back. **The third is empty.**

Manifestation matrix

manifestation matrix

6 cells filled since the count opened

How economic pressure turns into a decision. Not directly. In the known cases where an authoritarian regime stopped a war of its own accord, the immediate ground was the regime reassessing the ratio between the price of continuing and what was being gained. Economic degradation entered that reassessment — it is what makes the price high — but it worked through the calculation at the top rather than through pressure from below.

The matrix measures the depth to which the price has become manifest. The price-of-ground widget measures the ratio of price to gain directly. Together they are an input to the decision; the moment of decision the panel does not predict and will not attempt.

– HOW TO READ THE MATRIX, AND WHY IT IS BUILT THIS WAY

The limit is not assigned — it is recognised from events. We do not know how long Russia can hold out in a regime of worsening turbulence, and we do not know the level at which that turbulence becomes more costly to the regime than the war. But the ladder of decline is visible and can be tracked. The matrix does not predict a halt: it shows which cells are filled, how fast new ones fill, and in which circuit the movement is faster.

Sufficiency — what depth in which circuit means the regime will change its decision — is for the reader to determine. No ordering is established between circuits. The markers of how a breakdown would show were selected in August 2026 on one test: ‘has not happened yet, or its occurrence is not established’.

The observation window applies equally to burden added and burden relieved: to the filling of cells, to the rungs of the ladders and to entries in both logs. The panel measures movement from that point, not the history of the war. Constraints inherited from earlier years are set out as the baseline state below; they form no cells and do not enter the measurement of speed. An empty cell therefore means ‘has not happened yet’, not ‘nothing is going on’: anything plainly already the case before August 2026 was not put on the list, there is nothing to observe in it, and the inherited state precedes the structure of the matrix rather than sitting inside it. A cell is closed by an event, not by a judgement.

DEPTH	CRITERION
1 • local	One settlement, district, military unit or enterprise. May still have a local explanation
2 • regional	A whole region. The local explanation is exhausted
3 • inter-regional	Three or more regions at once. Requires a federal decision
4 • systemic	A federal decision has been taken and has not removed the phenomenon. It reproduces continuously

CIRCUIT	1 · LOCAL	2 · REGIONAL	3 · INTER-REGIONAL	4 · SYSTEMIC
I. Supply and daily life gate: decision + physics + season	▪ A cap on the volume of a single fill in an individual region (↔ 1.3 rung 2) Local freezing of parts of cities and rolling blackouts lasting over 24 hours, or beyond the statutory repair deadline (↔ M.3-D rung 2) Drinking water delivered by tanker to a settlement of 100,000 or more for more than 7 days, or to two or more settlements in one region within a month	▪ Restricted frequency of access to fuel in a region — odd-even, one fill a day (↔ 1.3 rung 5) Freezing of part of a city of over a million (↔ M.3-D rung 4) Regional protectionism: priority for local residents when buying, restrictions on taking goods out of the region ▪ Fuel supplied first to utilities, ambulances or public transport by decision of the regional authorities while other consumers are restricted⁵⁵ A region-wide blackout lasting more than 48 hours ▪ The obligation officially transferred to the consumer instead of the service being restored: an authority or regulator acknowledges a failure in the quality of a utility service in a city of 100,000 or more and advises the population to provide for itself — boiling water, buying bottled water, using individual sources — with no tanker deliveries, tariff charges maintained, and a duration of more than 14 days (↔ bypass rung 1)⁵⁶	Rationed supply of food by lists, cards or certificates in three or more regions — whatever the measure is called A personalised fuel limit with identification of the buyer (↔ 1.3 rung 6) Freezing of parts of cities or a blackout in three or more regions at once; an estimate of coverage is given if officially stated and is not a load-bearing marker Air travel cut by more than 50% against the level at 1 Jan 2026, with regional hubs closed for more than two weeks Barter and offsetting instead of monetary settlement between state enterprises	Fuel supplied only to protected categories, with the shortage persisting after a federal measure (↔ 1.3 rung 7) A card system introduced by federal decision that failed to remove the shortage International assistance to cover a domestic shortage of basic goods or services: either formally requested or non-public assistance from friendly states in volumes comparable with the shortfall

II. Order and coercion

gate: diffusion

Arson of a state building in a regional capital, with a motive connected to economic conditions, the war or the actions of the authorities named in the case file or in reports

A federal highway blocked

Non-payment or delay of wages at a town-forming enterprise leading to a collective refusal to work, blockades or clashes

The killing of senior regional or city officials or heads of security bodies in a regional capital

Recurrent clashes among the population over the distribution of basic goods or services — food, fuel, water, heating, electricity (↔ bypass rung 2)

Food riots covering more than one settlement in a region

Recurrent attacks on security service personnel in a region

Production halted at an enterprise in a single-industry town

Serial looting of shops, warehouses or cargo carrying basic goods as a consequence of shortage; an isolated case does not fill the cell (↔ bypass rung 4)

Unrest in three or more regions at once

Production halted in single-industry towns across several regions at once

Three or more regions fail to carry out a federally imposed obligation after the deadline — publicly, or in fact according to reports by leading agencies. Confirmed by either of two routes: documentary, through an act extending the deadline or granting an exemption that cites non-performance; or factual, through systematic failure to meet targets, deadline postponements and unexplained dismissals

A refusal by MVD or Rosgvardia units to carry out an order. Official acknowledgement is not required: what counts is video evidence allowing the unit and the date to be identified, or a report by a leading international agency. Observable forms: forces brought in from another region in place of local ones, federal forces denied entry to a region, personnel going over to the side of the participants

Rosgvardia or the police assigned to systematic armed protection of the distribution of basic goods: an order, an instruction or a publicly announced protection regime for delivery routes or distribution points (↔ bypass rung 4)

Mass protests caused by the absence of basic goods or services, simultaneously in five or more regions and lasting more than three days. A combined turnout of 100,000 or more is a supporting marker: outside Moscow, counting participants is barely verifiable (↔ bypass rungs 3–4)

A federal decision to suppress has been taken and the unrest continues

The persistent existence of territories where federal law is in fact not applied — beyond historically established exceptions, with two or more documented cases

Recurrent attacks on authorities or distribution facilities caused directly by a prolonged absence of basic goods or services, continuing after a federal measure

Mass protests resuming after being dispersed by force

A protest in Moscow of more than 100,000 participants, regardless of the situation in other regions

CIRCUIT	1 · LOCAL	2 · REGIONAL	3 · INTER-REGIONAL	4 · SYSTEMIC
III. Military organisation gate: diffusion + combat tempo	Refusal by individual servicemen to carry out an order on a sector, recorded in a video appeal The number of cases reaching military courts under criminal code articles 337 and 338 exceeds the six-month moving average by 25% or more for two consecutive months; the baseline is 2025. The series is knowingly incomplete: court data from occupied territories are not publicly available, so it works on change rather than on level	Recurrent high-profile cases of a group refusal to go to positions or of a platoon-sized or larger unit leaving them, including the holding of refusers in basements and pits and the appearance of armed deserters in the rear. Each case requires two independent sources, of which at least one is not a party to the conflict A platoon-sized or larger unit surrendering in full — outside encirclement and not through exhaustion of the means to continue fighting A collective video appeal by a platoon-sized or larger unit refusing to carry out its task	Refusal by two or more company-sized or larger units to carry out a task on an operationally important sector, offensive or defensive The urgent forced replacement, withdrawal or disbandment of a battalion-sized or larger unit as a result of refusal to carry out a task — outside planned rotation and outside redeployment within an offensive operation The loss of a sector of the front preceded by a battalion-sized or larger unit leaving its position without orders, followed by the commitment of reserves or the construction of a new defensive line to the rear. Withdrawal under orders and the loss of a position under fire do not count	An armed action by a formation against the command Refusal by formations persisting after federal coercive measures have been applied. Evasion without a declared refusal also counts: a formation receives an order and does not move out, or is delayed en route for a period that precludes carrying out the task — like the units that stood on the M-4 highway in June 2023. Confirmation is by video with an identifiable unit and date, or by a report from a leading international agency

IV. Money

gate: decision + accumulation

Restricted cash withdrawals at an individual bank

Delayed wage payments to public employees at an individual institution or municipality

Cash shortages in ATMs in a city of over 100,000 for more than two consecutive days

An administrative restriction on the liquidity of a group of banks or a category of deposits (↔ bridge, link 5)

Delayed payments — public sector wages, military allowances, pensions, payments to bereaved families, settlements with defence order contractors — across a region

A nationwide restriction on withdrawal or transfer, or forced extension of most categories of liabilities, even with the smallest excluded

Delayed payments in three or more regions or to a federal category of recipients

Indexation of social obligations more than once a year as a regular practice (↔ 1.4, ↔ 2.4) and systematically below actual inflation, or part of the scheduled indexation deferred or replaced by a one-off payment

Multiple exchange rates

Nominal secondary-market housing prices falling by a third or more from the peak in three or more regions: the figure substantially exceeds the usual 20% mortgage down payment, the borrower is in negative equity, and an owner without a mortgage loses a third of accumulated wealth. The nominal price is used: the real one has fallen in any case. A fall in Moscow counts as a separate reading regardless of the number of regions

Forced conversion of foreign currency deposits into rubles, or a freeze on particular categories of retail deposits — foreign currency, large, term — by federal decision, even with the smallest excluded

Settlement in non-monetary form between state counterparties: offsetting, promissory notes, barter

An official restriction on cash circulation: a ceiling on cash settlement between individuals, mandatory non-cash payment for housing and cars, withdrawal of large notes from circulation, a low over-the-counter withdrawal limit — to drive money into banks, from which the regime borrows it (↔ 1.2)

Forced conversion of ordinary depositors' ruble deposits into term government obligations, or their freezing, even with the smallest excluded. The difference from depth 3: there it is particular categories and the foreign currency part of savings, here it is the bulk of ruble deposits. The state stops borrowing from the population and starts taking

Stabilisation measures have been taken and the outflow from the ruble continues

Housing prices continue to fall and exceed 40% off the peak after federal measures to support the market — expanded subsidised programmes, buy-ups, subsidies to developers

CIRCUIT	1 · LOCAL	2 · REGIONAL	3 · INTER-REGIONAL	4 · SYSTEMIC
V. Elites and property gate: decision	▪ Seizure of an asset from individual large owners outside a systematic regime (↔ conversion)⁵⁷	▪ Seizure on a ground different from previous ones. The 2022–2025 wave ran on prosecutors’ claims of privatisation violations and of foreign citizenship of the owner; what counts is the transfer of assets by an owner held in custody or subject to a search, or the use of a criminal ground in place of a privatisation one, or extension to persons from the historical inner circle of the head of state. The cell is filled by the transfer of the asset, not by an established motive⁵⁷ Two or more members of the Forbes list lose control of their principal Russian asset within a year for a non-market reason: seizure, forced sale, transfer while in custody or under search, or the owner leaving the jurisdiction. The marker of non-market character is that the asset continues to operate and retains its value under the new owner; depreciation along with its sector does not count	The same loss of a principal asset for a non-market reason as at regional depth — for five or more members of the Forbes list within a year A public resignation by two or more people of nomenklatura rank — minister, deputy minister, governor, head of a state corporation Two or more federal officials failing to return, or refusing to return, within six months — minister, deputy minister, ambassador, governor, head or deputy head of a state corporation, a company with state participation or a federal agency — while still in post or immediately after leaving it. A criminal case opened after the departure does not refute the cell: the unsanctioned character of the exit is its substance Departure with no intention of returning by two or more public figures who systematically received state or quasi-state funding for supporting the official line	Seized private assets regularly pledged into the budget, transferred to state companies, or used as collateral for new financing instruments Control over property passing without a judicial or other legal act — two or more documented cases The redistribution of property continuing after a federal decision to end it Defections by federal officials continuing after restrictive measures have been introduced for the category — a travel ban, confiscation of passports, clearance requirements for trips

The circuits are connected, and the matrix does not conceal it. Filling in the supply circuit raises the probability of filling in the order circuit; so does filling in military organisation. The loss of external support acts on all circuits at once. The depth profile should not be read as five independent measurements: these are five cross-sections of one process, separated by type of payer rather than by cause.

Connections declared in advance: supply → order · military organisation → order · money → supply · supply → the bypass ladder. A neighbouring circuit filling in after the first is confirmation of the connection rather than an independent reading, and does not enter the speed assessment a second time.

Speed is measured only within a circuit — in months between entry into adjacent depths. A scalar figure of cells per quarter is not published: cells are not equidistant and are opened by gates of different kinds. The card-rationing cell is opened by a decision — overnight; battalion-scale desertion is opened by diffusion — over months and non-linearly; the freezing of a city of a million is opened by physics plus the season. Adding different gates into a single unit is equivalent to adding percentages and rungs. **Acceleration** is registered by comparing intervals within a circuit: if entry into depth 3 took less time than entry into depth 2, the circuit is accelerating. Intervals that cross the winter window, the pre-election window or a change in combat tempo are flagged, and without the flag do not enter the acceleration assessment.

The filling rule. A cell is filled only by a dated event with a named source; plausibility and reports without a primary source do not fill a cell. A cell records **burden on a balance, not the duration of an event**: the end of an episode does not empty the cell. Emptying is possible only when the balance itself is relieved, requires an explicit reasoned decision, and automatically creates an entry in the log of relieved balances. Depth 4 is determined only through a federal decision that has been applied and has not worked; the discontinuation of a statistical series does not set a depth — that is tracked in the Went dark log.

The baseline state at 1 Jan 2026. A list of constraints and burdens inherited from 2022–2025 and still in force. This is the background against which movement is measured, not a reading of the panel. No item forms a cell or enters the measurement of speed. **The list below shows that these cells do fill:** the count was reopened not because nothing happened earlier, but to separate movement from what was inherited. A small number of filled cells is a property of the first release and of the chosen calibration, not a property of the instrument.

Money	Restrictions on withdrawing foreign cash · restrictions on cross-border transfers · the mandatory sale of export earnings, in weakened form
Supply	The fuel market under administrative supervision; the petrol export ban used as a routine instrument
Elites	An operating regime of asset seizure through the courts
Budget	Defence and security spending at the level set in 2023–2025 · the liquid part of the NWF at the level left after the drawdowns of 2022–2024
External circuit	The external capital market closed entirely · exports to Europe wound down on pipeline routes

Markers of an approaching decision

observables that preceded decisions to stop

a list, not a ladder

The matrix measures the price of continuing. This list is about something else: what was observed immediately before decisions to stop, in cases where an authoritarian regime ended a war of its own accord and survived. Not a ladder and not depths: each line is simply marked observed or not observed. No ordering is established between the lines.

MARKER	STATE	WHERE IT COMES FROM
Public distancing by an external patron at a moment of crisis · energy purchases cut below the previous year’s level · refusal to supply components	not observed	Kosovo 1999 · Kargil 1999. The observables are in widget 2.5
Acknowledgement of a military stalemate in Russian public discourse above the level of bloggers	partly observed	Chechnya 1996 · Angola 1988 · Iran 1988 (where the leader’s public assent to ending the war was described as a decision harder to take than drinking poison). Observed: the chief economist of the state development corporation VEB.RF at a meeting of the Nikitsky Club on 21 May 2026 ⁵⁸ said that this war of attrition is a competition Russia will not win, and that the belief the other side will collapse is an illusion — it has not collapsed and will not. He was dismissed on 16 Aug 2026. ⁵⁹ The acknowledgement is partial: isolated statements, each punished, and the official line unchanged. The dismissal is itself a reading — breakdown below.
A legitimization event approaching	observed	Chechnya 1996 — the only case in which Russian authorities stopped a war by decision. A direct transfer is not warranted: a relatively competitive electoral order was in place then, and elections were capable of changing the decision. Today elections do not perform that function, and the electoral calendar can slow or soften decisions but not stop the war. In the present configuration the legitimization event is more likely to be something else: a deterioration in the leader’s health · a change in Beijing’s preferences · elites withdrawing support for the decision · the approach of military defeat, since for a leader who has become a wartime leader in fact, defeat means delegitimation, and the logic of such a leader requires stopping before it rather than after
A change in the upper bound of the threat, including declared removal of limits on range and on categories of weapons	partial	Kosovo 1999. In the present war this covers both the removal of limits on the range and categories of weapons transferred to Ukraine by its partners and Ukraine’s own production of long-range strike systems — that is, the widening circle of facilities on Russian territory that cease to count as unreachable and indestructible. The observables are the ladders in widget M.3
Discussion of the price of the war inside the elite reaching the public domain	observed	Afghanistan 1989 · Angola 1988. Observed: a public forecast of social crisis and of falling behind in technological and economic competition, made on behalf of a state development institution; more cautious remarks by the heads of the largest banks on the desirability of ending the war, without stating terms. Ambiguity of this kind was not previously permitted

A case breakdown: why the dismissal is more informative than the remarks. The remarks were made on 21 May 2026; The Moscow Times published them, Russian media picked the report up on 15 August, and the dismissal was carried out on 16 August — a Sunday⁵⁹. The reaction was not to the statement but to its circulation, with a response time of about a day, on a weekend: an emergency action rather than a personnel one. Cheaper options existed and were not taken — a clarification that he had been misunderstood, silence, a quiet departure months later — each cheaper because none confirms the significance of what was said; the most expensive and most visible option was chosen, so the cost of leaving him in post was judged higher than the cost of public confirmation. The issue is the subject matter, not the tone: deputy minister of economic development from 2008 to 2014 with responsibility for forecasting and budgeting, and chief economist of VEB since 2014, he spoke neither about crimes nor about politics but delivered a professional judgment on exactly the quantity this panel measures — whether the attrition calculation adds up. The regime tolerates a wide range of pessimism about the economy; it did not tolerate this judgment. Hence a second-order consequence more significant than the first: the boundary has been drawn around the calculation itself rather than around any assessment of its result, and inside the system it is no longer discussed aloud by those capable of performing it — **the regime bought silence at the cost of its own diagnostics**. This reading is not the only possible one: no reasons were officially given and they may have been different, with the May remarks serving as a pretext. The reading would be refuted by Klepach appearing in a post of comparable standing in the state or quasi-state sphere within six months, or by comparable public statements from officials of the same rank going without consequence.

The second marker is the political component removed from the definition of the red zone in the price-of-ground widget. Here it is in its proper place: not as a condition of a zone, which would make the scale controllable by the Russian side, but as a marker of an approaching decision, and the panel is under no obligation to wait for it. **The list is not a forecast and does not sum:** in the cases examined, a different number of markers proved sufficient each time, and none of them was necessary.

Separately: once lethal force has been used against unarmed participants, the absence of protests stops being a reading — it indicates the price of participation that has been reached, not calm.

The link to the headline parameters. The conversion counter counts the regime’s decisions — the input. The matrix counts observable consequences — the output. The divergence between them is a reading in its own right: many mechanisms spent with an empty matrix means conversion is working and the bill is still being paid by those who cannot yet answer in a way that changes the regime’s decisions; a filling matrix with an unchanged counter means the decisions have stopped holding the position. It is this pair, rather than any single number, that answers the question of how many decisions remain. The matrix does not enter the conversion counter and does not aggregate with it.

Calendar of resolving events

resolving events

dated and undated events

DATE	EVENT	WEIGHT
20 Sep 2026	State Duma elections — they explain the window on the expenditure ladder	high
11 Sep 2026	Bank of Russia board meeting	medium
late September	The Finance Ministry’s Q4 borrowing plan — will it acknowledge that the market is closed	high
by 1 Oct 2026	The draft 2027 budget; the inflation assumption inside it	high
1 Oct 2026	4% indexation of military pay against observed inflation of 15.1%	high
~9–10 Oct 2026	Nine-month execution — a check on the 10.8–11.5% forecast	medium
16 Sep and 7 Oct 2026	OFZ redemptions: issues 26219 and 26226, both fixed-coupon. After 7 Oct there are no redemptions until February 2027	medium
October–November	Three budget readings; the indexation decrees	conditional: high if rungs 3+ of the ladder are involved
October	The northern supply run and the start of the heating season — the diesel threshold	conditional: high if diesel data become available
December–January	Exhaustion of the Treasury cash balance against an operating range of ₺2.0–3.0 trn	high
December–February	The winter low in petrol demand — rung 3 or above persisting removes the seasonal explanation	high

DATE	EVENT	WEIGHT
~15–20 Jan 2027	Full-year execution — a check on the 11.5–12.5% forecast	high
1 Jan 2027	The 2027 budget, pension indexation, the minimum wage	medium
monthly	CBR: M2 and InFOM around the 20th · Finance Ministry: execution around mid-month · NWF around the 5th	—
weekly, Wednesday	OFZ auction day	—

7.2 Undated events undated events half the decisive events will never get a date

EVENT	MARKER TO WATCH FOR	WEIGHT
Quiet mobilisation	Rung 3 of the ladder: a real cut or a freeze in signing bonuses while the shortfall persists	high
An administrative measure on retail deposits	An open question on the banking branch	high
Resumption of OFZ auctions	Every Wednesday	high
An external loan	Thresholds from section 6.2: registration at ≥1% of GFN, recomputation of 1.1 at ≥5%, a change of zone at ≥20%	conditional on the threshold
A breach of the ladder order	A rung passed out of sequence	high
Rung 6 — new payments with an empty treasury	No source of funds	medium
Bank liabilities to the CBR reaching ₸8 trn	₸3.637 trn at end-2025 → ₸6.6 trn on 14 Aug 2026; a rate of +₸0.40 trn a month. If that holds, October–November 2026. If ₸1.5 trn of floaters are placed against repo, one to two months. The series is the operational one: Bank of Russia claims on credit institutions. The balance sheet line for CBR credit is unusable — at 1 Jan 2026 it was inflated by the annual repo peak of ₸5.08 trn	high
The deposit rate's reaction to the CBR decision of 11 Sep 2026	The key rate was cut to 14.00% on 24 Jul; the top-ten average maximum rate rose over the same period: 12.756% (third ten days of June) → 12.786 → 12.826 → 12.845 → 12.885% (first ten days of August). If the deposit rate again fails to fall after the September decision, a floor under the key rate is confirmed. Checked every ten days, with a two-week lag	high

Financing need and the capacity to close it appendix C.1 — mandatory disclosure page for widget 1.1 the first column argues against our own reading

On the size of its financing need and on the level of its debt, Russia is the best in the sample. The discriminating variable is not the size of the need but whether a channel exists to close it.

	GFN, % OF REVENUE	DEBT, % OF GDP	DEBT SERVICE, % OF REVENUE	MARKET OPEN	NON-RESIDENT SHARE	AVG. COST OF BORROWING	SHARE OF DEBT REPRICED WITHIN A YEAR
Russia	20–25% (H)	15.6% (H)	10.3% (H)	no, since 20 Jul 2026 (H)	~0 (about 35% before 2022)	14–16% (H)	~35% (M)
Italy	~40% (L)	138% (H)	7.7% (M)	yes	~25–30% (M)	~3% (M)	~15% (L)

	GFN, % OF REVENUE	DEBT, % OF GDP	DEBT SERVICE, % OF REVENUE	MARKET OPEN	NON-RESIDENT SHARE	AVG. COST OF BORROWING	SHARE OF DEBT REPRICED WITHIN A YEAR
France	~35% (L)	118% (H)	4.1% (M)	yes	~50% (M)	~2–3% (M)	~12% (L)
United States	>150% (L)	126% (H)	19% (M)	yes	~30% (M)	~3% (M)	~20–25% (L)
Japan	>120% (L)	204% (H)	6–8% (M)	yes, plus central bank purchases	~7% (M)	~1% (M)	~15% (L)

The letter in brackets describes the state of verification inside the project, not the reliability of the source. Debt to GDP, non-resident shares and the cost of borrowing are taken from published international statistics and marked H and M. The L marking remains where the figure has been reconstructed by the project: gross financing need for the United States and Japan, and the share of debt repriced within a year.

Russia has the smallest financing need relative to revenue and the smallest government debt in the whole sample — and is the only member of the sample that cannot close that need. The United States refinances a volume six to seven times larger relative to revenue, every year and without difficulty. So the question is not the size of the need. The question is whether a channel exists.

DIFFERENCE	CONTENT
Market access	Italy, France, the United States and Japan place debt weekly in deep, liquid markets. Russian auctions are suspended, and even the floater — an instrument that carries no interest rate risk for the buyer — failed to clear
External demand	In the comparison countries, between a quarter and a half of the debt is held by non-residents, so the need is met out of the rest of the world's savings. For Russia that channel is closed, and the entire need falls on the domestic base, which is at the same time the base financing the war
Price and structure	Sensitivity per unit of debt is roughly twice as high in Russia: the share of debt repriced within a year is about 35% against 12–25%. But the stock of debt relative to revenue is three to seven times smaller, so the effect of one rate step on the debt service to revenue ratio is smaller in Russia than in Italy or Japan . The Russian problem is not sensitivity to the step but the level of the rate — 14–16% against 1–3% — applied to new borrowing, and the absence of a market in which to place it. The structural gap has narrowed: the floating-rate OFZ share fell from 43% at end-2024 to 33% in July 2026, and did so passively — the absolute volume did not change

Contingent claims appendix A — contingent claims are routed, not added a stock, not a flow

The choice is not between paying and not paying — there is no source outside the state. The choice is between channels of realisation, and all of them already appear on the panel. Contingent claims are therefore not added to the need but routed into existing widgets. What enters the calculation is the part of an obligation for which a documented budget channel exists: interest rate subsidy, recapitalisation, a state guarantee against performance. An obligation without a channel is a claim, not an expenditure of the period.

OBLIGATION	SIZE	CHANNEL	WHERE IT LANDS
Russian Railways — servicing about ₺4 trn at 16–18%	Interest of ₺0.64–0.72 trn a year; only the gap not covered by tariff revenue enters, ₺0.3–0.8 trn (L)	Tariff → the consumer · recapitalisation → the budget · restructuring → the banks	1.4 · 1.1 · tier 3
The Social Fund — the gap between receipts and payments	about ₺2 trn (L)	An increase in the transfer	1.1 — a layer of the stack, not an addend

OBLIGATION	SIZE	CHANNEL	WHERE IT LANDS
The defence industry — bank credit	Rollover of ₹1.0 trn (0.8–1.4) plus net growth of ₹0.5 trn (0.3–0.7). The estimate is derived from the relation between profitability and the cost of debt at a rollover coefficient of 0.75; the implied principal falling due is about ₹1.33 trn	Restructuring → bank capital	tier 3
Regional obligations	Debt of ₹3.5 trn — a 15-year record; deficits of ₹1.9–2.0 trn	Budget loans replaced by commercial ones	tier 3 · a marker of rung 2

The transfer to the Social Fund is a line of federal expenditure and is already contained within it. Adding about ₹2 trn on top would produce double counting of the same class as adding transfers to regions. The layer of the stack is called the Social Fund transfer, not pensions.

Common errors appendix B — common errors

a checking frame

ERROR	WHY IT IS WRONG
Measuring debt service against GDP	Payment is made out of revenue. Substituting the denominator understates the burden by a factor of three to four: 1.7% of GDP against 10.3% of revenue
Using the deficit instead of the financing need	The deficit excludes redemptions and quasi-fiscal operations
Adjusting one side of the budget and not the other	A seasonal or inflation adjustment applied to revenue but not to expenditure systematically understates the deficit
Counting under-indexation as a source of saving	It yields goods rather than money; the fiscal effect is close to zero. Double counting arises if inflationary revenue growth is counted at the same time
Applying the sequestration proportions of 2015–2017	The protected core has tripled
Adding debt service to the deficit	It is already inside expenditure
Adding the accumulated debts of state companies to the annual deficit	A stock, not a flow
Adding the federal and regional deficits together	Transfers are already in federal expenditure
Treating the NWF as a non-issuance reserve	The mechanism of realisation is a sale to the central bank for rubles. Selling the same asset externally would, by contrast, sterilise
Measuring the depletion of reserves in rubles	The ruble figure moves with exchange rate revaluation and can rise while the tonnage falls
Subtracting an averaged damper	The series is non-linear and changes sign: in January–February 2026 the companies were paying the budget
Taking quarterly tax payments for an improving trend	The July 2026 spike in hydrocarbon revenue was a one-off quarterly profit-tax payment; without it the month would have shown a decline
Replacing InFOM with the GDP deflator as ‘methodologically correct’;	The GDP deflator is derived from the same Rosstat price observations; substituting one series from a source for another from the same source masks the problem

ERROR	WHY IT IS WRONG
Deflating a series by a figure derived from that series	A tautology: the conclusion is contained in the assumption
Taking a planned figure as an estimate of the outturn	A plan is a commitment by one party, not an observation. The nominal GDP forecast from the budget law cannot be used as a denominator for indicators measuring the actions of that same government
Dividing by GDP without naming the year	Ratios to 2025 GDP and to 2026 GDP differ by roughly 10%. A debt burden of 17.0% and one of 15.6% are the same debt on two different denominators
Reading the red zone as a forecast of collapse	The red zone means the balance is being covered by conversion, not that it is going uncovered
Analogies with Venezuela and Zimbabwe	Their hyperinflations were the monetisation of deficits of 15–20% of GDP with a ruined export base and dependence on food imports. The difference is one of class, not of degree
Treating the capacity of the banking system as a constraint on volume	No such constraint exists: the Bank of Russia is not limited in supplying rubles, sector capital is growing, and repo collateral capacity is not exhausted. The constraint lies in the price of the ruble and in who pays it

What the panel does not measure exogenous drivers quantities outside the frame

Quantities that move the panel from outside and are not measured by it. The list is published because without it a reader could take the panel for a closed model. **These are not recommendations:** the panel does not say what should be done about these quantities — it says that they are what determine its readings, and leaves the conclusions to the reader.

DRIVER	WHAT IT ACTS ON	WHY IT IS NOT MEASURED
The oil price	Oil and gas revenue, the deficit, the deflator of the export component, the GDP denominator — and through them five widgets	The most influential driver on the panel, and not one of its widgets: exogenous by construction
The political will of Ukraine's partners	Intensity of long-range strikes → the ladders in M.3 → the fuel circuit in 1.3 → the net share in 2.3	Outside the frame: the panel measures the Russian side
The regime's willingness to pay a political price	All ladders: the order and the speed at which rungs are passed	Maximum centrality at zero measurability. The panel calls it the central variable and does not measure it — there is nothing to measure it with; only signals can be observed, which is what the manifestation matrix and the list of markers of an approaching decision are for
Chinese decisions on price and volume	Terms of trade, forgone revenue, the negotiating position	Partly inside widget 2.5 as observed behaviour; intent is not measured and will not be
The speed of technological adaptation	Restoration of secondary refining units, catalyst substitution, air defence of facilities	No series exists. It determines the irreversibility on which ladder A of widget M.3 rests
Heating-season weather	The winter circuit in M.3, seasonal fuel demand, the timing of the northern supply run	Wholly exogenous

LAYER	CONTENT	FALSIFIER
Frame	War requires several mandatory resource balances to be covered without interruption	Practically none: this is an accounting identity, and that is its strength rather than its weakness
Assessment	Russia is approaching one of the bottlenecks that limit continuation of the war at current intensity; at lower intensity it would probably be unable to hold back Ukrainian pressure and would worsen its negotiating position	All three load-bearing replenishment balances at or above the level of need for six consecutive months without any strengthening of conversion mechanisms

Three departures from standard convention two departures from standard practice

In two places the panel counts differently from standard practice. Each departure is declared here rather than in a widget footnote, because each changes either the sign or the order of magnitude of the result.

WHERE	STANDARD CONVENTION	WHAT THE PANEL DOES	CONSEQUENCE
Financing need	Federal GFN: 20–25% of revenue, the best figure in the comparison set	CSC — the Consolidated State Claim: 40% of revenue	Both the order of magnitude and the object of measurement change: legal entity → system
The GDP denominator	The nominal GDP forecast from the budget law: ₪235.1 trn ¹	Reconstructed 2026 GDP: ₪231–236 trn, built up separately by deflator component. The planned figure is not used as a denominator: it embeds the government’s own assumptions about real growth and the deflator — precisely what the panel is testing	Ratios to GDP shift by roughly 2% and are kept out of the masthead entirely

A reader who rejects either departure can recompute the affected quantities: the underlying series and the recomputation rules are published. The departures are declared here so that disagreement can be specific rather than general.

Three summary figures that do not aggregate three summary figures that do not aggregate

The panel does not collapse its widgets into an index. The three summary quantities answer three different questions and do not aggregate with one another.

QUANTITY	QUESTION	WHAT IT MEASURES
CSC → 40% of revenue	How large the claim is	The scale of the task
7 of 12 known conversion mechanisms spent	How many moves have already been used	The regime’s decisions — the input
The manifestation matrix	How far the manifestation has gone	Observable consequences — the output

The first is a magnitude. The second is a counter of decisions. The third is a counter of consequences. The panel does not build an index combining them and will not: averaging heterogeneous scales conceals exactly the information the panel exists to show.

The ladder rule: the ordering of rungs the ladder rule

The ordering of the rungs is the one key place where the panel makes an unverifiable judgment. Every other key element is either observable or derived from something observable by a published rule. The ordering, by contrast, is built on the sensitivity of the payer, and sensitivity has not been measured: it is inferred from the literature on the political economy of authoritarian regimes, from historical cases of fiscal consolidation under military load, and from the sequence of decisions the Russian government has already taken between 2022 and 2026. The ordering was checked for consistency against those sources and discussed with a number of specialists.

It remains a judgment, and it is declared as one. The panel can be rebuilt on a reasoned proposal to reorder the rungs, taking account of the specifics of the Russian case and of the panel’s purpose. Reordering does not invalidate the construction: the ladder remains a way of asking who pays for the next step, even if the answer to the question of order is corrected.

The distinction the panel draws: exhaustion of the economy versus exhaustion of the capacity to attack two different quantities a distinction, not a refusal

A mistake made constantly: survival in poverty is taken for the capacity to wage war.

Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Venezuela show that a regime can persist for decades with a ruined economy and not change. From this it is concluded that Russia too can fight for as long as its population will tolerate a deteriorating economy and deteriorating conditions of life. That substitutes one proposition for another, and it is wrong for one reason: **the adversary of those regimes was sanctions, not an army.**

Sanctions do not take territory, do not destroy facilities at a measurable rate, and set no deadline; they can be waited out. Against a comparable adversary, waiting is not neutral: a front that does not move hands the initiative to the other side, worsens the negotiating position and devalues what was taken by force — while the adversary builds up its technological capability and its allies rearm. **Time works in opposite directions in these two constructions.**

The panel draws the distinction explicitly: **exhaustion of the economy and exhaustion of the capacity to attack are different quantities on different timescales.** The panel measures the second, and the first only to the extent that it pays for the second.

The observable that separates the two propositions is the price of a kilometre in widget [M.2](#). **A regime that could simply do nothing at little cost to itself does not pay 845 casualties per square kilometre.** A regime that does pay has made a bet and is not revisiting it.

Stated refusals stated refusals on the panel, not in the footnotes

The donor channel	The panel measures one of two clocks. One of the central questions of this body of work is which comes first: the breakdown of the monetary channel in Russia or the breakdown of the donor channel in Europe. Only the first is measured here. The second is left unmeasured deliberately.
A Ukrainian panel	The absence of Ukrainian indicators is not a gap but a consequence of the asymmetry of the subject. The panel’s indicators are built for an aggressor: they ask whether continuing pays and what it costs — and that is the question facing whoever decides whether to press on with an unprovoked aggression. For a defender the calculation is different. Defence can pay off — in territory, reparations, alliances, in the very existence of the state twenty years on — but it almost never pays off in the same account and over the same horizon in which the attacker counts. And when the aggressor starts with superior forces, and its leadership denies the existence of the defending state and people, the defender’s payback calculation degenerates: any result of it leads to capitulation, because the alternative to defending is not saving money but losing everything. The aggressor chooses whether to continue; the defender has no choice but to defend. It does not follow that the defender is an object: a substantial part of what the panel measures on the Russian side was produced by Ukrainian decisions and Ukrainian means, including long-range systems of Ukraine’s own design — and widgets M.1, M.2 and M.3 are to a large extent a record of the results of those decisions: the losses that make up manpower reproduction, the price of ground, and the depth of strikes into the rear are all produced by Ukrainian action. The panel does not measure the Ukrainian side not because there is nothing to measure there, but because its question is addressed to whoever decides whether to continue the war. A symmetrical panel is separate work with a different structure and different questions.

The resilience of the banking system	The panel keeps no separate indicator of the condition of banks, and that is a decision rather than a gap. A bank here is not an entity but a transmission link between the depositor and the state perimeter: what is measured is the transmission, not the link. Separately from that: no liquidity crisis and no run on deposits is currently observed, and none is forecast on the horizon of the available leading indicators. Capital adequacy rose to 14.1% at 1 Jul 2026 on preliminary data ⁶⁰ , the CMASF composite indicator of deposit-run risk is close to zero, and foreign currency holdings are about 4.5% of household deposits, an all-time low. The panel measures something else: at what price the banking system is prepared to absorb government debt. Two pressures are observed — the cost of bank funding relative to the key rate, and the premium of long OFZ over short government debt. Both rising together means the state has to pay more both to secure bank liabilities and to have long-dated sovereign risk taken on; both compressing together means the channel is recovering.
A front-line panel	Drone counts, advances, equipment losses and interception statistics are the province of ISW, DeepState and other professional sources. The military group contains three quantities, and only because they enter the financial calculation.
The limits of the list of balances	The list of balances tracked is not complete. Not measured: the material balance of weapons and munitions; sub-threshold operations against Ukraine and its partners.
Reconstitution	The panel measures the need at the current intensity of combat. The need after a ceasefire — reconstitution and force build-up — is not measured here.

The panel measures Russian endurance, not the probability that Russia wins or achieves its war aims.
No conclusion about Russian endurance relative to Ukraine, or relative to Europe, can be drawn from this panel alone.

Convertibility convertibility

a standing statement of the panel

What the panel asserts. War requires several mandatory resource balances to be covered without interruption. Russia is covering all of them — and covering them by means each of which has a payer and a finite number of uses.

The concession without which none of this reads correctly. No indicator here predicts immediate collapse. A red zone means the balance is being covered by conversion, not that it is going uncovered. The panel should not be read as a forecast that the war stops because the budget runs out of money: it stops when the regime is left with no conversion of available resources into the continuation of the war that it finds acceptable. Nor should the regime be expected to stop short of extreme measures, so long as those measures do not threaten the survival of the regime itself.

It does not follow that there are no constraints. Conversion moves the burden between balances; it does not remove it. The Kremlin can shift a constraint; lifting it is another matter. In roughly half the cases the shift is irreversible: an asset sold does not come back, a destroyed catalytic cracker takes eighteen months to restore, and a person spent is never restored at all. Each successive level costs more than the last.

And every way around has one exit. Print money, place debt under compulsion, cut spending, seize an asset, take a person without announcing it — each of these decisions passes through the price of the ruble and pushes it higher. This constraint differs from the others in that **it cannot be lifted by a decision, because it is itself the sum of the decisions taken.** It cannot be gone around, because it is where all the ways around come out.

The bill moves in one direction. So far it has been presented to those who cannot answer back: poor regions, future generations, the long-run economy. Each successive decision moves the bill closer to those the regime rests on — to depositors, to pensioners, to the cities, to the coercive apparatus, to the recruitment mechanism itself.

Movement in the opposite direction has not been observed once: the bill does not return to those who have already paid, and the panel records no relieved balances.

A willingness to pay any price is not an objection to this panel but its central variable: it holds precisely for as long as the price is paid by someone else. **The panel measures how many decisions remain, who pays for the next one, and what the previous ones cost.**

Zones zones defined by method of coverage method of coverage, not severity of position

ZONE	DEFINITION
 Green	Replenishment covers the need without exceptional adaptation
 Yellow	Routine adaptation is required
 Orange	Non-routine substitution or conversion is required
 Red	Sustaining the current tempo of the war requires compulsory, monetary or externally dependent conversion — or the balance is not covered at all

The definition of the red zone shows directly why it is not a prediction of collapse: red means covered by conversion, not uncovered. The green zone deliberately carries no horizon: the panel is issued as dated snapshots, and the horizon is set by the release date rather than by the text of a widget.

Partial passage of a rung partial passage the rule for ordinal scales

A rung on an ordinal scale has three states, not two. **Passed** — the observable action occurred in full; the zone is set by it. **Partly passed** (⚡) — the action is observed at limited coverage or in an unacknowledged form; what is observed and how far it extends are listed; **it does not count toward the zone. Not passed.** Partial passage is itself a dateable observable fact and always precedes full passage. Without this state the ladder lags reality systematically, showing an early rung while elements of a later one are already operating; the zone does not move, so the panel does not begin to overstate — it merely stops concealing.

What you can send how to contribute criteria published in advance

Some ladders and cells are empty not because the events did not occur but because the author has not collected them. The criteria for filling them are published in advance and are the same for the author and for anyone sending material: **a dated event with a named primary source.** Plausibility, second-hand accounts and reports without a source do not fill a cell.

WHERE IT IS MISSING	WHAT WOULD CLOSE IT
Ladder C of widget M.3, rungs 4–6	Dated strikes in Moscow oblast, on missile production plants, on military command bodies, on strategic-level facilities — with satellite or ground confirmation
Ladder D of widget M.3	Rolling blackouts and restrictions on heat supply, with settlement and date, from the start of the heating season
Limit matrix, circuits II, III, V, VI	Dated events inside the window from 1 Jan 2026, against the criteria given in the cells
Rung 6 of ladder A	A monthly comparison of the rate of damage against the rate of capacity restoration; the state of the tank farm
A monthly series of refining capacity taken offline	A series with a disclosed method of calculation: point estimates exist, but none discloses its algorithm in the public part

A series on the share of term deposits against the real rate

Monthly from Jan 2023, on two deflators

Objections are accepted on the same footing as data. Falsification conditions are published for every widget; an observation that refutes any one of them enters the log of relieved balances automatically. The ordering of the rungs is the one key place where the panel makes an unverifiable judgment, and it can be rebuilt on a reasoned proposal.

Sources

sources

60 entries

Numbered in order of first appearance on the panel. A link is given where it has been verified; otherwise the document in which the figure can be found is named.

1. **Federal law on the federal budget for 2026 and the planning period 2027–2028** — Signed 2 Dec 2025 ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
revenue ₹40,283.3 bn · expenditure ₹44,069.7 bn · deficit ₹3,786 bn · GDP ₹235,067 bn · national defence ₹12.93 trn · national security ₹3.91 trn
2. **Statements by the management of the state corporation Rostec** — On the profitability of state defence order contracts ↩
about 2%; the cost of borrowed funds is several times higher
3. **Russian Finance Ministry** — Monthly operational data on federal budget execution, January–July 2026 ↩1 ↩2
revenue ₹22,112 bn, expenditure ₹28,567 bn, deficit ₹6,455 bn

OPEN ↗ minfin.gov.ru (HTTPS://MINFIN.GOV.RU/RU/STATISTICS/FEDBUD/EXECUTE/)
4. **Russian Finance Ministry** — Operational data on hydrocarbon revenue, July 2026 ↩
₹4,594.7 bn against a base level of ₹4,467 bn

OPEN ↗ minfin.gov.ru (HTTPS://MINFIN.GOV.RU/RU/STATISTICS/FEDBUD/)
5. **Bank of Russia** — Board decision on the key rate, 19 Dec 2025 ↩
a cut to 16.00% — the level at the opening of the observation window on 1 Jan 2026

OPEN ↗ cbr.ru (HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/HD_BASE/KEYRATE/)
6. **Bank of Russia** — Banking sector liquidity and the money market ↩
bank liabilities to the CBR ₹6.6 trn at 14 Aug 2026 against ₹3.637 trn at end-2025; structural deficit ₹2.7 trn

OPEN ↗ cbr.ru (HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/HD_BASE/BLIQUIDITY/)
7. **Russian Finance Ministry** — Registration of floating-rate OFZ issues 29030 and 29031, 23 Jul 2026; admission to the top listing tier, 28 Jul 2026 ↩
₹1.5 trn
8. **Bank of Russia** — Monitoring of maximum deposit rates at ten banks, first ten days of August 2026 ↩1 ↩2
12.89%

OPEN ↗ cbr.ru (HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/STATISTICS/AVGPROCSTAV/)
9. **InFOM, commissioned by the Bank of Russia** — Inflation expectations and consumer sentiment, July 2026 ↩1 ↩2
observed 15.1%, expected 14.7%

OPEN ↗ cbr.ru (HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/ANALYTICS/DKP/INFLATIONARY_EXPECTATIONS/)
10. **Bank of Russia** — Banking sector review ↩
outflow into cash ₹643.4 bn in July; household term deposits at 34.0% of M2

11. **Financial Times · Reuters** — Reporting on strikes against oil refineries, July 2026 ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
no fewer than 194 strikes in the first half of the year; 24 of the 33 largest plants affected; petrol output covers about 65% of seasonal demand
12. **Decrees of the Government of the Russian Federation** — No. 819 of 2 Jul 2026 and No. 976 of 5 Aug 2026, lowering motor fuel quality requirements ↩
Euro-3 until 31 Dec 2026, then Euro-2/3/4/5 and diesel until 1 Jul 2027; the additive share raised from 10% to 20% and blending rights extended to fuel depots
13. **Bank of Russia** — Board decision on the key rate, 24 Jul 2026 ↩
14.00%
[OPEN ↗ cbr.ru \(HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/HD_BASE/KEYRATE/\)](#)
14. **Rosstat** — Consumer price index, July 2026 ↩
5.91% year on year
[OPEN ↗ rosstat.gov.ru \(HTTPS://ROSSTAT.GOV.RU/STATISTICS/PRICE\)](#)
15. **International Monetary Fund** — World Economic Outlook, April 2026 ↩
general government debt to GDP: Japan 204%, Italy 138%, the United States 126%, France 118%, China 107%
[OPEN ↗ imf.org \(HTTPS://WWW.IMF.ORG/EN/PUBLICATIONS/WEO\)](#)
16. **Russian Finance Ministry** — Auction schedule and borrowing plan for Q3 2026 ↩
₽1.5 trn
[OPEN ↗ minfin.gov.ru \(HTTPS://MINFIN.GOV.RU/RU/STATISTICS/\)](#)
17. **Russian Finance Ministry** — Results of OFZ placement auctions ↩1 ↩2
1 Jul 2026: ₽10.4 bn placed at 14.96%; subsequent auctions failed
[OPEN ↗ minfin.gov.ru \(HTTPS://MINFIN.GOV.RU/RU/STATISTICS/\)](#)
18. **Janis Kluge** — Reconstruction of contract signing payments and estimate of recruitment ↩
signing bonuses ₽1.47 → ₽1.65 mn; 71,200 recruited in Q1 2026
[OPEN ↗ swp-berlin.org \(HTTPS://WWW.SWP-BERLIN.ORG/EN/RESEARCHER/JANIS-KLUGE\)](#)
19. **General Administration of Customs of China · industry reviews** — Pipeline gas import prices ↩
\$258.8 against \$390 per thousand cubic metres
20. **Bank of Russia** — International reserves, monthly tonnage ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
2,277 t at 1 Aug 2026; 49.7 t sold over January-July
[OPEN ↗ cbr.ru \(HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/HD_BASE/MRRF/\)](#)
21. **World Gold Council** — Gold Demand Trends, Q2 2026, published 30 Jul 2026 ↩1 ↩2
central bank net purchases 289 t — a record for a second quarter; the Q1 estimate revised from 244 to 57 t; the Bank of Russia the only sizeable seller of the quarter, 21.77 t against 4.23 t for Turkey
[OPEN ↗ gold.org \(HTTPS://WWW.GOLD.ORG/GOLDHUB/RESEARCH/GOLD-DEMAND-TRENDS/GOLD-DEMAND-TRENDS-Q2-2026/CENTRAL-BANKS\)](#)
22. **World Gold Council** — Gold Demand Trends, full year 2025 ↩
the Bank of Russia sold 6 t over 2025 and was one of four sellers alongside Singapore (15 t), the Bundesbank (1 t) and Jordan (1 t)
[OPEN ↗ gold.org \(HTTPS://WWW.GOLD.ORG/GOLDHUB/RESEARCH/GOLD-DEMAND-TRENDS/GOLD-DEMAND-TRENDS-FULL-YEAR-2025/CENTRAL-BANKS\)](#)

23. **General Administration of Customs of China** — Exports to Russia ↗
H1 2026 — \$60.6 bn
[OPEN](#) ↗ english.customs.gov.cn ([HTTP://ENGLISH.CUSTOMS.GOV.CN/](http://ENGLISH.CUSTOMS.GOV.CN/))
24. **National Bureau of Statistics of China** — Net margin, motor vehicle manufacturing ↗
3.2% in Q1 2026 against 7.8% in 2017
[OPEN](#) ↗ [stats.gov.cn](https://www.stats.gov.cn) ([HTTPS://WWW.STATS.GOV.CN/ENGLISH/](https://WWW.STATS.GOV.CN/ENGLISH/))
25. **MERICs** — China-Russia Dashboard ↗
discount on Russian crude, cumulative saving to the buyer
[OPEN](#) ↗ meric.org ([HTTPS://MERICS.ORG/EN/TRACK/CHINA-RUSSIA-DASHBOARD](https://MERICS.ORG/EN/TRACK/CHINA-RUSSIA-DASHBOARD))
26. **Swiss National Bank** — Gold sales — lessons and experiences ↗
a 1,300 t programme stretched over about five years, annual quotas mostly 120-284 t
27. **Central Bank Gold Agreements** — European central bank gold agreements, 1999-2019 ↗
a combined ceiling on official sales of 400-500 t a year; 400 t a year for 2009-2014
28. **International Monetary Fund** — Gold sales — FAQ ↗¹ ↗²
a 403.3 t programme: 212 t sold directly to official holders, the remaining 191.3 t phased onto the market; the principle of not disrupting the market to the detriment of gold holders, producers and market functioning
29. **South China Morning Post** — Power of Siberia 2 negotiations, 9 Sep 2026 ↗
talks stalled on price; Beijing is pressing for a level comparable with the subsidised Russian domestic market
30. **UN Comtrade** — Bilateral exports to Russia, 2024 ↗
Turkey \$8.56 bn, India \$4.84 bn
[OPEN](#) ↗ comtradeplus.un.org ([HTTPS://COMTRADEPLUS.UN.ORG/](https://COMTRADEPLUS.UN.ORG/))
31. **Institute for the Study of War** — Daily assessments and mapping ↗
confirmed advance of 37.85 km² in July 2026
[OPEN](#) ↗ [understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org) ([HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG](https://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG))
32. **H. Heer, K. Naumann (2000) · Imperial War Museums · Encyclopædia Britannica** — Estimates of losses at the Battle of Verdun, 21 Feb — 18 Dec 1916 ↗
302 days; French losses 377,231, German 337,000, total 714,231 — an average of 70,000 a month across both sides; about 300,000 killed; by December the French positions had returned roughly to where they began
[OPEN](#) ↗ [iwm.org.uk](https://www.iwm.org.uk) ([HTTPS://WWW.IWM.ORG.UK/HISTORY/WHAT-WAS-THE-BATTLE-OF-VERDUN](https://WWW.IWM.ORG.UK/HISTORY/WHAT-WAS-THE-BATTLE-OF-VERDUN))
33. **G. F. Krivosheev (ed.)** — Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: losses of the armed forces. A statistical study ↗
the Belgorod–Kharkov strategic offensive operation Rumyantsev, 3–23 Aug 1943: duration 21 days, initial strength 1,144,000, irrecoverable losses 71,611 (6.2%), sick and wounded 183,955, total 255,566, daily average 12,170; frontage 300–400 km, depth of advance 140 km. The area liberated is absent from the source and has been derived from these parameters at its lower bound — confidence M
[OPEN](#) ↗ statehistory.ru ([HTTPS://STATEHISTORY.RU/BOOKS/POD-RED--G-F--KRIVOSHEEVA_ROSSIYA-I-SSSR-V-VOYNAKH-XX-VEKA--STATISTICHESKOE-ISSLEDOVANIE/28](https://STATEHISTORY.RU/BOOKS/POD-RED--G-F--KRIVOSHEEVA_ROSSIYA-I-SSSR-V-VOYNAKH-XX-VEKA--STATISTICHESKOE-ISSLEDOVANIE/28))
34. **Institute for the Study of War** — Estimates of the rate of advance, January — August 2026 ↗
622.60 km² of advance and infiltration in the first half of 2026 against 2,189.87 km² taken in the first half of 2025; July 2026 — 37.85 km² of advance and 121.56 km² including infiltration
[OPEN](#) ↗ [criticalthreats.org](https://www.criticalthreats.org) ([HTTPS://WWW.CRITICALTHREATS.ORG/ANALYSIS/RUSSIAN-OFFENSIVE-CAMPAIGN-ASSESSMENT-AUGUST-1-2026](https://WWW.CRITICALTHREATS.ORG/ANALYSIS/RUSSIAN-OFFENSIVE-CAMPAIGN-ASSESSMENT-AUGUST-1-2026))

35. **Energy Intelligence** — Russian Refining: Drones Knock Out One-Third of Primary Capacity, 11 Jun 2026 — Gary Peach, editor John van Schaik ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
2.14 mn bbl/day of primary refining capacity taken out of service — almost a third of the Russian total. Separately: actual refining in the first week of June 2026 fell below 4 mn bbl/day, a 21-year low. The metric is unambiguously defined as primary capacity, not actual utilisation and not the nameplate capacity of every plant ever attacked; the calculation method is not disclosed in the public part of the piece
[OPEN](#) ↗ [energyintel.com](https://www.energyintel.com) (HTTPS://WWW.ENERGYINTEL.COM/0000019E-B282-DF4C-A5DF-B6DE49900000)
36. **Meduza · Reuters** — Attacks on Russia's largest refineries, 29 Jun — 7 Jul 2026 ↩1 ↩2
on 29 Jun Meduza listed the Omsk refinery and the Angarsk petrochemical company as unattacked, then corrected the piece: Angarsk is not among the ten largest by installed capacity. On 6 Jul the Omsk refinery was attacked — leaving no plant in the top ten never attacked. On 7 Jul Reuters confirmed refining had stopped: a primary unit accounting for about 38% of the plant's capacity was damaged, and a second at about 37% was shut down because of damage to connected networks and could be restarted comparatively quickly
[OPEN](#) ↗ meduza.io (HTTPS://MEDUZA.IO/SHORT/2026/07/06/V-TOP-10-ROSSIYSKIH-NPZ-BOLSHE-NE-OSTALOS-ZAVODOV-NE-TRONUTYH-UKRAIN0Y-SPISOK)
37. **Baltic Exchange · S&P Global Commodity Insights · Reuters · Baird Maritime · Seatrade** — Freight rates and shipowner behaviour on Black Sea routes, June — August 2026 ↩
CPC/Novorossiysk WS230 (mid-June) → WS530 (10 Aug 2026); TCE Novorossiysk–Vadinar \$262,000/day on 3 Aug → \$439,000 on 7 Aug; shipowners declining Russian Black Sea ports
38. **The Insurer · Russian National Reinsurance Company** — War risk insurance rates and state reinsurance, December 2025 — August 2026 ↩
0.6–0.8% of vessel value → 1% in January → above 1% by 21 Jul, and around 1.5% per voyage with some brokers; on 6 Aug 2026 the RNRC set 1% of hull value for the first seven days in the dangerous areas of the Azov and Black Seas
39. **SovEcon · Reuters · Delo Group** — Condition of grain and oil terminals in the Azov–Black Sea basin, July — August 2026 ↩
less than 10% of the basin's grain export capacity operating by 13 Aug; NZT, NKHP and KSK halted, about 26.1 mn tonnes a year between them; the August wheat export forecast is 2.2 mn tonnes against 4.5 mn a year earlier; oil shipments through Novorossiysk 0.8–1.0 → about 0.4 mn bbl/day
40. **Ukrainian General Staff · OSINT verification** — Strikes on the Alabuga special economic zone, 2024–2025 ↩
damage to the final assembly workshop confirmed; distance 1,054 km
41. **St Petersburg city government · Reuters · Naval News · Vantor via the Skhemy project · OSW** — Strikes on Kronstadt, 3 and 6 June 2026 ↩
the governor officially acknowledged damage to facilities; Reuters geolocated the video and identified the Project 20380 corvette Boiky; Vantor satellite imagery of 3 Jun shows a fire being extinguished on board; Naval News reports no fewer than two hits amidships
42. **Ukrainian General Staff · Ukrainian Defence Ministry · OSINT verification** — Reports of strikes on facilities in Russia, December 2025 — August 2026 ↩
military production plants, arsenals, airfields, offshore platforms, oil depots; the list is incomplete and is given as a lower bound
43. **Ukrainian General Staff · Bloomberg · The Moscow Times** — Strikes on Lukoil fixed platforms in the Caspian Sea, December 2025 — April 2026 ↩
the Filanovsky, Korchagin and Grayfer platforms; no fewer than four episodes; production processes halted at Korchagin
44. **Reuters · Meduza** — Strikes on the Moscow refinery at Kapotnya, 16 and 18 June 2026 ↩
both primary distillation units knocked out; repairs of at least six months
45. **Novaya Gazeta Europe** — Ukrainian strikes have halted Russian capacity producing up to 44% of diesel and 41% of petrol, 17 Jun 2026 — Denis Morokhin ↩
the publication's own calculation: 13 plants halted wholly or partly with combined capacity of about 109 mn tonnes of crude a year, potential output of about 17.3 mn tonnes of petrol and 37.1 mn tonnes of diesel — roughly 40% of refining, up to 41% of petrol and up to 44% of diesel. The publication notes that the exact utilisation of some plants is unknown
[OPEN](#) ↗ novayagazeta.eu (HTTPS://NOVAYAGAZETA.EU/AMP/ARTICLES/2026/06/17/POSLE-UKRAINSKIKH-UDAROV-PO-NPZ-V-ROSSII-OSTANOVLENY-MOSHCHNOSTI-PROIZVODIASHCHIE-DO-44-DIZELNOGO-TOPLIVA-I-41-BENZINA-NEW)
46. **Federal law No. 256-FZ of 21 Jul 2011 · Russian Finance Ministry** — Articles 12 and 16 of the law on the security of energy facilities; tax policy department letter No. 03-03-06/1/77457 of 11 Aug 2025 ↩
security measures at energy facilities financed out of the energy companies' own funds; the costs deductible against profit tax and the equipment depreciated

47. **Federal law No. 58-FZ of 23 Mar 2026** — On amendments to the federal law on weapons and to related legislation ↗
combat small arms issued for temporary use to certain private security companies to counter UAVs for the duration of the operation; passed by the Duma 11 Mar 2026 and approved by the Federation Council 18 Mar 2026
[OPEN](#) ↗ government.ru ([HTTP://GOVERNMENT.RU/DOCS/ALL/163900/](http://GOVERNMENT.RU/DOCS/ALL/163900/))
48. **Rosstat / Russian Energy Ministry** — Discontinuation of published data on petroleum product output ↗1 ↗2
petrol closed 29 May 2024; diesel and other petroleum products in August 2024; last data June 2024
49. **Bank of Russia** — Bank of Russia claims on credit institutions under repo operations, at 18 Aug 2026 ↗
₽5,244.1 bn, entirely through the main auction
[OPEN](#) ↗ cbr.ru ([HTTPS://CBR.RU/HD_BASE/REPO_DEBT/](https://CBR.RU/HD_BASE/REPO_DEBT/))
50. **Russian Finance Ministry** — Domestic and external state debt of the Russian Federation at 1 Jun 2026 ↗
₽36.8 trn
51. **Russian Finance Ministry** — State debt of the regions of the Russian Federation ↗
₽3.5 trn
52. **Government of the Russian Federation · State Duma legislative database** — Bill No. 1322096-8, introduced 20 Aug 2026 ↗
administrative liability for failing to comply with decisions of a regional head or of an operational headquarters; the object of the offence includes the conduct of mobilisation measures
[OPEN](#) ↗ [interfax.ru](https://www.interfax.ru) ([HTTPS://WWW.INTERFAX.RU/RUSSIA/1110393](https://WWW.INTERFAX.RU/RUSSIA/1110393))
53. **UN World Food Programme · EFE · Cubadebate** — The first appeal in its history by the Cuban government to the WFP for help purchasing powdered milk for children under seven, 2024 ↗
the appeal was received by the WFP and confirmed by Cubadebate on 4 Mar 2024; the first consignment was 375 tonnes from Brazil. In February 2024, for want of wheat, the subsidised bread ration was cut by 25%, from 80 to 60 grams
54. **Audit Chamber · Prosecutor General's Office · The Bell · Novaya Gazeta** — Realisation of property transferred to state ownership; Prosecutor General's Office board meeting, May 2026 ↗
the share successfully sold does not exceed 8% of the volume seized; estimates of the volume diverge sharply: up to ₽6.5 trn on The Bell's count against around ₽100 bn on Audit Chamber figures
[OPEN](#) ↗ novayagazeta.ru ([HTTPS://NOVAYAGAZETA.RU/ARTICLES/2026/05/26/IZIATOE-S-IZIANAMI](https://NOVAYAGAZETA.RU/ARTICLES/2026/05/26/IZIATOE-S-IZIANAMI))
55. **Government of Irkutsk oblast · summaries of regional restrictions** — Statement by the head of Irkutsk oblast on moving fuel supply to manual control, 24 Jun 2026 ↗
the priority recipients were named: emergency services, public transport, agricultural machinery. At the same time restrictions on fuel sales were in force in more than 60 regions; Oryol oblast introduced sales by the parity of the plate number
[OPEN](#) ↗ finance.mail.ru ([HTTPS://FINANCE.MAIL.RU/ARTICLE/30-LITROV-NA-AVTO-V-KAKIH-REGIONAH-VVELI-OGRANICHENIYA-IZ-ZA-TOPLIVNOGO-KRIZISA-69214349/](https://FINANCE.MAIL.RU/ARTICLE/30-LITROV-NA-AVTO-V-KAKIH-REGIONAH-VVELI-OGRANICHENIYA-IZ-ZA-TOPLIVNOGO-KRIZISA-69214349/))
56. **Rospotrebnadzor of Tyumen oblast · Radio Liberty · Novaya Gazeta Europe** — Tap water quality in Tyumen, July 2026 ↗
from 16 Jul monitoring moved to a daily regime, and on 23 Jul residents were advised to use bottled water; the authorities acknowledged that the treatment works at the Metelevsky intake cannot remove the odour, while declaring the water compliant with safety norms. No tanker deliveries were organised and tariff charges continued. The city is a regional capital of about 850,000
[OPEN](#) ↗ [svoboda.org](https://www.svoboda.org) ([HTTPS://WWW.SVOBODA.ORG/A/IZ-KRANA-PAHNET-FEKALIYAMI-RYBA-V-REKE-GNIET-CHTO-PROISHODIT-V-TYUMENI/33816055.HTML](https://WWW.SVOBODA.ORG/A/IZ-KRANA-PAHNET-FEKALIYAMI-RYBA-V-REKE-GNIET-CHTO-PROISHODIT-V-TYUMENI/33816055.HTML))
57. **Fontanka · Radio Liberty · The Moscow Times** — The detention of Ilya Traber and searches of Gennady Petrov, 17 Jun 2026; transfer of business assets from pre-trial detention, 17 Jul 2026 ↗1 ↗2
the detention was carried out by FSB central headquarters; the ground was a 2020 murder case rather than privatisation claims. The panel records the transfer of the asset; the motive is not established. The St Petersburg Oil Terminal, previously controlled by the subject, was nationalised on a Prosecutor General's claim in 2025
[OPEN](#) ↗ ru.themoscowtimes.com ([HTTPS://RU.THEMOSCOWTIMES.COM/2026/07/17/BLIZKII-K-PUTINU-KRIMINALNII-AVTORITET-IZ-PETERBURGA-SDAL-BIZNES-AKTIVI-POSLE-POSADKI-V-SIZO-A201136](https://RU.THEMOSCOWTIMES.COM/2026/07/17/BLIZKII-K-PUTINU-KRIMINALNII-AVTORITET-IZ-PETERBURGA-SDAL-BIZNES-AKTIVI-POSLE-POSADKI-V-SIZO-A201136))
58. **Nikitsky Club of the Moscow Exchange · The Bell** — Remarks by the chief economist of VEB.RF on 21 May 2026 and his dismissal on 16 Aug 2026 ↗
that this war of attrition is a competition Russia will not win

59. **Vedomosti · Kommersant · The Bell** — Andrei Klepach’s departure from the post of chief economist at VEB.RF, 16 Aug 2026 ↗1 ↗2

VEB.RF confirmed the departure and named a successor, and did not comment on the reasons; the dismissal was carried out on a Sunday after Russian media picked up a report by The Moscow Times

OPEN ↗ vedomosti.ru (HTTPS://WWW.VEDOMOSTI.RU/FINANCE/NEWS/2026/08/16/1221476-KLEPACH-USHEL-S-DOLZHNOSTI)

60. **Bank of Russia** — On the development of the Russian banking sector in June 2026, July 2026 issue ↗

the total capital adequacy ratio N1.0 rose 0.2 pp in June to 14.1% on preliminary data; the cause is capital growing faster (+2.0%, reflecting retained profit) than risk-weighted assets (+0.7%). Reporting date 1 Jul 2026

OPEN ↗ cbr.ru (HTTPS://WWW.CBR.RU/COLLECTION/COLLECTION/FILE/62167/RAZV_BS_26_06.PDF)

Falsifier of the assessment. The assessment is withdrawn if all three load-bearing replenishment balances hold at or above the level of need for six consecutive months **without any strengthening of conversion mechanisms**. The second half of the condition is essential: without it the assessment could be refuted simply by paying more. Strengthened conversion is itself observable and is recorded in section 8 and in the Conversion log.

green yellow orange red no data H — established fact from a primary source M — derived estimate or calculation from published data

L — estimate with a wide interval or a single source

Staleness rule: a value more than 62 days older than the anchor date of 21 Aug 2026 — two missed expected updates — automatically loses its zone colour and is shown in grey marked “needs checking”. The threshold equals two missed monthly publications and is tied to the release frequency of the source rather than chosen as a round number. The rule is applied by the machine rather than the editor, and admits no exceptions.

v2.0 · data as of 21 Aug 2026 · next revision after 20 Sep 2026

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